Il Barbarigo en Nettuno y Roma 1944.

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Hello to all ; salvaging some history.....................

Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

Origin.

It was created in November 1943, initially in the San Bartolomeo barracks in La Spezia, as the "Maestrale" Battalion and later assumed the name "Barbarigo", in memory of the homonymous submarine of Commander Enzo Grossi, silver medalist for military valor. It was the first Marine Infantry unit of the "Decima" division.

Four Companies were organized, the 2nd and 4th had trained in San Bartolomeo, while the 1st and 3rd had been transferred for training to Cuneo, to the San Dalmazzo barracks. In mid-February 1944, the battalion reassembled at La Spezia under the command of Lieutenant Commander Umberto Bardelli. On February 19, it received from the division commander, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese, the battle flag, which featured the lion of San Marco on a red background and the motto "We are who we are" (Siamo quelli che siamo).

His OoB was as follows:

HQ and HQ Company, platoon of arditi scouts,
1st Company "Decima" then "Bardelli",
2nd Company "Scirè",
3rd Company "Iris",
4th Company "Tarigo" then "San Giorgio",
5th Gun Company,
Ca de Voluntariaos "La Última" (the last).

March to Rome and to the front.

The Barbarigo Battalion with individual weapons and few collective weapons, War Flag with Republican Eagle and Fascio and its Banner with the X MAS shield and on the reverse the Lion of San Marco and the inscription "We are who we are", departed from La Spezia on February 22, 1944 crammed into civilian buses and trucks assigned by the Germans. The unusual column followed the Statale 1 Aurelia, abandoned in Viareggio, and after Prato and Peretola, heading south, they took the Statale 2 Cassia, the old consular road that over the centuries has linked the Florentine Ponte Vecchio with the Roman Ponte Milvio.

The first overnight stops were in Tavernelle Val di Pesa and, after passing Siena, in Montalcino. Due to the snow, some outdated vehicles are unable to cross the Radicofani Pass and the column is forced to fall back to Siena, where it reunited at the large Lamarmora barracks (formerly 5. Bersaglieri Regiment) at the Battalion Headquarters School of the GNR (Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana) Siena and where, during the break, gathers Black Shirt Volunteers. On February 24 the night rest is in Orvieto and there the stop is extended the next day.

On the afternoon of February 26, the Barbarigo Battalion concludes the adventurous transfer. After crossing the historic Ponte Milvio, enter Rome and arrive at the Grazioli Lante barracks of the Republican Navy at Piazza Randaccio 5, ascending the right bank of the river from Ponte Risorgimento on Lungotevere della Vittoria. On February 27, the 3rd Company, with Flag and Banner, parades through Rome and pays homage, on behalf of all Marines, to the monument of the Unknown Soldier.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FUNDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. INSTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SEPTEMBER ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBER 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

The Barbarigo went to the front during the night between 1 and 2 March 1944, when the one thousand and eighty that made up the Battalion were transported by the Germans as far as Sermoneta. At that moment the second counter-offensive was underway, and the unit was facing American Rangers and super-trained Canadian. After a brief stop in Sermoneta, from whose hills the enemy lines could be seen, the unit was deployed on the flat and marshy terrain, crossed by a tangle of canals and irrigation ditches, on the upper stretch of the Mussolini Canal (now Canale Italia).

There, after Commander Bardelli had managed to avoid the complete dismemberment of the Department, the assignments were distributed: the 1st Company was deployed in the "holes" of the Mussolini Canal to relieve the exhausted German soldiers at the advanced point of the deployment; two Companies deployed from Lake Fogliano to the Gorgolicino ditch (the 3rd between the Gorgolicino ditch and the Strada Lunga, the 4th from there to the edge of the marshes); another in Sezze (the 2nd) for a training course to the use of the panzerfaust and the MG 42 machine gun. For example, anti-tank rockets had recently entered the scene, which the Germans called panzerfaust, and which you had to learn to use by lying on the ground and letting the tank get as close as possible, without giving in to the temptation to run away.

The 1180 Volunteers of the Rgt. San Marco within the Btg. Barbarigo, bold for love of country, begin to fight on the Nettuno Front after the German failure, from 16 to 19 February 1944, of the desperate attempt to drive back into the sea the Anglo-Americans who landed by surprise at Anzio on 22 January 1944. On the northern front of the bridgehead in this first battle, in the Ardea area, 340 Nembo paratroopers had operated with strenuous valor since 9 February and were part of the 4. Fj D.

The attempt to reject the landing of Anzio-Nettuno, albeit with some territorial conquests, had been frustrated as had happened in Salerno, from the decisive intervention of the guns of the enemy ships. The Marines (Maró) of the Btg. Barbarigo largely lacking in military experience and initially armed only with MAB 38 machine guns and two Balilla hand grenades, are transformed into bold fighters just incorporated into the Grenadier Regiment 735 of the 715. ID and its Kampfgruppe under the orders of Friedrich Schellerer.

This is deployed between the Consular Via Appia 7 and the Tyrrhenian Sea south of Cisterna and incorporates the X MAS Companies in the first fighting lines, one separated from the other and alongside the German detachments. The four Marò Companies begin to operate east of the Mussolini Canal and will lay close to the Fogliano Lake, integrated by the 5. Company cannons which with pieces supplied by the Germans and Artiglieri arriving from La Spezia are transformed into the San Giorgio Artillery Group at full firing efficiency from 15 April.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

During the night from 04 to 05, the 1st Company entered the line: a first section in German trucks, which rolled silently into the night along the roads of the Agro Pontino pierced by shells but still lined with rows of eucalyptus trees. Then, starting from Borgo Isonzo, on foot and in silence. That exchange in the "holes" happened without the enemy noticing and was really a good test for inexperienced soldiers, like us. We realized that the "holes" of the enemy were so close that everything could be heard and understood.

The first to be attacked was the 3rd Company. The Americans engaged the Sailors in a frontal attack, followed by the more aggressive Canadians. The 2nd Company relieved the 3rd. Mario Tedeschi writes:

“I saw the first death in my life one cold and wet morning in March 1944. His name was Alberto Spagna and he was younger than me, having just turned 19 at the time. The sniper's bullet hit him in the center of the head, piercing the helmet and coming out the other side. He fell into the "hole" dug in the embankment of Canale Mussolini, today Canale Italia, where during the night we had relieved the exhausted German soldiers, the last remnants of what had been the 715. Division....Alberto Spagna who had enlisted voluntarily and had come to the front driven only by his great passion, he could not resist, staying locked up seemed cowardly to him, not seeing the enemy, an even more absurd act. And as soon as it was morning, he stood up to watch. And he died........"

At the end of March, the "Degli Oddi" (commander's name) battalion of the Italian SS relieved the 1st company along the Mussolini channel, this company moved to Terracina for training and coastal surveillance. The 3rd Company returned to the line in front of Cerreto Alto, between the Nascosa road and the coast road.

The command of the Tenth sent Lieutenant Carnevali, Commander of the "San Giorgio" Group, to the Nettuno front to organize the field artillery group. The group consisted of a battery of 105/28, one of 105/32 and another of 75/27. These were also devoid of camouflage nets and other tools, which Carnevali himself had to go to Rome to obtain with improvised means, traveling in a battered Balilla, called the "coffin of death". Carnevale within three weeks managed to obtain a mention from the Kesselring Command.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

On April 1, 1944, the number one of the battalion's newspaper, a modest brochure printed in Littoria (today Latina), published the list of the first fallen and the greeting of Commander Bardelli: Midshipman Sebastiani Paolo, 1° Compagnia; 2nd Capo Nobili Emilio, 1st Company; Sergent Enzo Cortese, 3rd Company; S.C. Farne Alfonso, 2nd Battery; Marò Egi Walter, 3rd Company; Marò Frezza Emanuele, 1st Battery; Marò Mancino Aldo, 2nd Battery; Marò Spagna Alberto, 1° Compagnia.

There were many individual heroic gestures performed by the Barbarigo's Italian sailors at Anzio. Capo di 3° classe Giulio De Angelis, known as "the Sheriff", for making sure his young sailors were wide awake at night, stumbled out of the "holes" and then crawled closer to the lines, to risk of being hit; and when he found someone asleep he pounced on him and began to hit him hard with the German hand grenade used as a club saying: "if it was the black one (usually the Americans used black soldiers for surprise actions*) at this time you would be dead".

Mario Riondino, at that time a midshipman, who in a patrol action led by a German feldwebel finally found himself rescuing the wounded non-commissioned officer on his shoulders, after the Wehrmacht soldiers had fled, and therefore also received a shot upon re-entry in the own line; got a second class iron cross that von Schellerer personally placed on his chest.

On April 15, there was an attack by Canadian armored vehicles in the sector of the front occupied by the 2nd Company, which lost the strong points "Erna" and "Dora". On the same day, under the command of Lieutenant Giulio Cencetti, the sailors recaptured the bastions lost in the previous attack. On April 19 there was another attack on the front held by the 2nd Company.

At the beginning of May, new changes in the line: the 4th Company replaced the 2nd, the 1st relieved the 3rd, which moved to Terracina to watch the coast. On April 26, Commander Bardelli was recalled to La Spezia to take up a higher position. Lieutenant Vallauri replaced Bardelli in command of the battalion and the 4th Company was attacked by the Americans in the Gorgolicino ditch. The sailors resisted the attacks and counterattacked the enemy.

The battle of Nettunia lasted until May 24 and ended, not because the Anglo-American troops concentrated in the Anzio bridgehead had managed to break through, but because the other invading forces, thanks above all to the Moroccans and their expertise, and to the Poles, had managed to open decisive gaps in the Cassino Front.

* masked soldiers?

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

In order not to risk being outflanked by the advancing enemy troops, the order to withdraw was given. On May 24, 1944, the "Barbarigo" Battalion and the "San Giorgio" Artillery Group received the order to withdraw from the front after the collapse of the Gustav Line. The three companies in line stood out in the direction of Sermoneta and Bassiano. The 2nd was attacked by armored vehicles near Cisterna, the 4th resisted the enemy attacks in the town of Norma. The artillerymen of the "San Giorgio", after having exhausted all the ammunition at their disposal, blew up the cannons. The 3rd Company withdrew from Terracina reuniting with the rest of the "Barbarigo" Battalion.

During these combats, Midshipman Alessandro Tognoloni of the 2nd Company distinguished himself. The position of the platoon commanded by Midshipman Alessandro Tognoloni, positioned at km 51 of the Via Appia, was surrounded by American Sherman tanks. Shouting “Decima! Barbarigo!", the sailors attacked the tanks. Tognoloni threw a hand grenade and fell from an impact that tore his chest. Before losing consciousness, he discharged the shots from his pistol and, emptying the magazine, threw it against the advancing tank.

For acts of valor carried out on the Nettuno front, he was awarded the Gold Medal for Military Valor in memory, since he was believed to be dead. Midshipman Tognoloni was not dead, however, and the astonished Americans picked him up badly wounded on the battlefield, treated him, and then sent him to a concentration camp for Italian prisoners in Texas. When he was released after the end of the war, the camp commander turned to Tognoloni and said: "If I had to go to war, I would like to have fighters like you by my side."

On May 31, the "Barbarigo" arrived in Rome and met at the Caserma di Maridist, in Piazza Randaccio. On the afternoon of June 4, the vanguards of the US 5th Army entered the city, first of all the 1st Detachment of the Special Service Force, which the "Barbarigo" had vigorously opposed for three months.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

Below follows the report on the actions of the "Barbarigo" Battalion and the "San Giorgio" Group in Anzio, sent on June 7, 1944 by the Commander of the Tenth MAS Flotilla, Capitano di Fregata Junio Valerio Borghese to the Minister of the FF .AA. of the RSI, the Marshal of Italy Rodolfo Graziani and the Chief of Staff of the Navy Rear Admiral Giuseppe Sparzani.

To the Minister of the Armed Forces through and, for his information, To the Chief of Staff of the Navy.
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET PERSONNEL

Upon arrival at the line, the Barbarigo Battalion formed, at the request of the allies, 2 Batteries of 105 with men from the Battalion itself. Subsequently, the two constituted Batteries were given the appearance of a Group, sending a Group Commander and other Officers with personnel from the Depot. Until May 12, the Battalion and the Group took the form of a Battle Group under the orders of Lieutenant Commander Bardelli. On the aforementioned date, said Officer returned to assume the organization of the 1st Regiment of the "Tenth" Division and the two units split into an Infantry Battalion under the orders of Tenente di Vascello Vallauri and an Artillery Group under the orders of Tenente di Vascello Carnevale. Both units, which I will refer to as “Barbarigo” later on for abbreviation, were attached to the 715. Motorized Division under the command of General Hildebrand. In particular, both the Battalion and the Batteries were under the orders of Oberst von Schellerer, who commanded the Kampfgruppe of the same name. Basically, however, under the direct orders of Oberst von Schellerer, there were only three Companies out of the Battalion's four and two Batteries.

A Company was always under the orders of other Commands (Canale Mussolini or Terracina). The two Batteries were under the command of the German Artillery Group attached to Group v. Schellerer, the Support Battery was under the direct orders of the Group and the Companies divided between the German Battalions, always under the Group's orders. The Command of the Barbarigo by order of the Oberst v. Schellerer has always operated on the flank of Commando II. Battalion of the 735 Grenadier Regiment. Repeatedly submitted to Oberst v. Schellerer to arrange the Command of the Barbarigo together with the Command of the German Battle Group; but such requests never received much consideration.

At the time of the withdrawal, the German detachments were almost all under the command of Oberst v. Schellerer (with the exception of a platoon of the 1st Company that remained in Cisterna and that was immolated in its entirety), that is, employed by various German Commandos, all of them dependent on said Superior Officer.

Development of the situation during the withdrawal: Despite the continuous contact between the Battalion Command and the II. / GR 735, a contact made even more intimate by the personal friendship between the two Commanders, nothing was ever mentioned to the Battalion Commander about the opportunity to coordinate a withdrawal. However, for a few days, withdrawal orders for warehouses and motorized elements have been insistently requested; but it was replied that the Group Command would carry out a reconnaissance in the area and that the orders would come when the reconnaissance was completed.

According to news obtained later, the Division Command began its withdrawal on May 23. On May 24, Tenente di Vascello Vallauri, Commander of the Battalion, went to the CP of v. Schellerer on his own initiative, to report the return of two platoons of the 2nd Company from Cisterna and ask for orders in this regard. To his astonishment, he noted that a report was being made to all Unit Commanders of Group v. Schellerer and that everything was ready for a quick departure.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/
https://xflottigliamas.forumfree.it/?t=18672525

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

After waiting until 2:00 p.m. for the report to be completed, he received verbal orders that can be summarized as follows:

- start of withdrawal to other positions in the afternoon of the same day;
- unchanged tactical and logistical dependencies of each Italian detachment in the different German commands;
- withdrawal methods was to be detailed for each Italian detachment by those various German commands.

The detachments therefore withdrew in isolation and it is not surprising that there is no connection between the commands of the detachments and the Barbarigo Command and on occasions between the German commands and the Italian commands, when the same Command of the II./GR 735 with which the Battalion Command has always remained lost contact several times with the dependent, lateral and superior commands. Due to this lack of connections, it was necessary to come up with a new arrangements of units for the same German detachments that were in the rear.

No Italian detachment thus left to itself has lost its way: all have tried by all means to resume connection, made difficult by the action of the partisans who prevented the use of relief on such a vast front and in a mountainous area. As the battle progressed towards Tivoli and Rome and the detachments failed to establish any connection, they continued to fight in isolation until the commanders on their own initiative decided to return to the Rome barracks, where they awaited the possibility of meeting and receiving new employment orders.

On the 27th, the 4th Company employed by the I./ GR 735 and the Battalion Command with a platoon of the 1st Company employed by the II./ GR 735 remained on the line.

The episode of the forced disarmament of the 4th Company forced the Battalion Commander to order the return of the subunit to Rome and to appear before the Command of the 735. Infantry Division to protest against the disarmament and communicate the decision made to said Command.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/
https://xflottigliamas.forumfree.it/?t=18672525

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

On the 30th the entire Battalion and Batteries met in Rome (loss during the withdrawal amounted to 2 Officers, 11 NCOs and 110 corporals and Maró-sailors) and the personnel could have been used again if the Allied (German) behavior in recent events, would not have created in the officers and ratings considerable distrust of their loyalty to them.

Capitano di corvetta Bardelli, Commander of the Regiment, sent by me to Rome, as soon as he was informed of the situation that had arisen there, worked from the day of his arrival to avoid the maneuver of charging the units, which made more than expected, the tactical failure of the 735. Division in the subsequent crisis.

Said Officer then worked so that the Barbarigo received clear and precise orders for its subsequent employment. Following various orders and counter-orders, on the afternoon of June 3, the Battalion was placed under the command of the German Commander of the city of Rome and a Training Company of 130 sailors with 6 Officers took up positions along the Via Appia, 10 km south of Rome at 8:00 p.m. that day, with the task of ensuring the withdrawal of German units from Rome.

In the early morning of June 4, the Battalion, which had now received the order to withdraw contrary to everything previously said, began the transfer to La Spezia. Due to the shortage of trucks and the surprise caused by the sudden order, the detachments now assembled in small groups and withdrew in order, where they received a short leave before resuming formation and training.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/
https://xflottigliamas.forumfree.it/?t=18672525

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

Report on the Barbarigo Battalion and the "San Giorgio" Artillery Group.

Considerations.

The characteristics and developments of the withdrawal were largely predictable; however, in the present circumstance it is convenient to study the causes, whether they are failures or merits, in order to draw lessons for the future.

1. The Battalion has never been used as a unit by the German Operational Command. This was followed by the fact that in the movement phase there was an evident crisis of dependencies, accentuated by the analogous crisis that occurred in the German commands.

2. The split was not ordered only between the detachments, but sometimes within the same companies, platoons and squads, offering great possibilities to the worst elements of the ally to carry out disastrous propaganda on the sailors and demonstrate a mentality still oriented towards the September 08.

3. Relations between the German commanders and the Italian commanders were excellent as long as they were elements that had collaborated with each other for a long time. German commanders have always been devoid of any understanding and sometimes downright hostile, as soon as the situation made the units dependent on commanders who had not been in line with them.

4. The detachments remained compact in the crisis of orders and withdrew, although on initiative, but always fighting. Perhaps the commanders who brought their units to Rome could be criticized, but this was also natural, because only there could a meeting of the units and the immediate solution of the food problem be foreseen (no unit had received the promised supplies for the marches , but only the exit order to "get by"). This order was easily enforceable by German troops on Italian soil, but not by us.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/
https://xflottigliamas.forumfree.it/?t=18672525

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more....................

Barbarigo Battalion on the Nettuno front.

Report on the Barbarigo Battalion and the "San Giorgio" Artillery Group.

Teachings.

From what has been said above, the following basic points must be drawn for any future sending of Italian regular troops to the front.

1. It is not enough to send only men who must then depend on the allied (German) formations in every single thing, which causes as a consequence that the logistical dependence involves the absolute tactical dependence and the fragmentation of the detachments.

It is therefore necessary to send much larger units to the Battalion or to the Artillery Group and above all equipped with all the means that any phase of the combat may require.

These units must be better trained than the Barbarigo was (this fell into line only for the 'moral commitment' of being the only unit of the Armed Forces of the Republic alongside the Germans in the defense of Rome), equipped with means of communication and its own autonomy, in order to allow its unitary use, the only truly profitable use and on which, also according to recent experience, one can undoubtedly place the safest reliance.

2. The use of volunteers is undoubtedly to be repeated, as these formations, due to their very origin, have more bite and a greater ability to recover after a crisis. Witness the 130 sailors who, after the disappointment they had experienced, poorly armed and equipped only with their enthusiasm and their faith, took to the line on the evening of June 3, while they saw the tanks and other German units withdraw. Without sinning too much used rhetoric, the said sailors set off on an adventure that easily predicted the almost certain end for everyone, singing loudly and arousing the moved admiration of the retreating Germans.

3. The Barbarigo can be readily reconstructed and the recent retreat has made it possible to make a selection of leaders and personnel, despite having cost the loss of excellent elements.

Sources: http://associazionedecimaflottigliamas. ... barbarigo/
FONDAZIONE DELLA R.S.I. ISTITUTO STORICO-ACTA 94 (94) SETTEMBRE ANNO XXXI N. 3 NOVEMBRE 2017
https://www.combattentiereduci.it/notiz ... one-decima
https://marcodistefanoguerrito.wordpres ... nticati/4/
https://xflottigliamas.forumfree.it/?t=18672525

Cheers. Raúl M .