Was it due to Italy Germany lost the war?

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd: I had just written a lengthy reply to the issues you raised. One of our cats came trotting across the keyboard and sent if off to who knows where? As we agree on the fundamental premise, the reply was purely informational, so I WILL re-write it. But right now it's pushing 0200. When I', awake, I'll be back.

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd:
1. Re: Poland. How could Poland ultimately have fared even worse had it chose the wiser course and allied with Germany in 1939? Consider Finland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Rumanian, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia. All were collaborators of Germany. How much worse off can you fare than wholesale rape and murder of your people and wholesale destruction of property?
The U.S.S.R. also invaded Poland in 1939. It took half the country and never gave back even a spoonful of soil. It murdered almost 22,000 Polish military officers. Late in the war, it decided to force the Poles who were still alive after 4-5 years in the Gulag to become Red Army soldiers. It had to teach Russian officers how to speak Polish and create "legends" for them in a bid to try to deceive the Poles into believing these men were actually Poles.\
A German-Polish alliance would have meant no war with the West. 100% of Germany's naval and air forces could have been used against the U.S.S.R. The Poles would have added 40 competent divisions. The Polish army of 1939 was very well regarded by Western military experts. They were at least as good as Finland's army. In 1939 and 1940, the Red Army was greatly hampered as result of Stalin's purges in 1937-38. It's poor performance in the "Winter War" with Finland proved this.
Before a German-Polish alliance, would the U.S.S.R. still try to expand into Finland, the Baltic states, and Rumania's Bessarabia? Could Germany have still enticed Rumanian participation without this Soviet aggression? Would Hungary and Slovakia still have provided troops? What about Italy? France? Britain? Who can say. But, starting 600 Km. further east, with a navy not weakened by the Norway campaign. and fresh parachute troops, I believe that a German-Polish offensive beginning in June, 1940, could have taken both Leningrad and Moscow long before snow fell. I doubt that Stalin could have remained in power after this, and I doubt that the U.S.S.R. could survive - especially without the huge amount of aid it historically received from the West.

2 French navy: Many French ships would be in Mediterranean ports. If all France was occupied, I doubt the Royal Navy would try to attack them underneath the Luftwaffe, which historically so devastated the R.N. at Crete. As the Japanese showed in Dec. 1941 with Prince of Wales, even the 1st-line R.N. ships could not stand up to air attack.

3. Free French: They were of little value until AFTER N. Africa was cleared of Axis forces and they could be equipped with U.S. ordnance. If all of France were occupied in 1940, I doubt that DeGaulle could have caught the ear of many in the West. The rebelions in French N. Africa that historically occurred c. 1960 may well have came 20 years sooner.

4. Crews for surrendered French ships: The Kriegsmarine could already supply many trained sailors from the ships it lost in the Norway campaign. Perhaps a few less U-boats could sail for a while, but the control of the Mediterannean (especially if Unternehmen "Merkur" was implemented) and ability to greatly increase escort of supply ships to the Afrika Korps would make this worthwhile.

5. 1st-line R.N. in Med: Exactly WHAT 1st-line R.N. ships were used in the Med. PRIOR to 2nd Alamein? None I can think of.

6. R.N. power in Med.: After Crete, R.N. power in the area was weak. The mining of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant made a dire situation. Only poor Axis intelligence prevented expolitation of that situation.

7. What else instead of "Sitzkrieg"?: In October 1939, Germany should have invaded Denmark and Netherlands. Neither required any great effort, time or troops. Both historically fell before the Allies could meaningfully act. The economies of both countries could have been "looted" immediately. German forces in Denmark may have dampened British incursions into Norwegian waters and the "Weserubung" may not have been needed. That would have preserved many ships for the Kriegsmarine to use elsewhere later.
With Netherlands occupied, the Allies may have felt obligated to move into Belgium - possibly even further northeast than the Dyle Plan prescribed. Then, when the Wehrmacht did attack in 1940, it still would have effected a breakthrough. Its armour tactics and superiority in machine guns would virtually guarantee this. But the, the British Army would be cut off far from sea ports. There could be no Dunkirk. With those 300,000 British troops dead or P.W.'s, even a raging hawk lilke Churchill - the man who said "It's better to jaw, jaw than to war, war" - might have taken his own counsel and seriously considered peace offers.

[lwd]

... A German-Polish alliance would have meant no war with the West.

That is by no means certain. Especially if the war dragged on for any length of time.

Before a German-Polish alliance, would the U.S.S.R. still try to expand into Finland, the Baltic states, and Rumania's Bessarabia?

Probably not as it was the pact with Germany that pretty much gave the Soviets a free hand to do so.

But, starting 600 Km. further east, with a navy not weakened by the Norway campaign. and fresh parachute troops, I believe that a German-Polish offensive beginning in June, 1940, could have taken both Leningrad and Moscow long before snow fell. I doubt that Stalin could have remained in power after this, and I doubt that the U.S.S.R. could survive - especially without the huge amount of aid it historically received from the West.

But in this circumstance catching the Soviets by surprise is going to be much more difficult and weren't there established defences along the Polish Soviet border?

2 French navy: Many French ships would be in Mediterranean ports. If all France was occupied, I doubt the Royal Navy would try to attack them underneath the Luftwaffe, which historically so devastated the R.N. at Crete. As the Japanese showed in Dec. 1941 with Prince of Wales, even the 1st-line R.N. ships could not stand up to air attack.

It's going to take some time for the Germans to occupy all of France especially to get significant air power in place. Furthermore France is not likely to surrender as quickly if the terms are complete occupation and this will give time for signifcant portions of the French navy to sail for either Britain or the US. In additon the LW wasn't particularly impressive at that point in the war when it came to attacking warships. Indeed they didn't even have a decent arial torpedo, a rather important weapon in the demise of POW and company.

3. Free French: They were of little value until AFTER N. Africa was cleared of Axis forces and they could be equipped with U.S. ordnance.

Well it depends on what you consider "little value" but clearing North Africa has little to do with equipping Free French forces. Consider the strategic situation if Madagascar and the French colonies in the Mid East go Free French. Even without much active effort on thier part the Indian Ocean is much more secure as is the Eastern Med.

4. Crews for surrendered French ships: The Kriegsmarine could already supply many trained sailors from the ships it lost in the Norway campaign. Perhaps a few less U-boats could sail for a while, but the control of the Mediterannean (especially if Unternehmen "Merkur" was implemented) and ability to greatly increase escort of supply ships to the Afrika Korps would make this worthwhile.

They certainly weren't trained on French ships. Look how long it takes to train up the crew of a ship that's home built. The Bismarck class required what 6+ months. Now imagine the difficulties of doing it with foreign ships. It's even worse if you are talking about the new French battleships as one is far from complete and the other is damaged during trials.

5. 1st-line R.N. in Med: Exactly WHAT 1st-line R.N. ships were used in the Med. PRIOR to 2nd Alamein? None I can think of.

Depends on what you consider first line. If you are talking capital ships then Illustrius, Ark Royal, and Hood.
Also contenderes would be Eagle, Formidable, Warspite, and Renown. But of significant import is the older British battleships were more than a match for all but the two new Italian battleships and there was only about a 6 month period of time when they were both available and both were working up during this period. Furthermore their dispersions problems would mean that they wouldn't have that much if any edge on the older British battleships.

6. R.N. power in Med.: After Crete, R.N. power in the area was weak. The mining of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant made a dire situation. Only poor Axis intelligence prevented expolitation of that situation.

I'm not at all sure this is the case. Even if it was the axis already had significant fuel problems and the French vessels aren't going to be ready by then.

7. What else instead of "Sitzkrieg"?: In October 1939, Germany should have invaded Denmark and Netherlands. Neither required any great effort, time or troops. Both historically fell before the Allies could meaningfully act. The economies of both countries could have been "looted" immediately. German forces in Denmark may have dampened British incursions into Norwegian waters and the "Weserubung" may not have been needed. That would have preserved many ships for the Kriegsmarine to use elsewhere later.

There goes any surprise with regards to the Germans going through Belgium to get to France. As far as discouraging the British in the North I suspect instead of a British/French invasion of Norway unopposed by the Norwegians you are more likely to see Norway actually joiing the alleis. This is going to make it much more difficult for KM ships and uboats to break into the Atlantic as well as subject more of Germany to air attacks early in the war.

With Netherlands occupied, the Allies may have felt obligated to move into Belgium - possibly even further northeast than the Dyle Plan prescribed. Then, when the Wehrmacht did attack in 1940, it still would have effected a breakthrough. Its armour tactics and superiority in machine guns would virtually guarantee this. But the, the British Army would be cut off far from sea ports. There could be no Dunkirk. With those 300,000 British troops dead or P.W.'s, even a raging hawk lilke Churchill - the man who said "It's better to jaw, jaw than to war, war" - might have taken his own counsel and seriously considered peace offers.

In this case Belgium is also not going to be caught sleeping. It also may have joined the allies and you end up with their frontier fortifications well manned by not only their troops but French and British. The break through is by no means guaranteed at this point and indeed becomes problematic. It's also of course questionable how ready the Germans would have been for an invasion of Denmark and Holland in October of 39. Given that the Polish campaign last into October it seems unlikely.

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd: I think we both acknowledge:
We have drifted so far off the originating question as to be in another ocean.
We agree our answer to "Was it due to Italy Germany lost the war?" is an emphatic "No". We have opened up new cans of worms, and debate the flavours. The problem of "what ifs" is that nothing is certain. Myriad unforseeable factors may make the exercise moot. Still, I enjoy a worthy opponent who is willing to consider alternate universes.

Re: Had Poland and Germany allied in 1939.
It was proposed as early as their 1934 Non-aggression Pact. Its likelihood was suggested in 1938 when, as Czechoslovakia was carved up, Poland helped itself to a chunk (Hungary's later alliance with Germany arose at least partly from Czech real estate IT acquired at that time courtesy of Germany.). If a P-G alliance was made, it would negate Chamberlain's foolhardy "guarantee." Hitler would be tacitly given the "free hand in the East" that was all he really wanted. Germany would then be busy "settling the East" - much as the U.S. "settled the (its) West" in the 19th. C. I cannot envision any reason why Germany would then act to bail Mussolini out of any future fiasco. Nor any British or French cause for war with Germany. - Especially France. It was quite reluctant to involve itself at all.

Re: Nazi-Soviet Pact.
The Pact really only affirmed intentions long held by Hitler and Stalin. Hitler aimed to crush Bolshevism and build a Grossdeutschland in the East, similar to the U.S. in N. America. Perhaps his dream began as a youth, as he read Karl May's books. Stalin wanted the S.U. to encompass at least the old Tsarist empire. The Baltic states, Bessarabia, Poland and Finland had to go. The two men, their ideals, and the unfortunate people they manipulated were destined to clash.

Re: Barbarossa "surprise" & Stalin Line
FAR too much is made by (mostly Soviet) authors on these points. Only an idiot would have been surprised by the Nazi attack. The 1939 Pact virtually guaranteed it. The only question was exactly when. The S.U. lost little time exploiting its "free hand," given by the Pact, and its military aligned in an offensive stance on the new borders. Andrei Vlasov, a highly placed Red Army general, said Stalin's plan was to attack central Europe in 1942. I think the only "surprise" was how hard the German punch was. No one, from Stalin on down, expected the Red Army to be so man-handled.
The Stalin Line was mostly propaganda pap for the Soviet masses. It was passed through by the Nazis in 1941 with scarcely a mention. Certainly no Maginot Line, or even a West Wall.

Re: French navy.
Perhaps the most contentious point of those I raised. By the historic surrender date, over half of France was over-run. I doubt the French army, with the scant resources it had left, could have held on more than a few weeks. Surrender of the fleet could have been made a surrender condition. Would the fleet obey or not? We will never know. Unmentioned in our discussion was Italy. It could have done much or even all the occupation of southern France. It had a large number of bombers. Quality aerial torpedoes or not, as U.S. Gen. "Billy" Mitchell showed in 1925, bombs sink ships too. The main question would be: "How much would the R.N. want to risk to attack the French ships at Toulon in those circumstances?"

Re: Free French.
We could argue this into the next millennium and never agree. Let's call it a coin-toss, although I think the colonies would have taken the opportunity to tell France "mangerais les merde."

Re: Crews for French ships
Britain was able to put 50 U.S. "Lend-Lease" destroyers it was gven in 1940 into service very quickly. The Soviets quickly employed H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, donated by Britain in 1944. Ships are ships just as cars are cars. Getting them operational is not that complex. The main purpose for obtaining the French fleet would be political and propaganda benefit. The "paper strength" of a Kriegsmarine refurbished or even fattened by French ships would help to make others think about a peace settlement (Britain), staying with the Axis (Yugoslavia) or not fighting at all (Greece may have accepted occupation). You omit the French Dunkerque class, which would have well-complemented the German battlecruisers, and were superior to the Graf Spee class.

Re: "1st-line R.N."
I apologise profoundly for my early-morning sleep-induced failure of Geography. I confused Oran (Algeria) and Rabat (Morocco). Of course Hood was there, shooting at the French fleet in 1940. But I don't rank ships built before or during WWI as "1st-line." They would have been scrap metal before Germany's 1st-line (Bismarck and
Tirpitz). That eliminates Renown and the Queen Elizabeth class (includes Warspite). The 'carriers would have been just 'ein leckerbissen' [a snack] to a capital ship. (Think of H.M.S. Glorious and its fate against Scharnhorst & Gniesnau.) You give more value to the old R.N. ships against Italy's Vittorio Veneto or Littorio than is warranted.

Re: State of R.N. in Med. after Crete
From Liddell Hart "History of the Second World War" (1970), p. 136:
"Evacuation began on the night of the 28th (May), and ended on the night of the 31st - the Royal Navy suffering heavy losses from the enemy's dominant air force in its persistent efforts to bring away as many troops as possible.... The Navy had well over 2,000 dead. Three cruiser and six destroyers were sunk. Thirteen other ships were badly damaged, including two battleships and the only aircraft-carrier then in the Mediterranean Fleet."
I'm certain that fuel for an enlarged Axis Mediterranean fleet could have been found in 1940. Remember: in late May 1941, Hitler only had eyes for the Soviet Union. Save for Yuogslavia, Barbarossa would have already been underway.

Re: instead of "sitzkrieg"
By the time the S.U. joined the invasion of Poland on 17 Sep., the issue was already decided. On 18 Sep, the government and military high command escaped into Rumania. On 28 Sep, Warsaw fell. On 5 Oct. the last sizable group of Polish troops surrendered. Although some guerilla action continued into the winter, it would have been easy for the Nazis to detach a large number of troops and aircraft fo ruse elsewhere. In April 1940, Denmark was occupied in an afternoon by a handful of troops. It would have been as easy in Oct. 1939. In May 1940, the Netherlands fell in 5 days. It would fall as easily in 1939. It only involved 9th Armoured Division, four parachute battalions and about 10 infantry divisions.
It is absurd to speak of any "surprise" about the Germans attacking through Belgium. The only options possible were (a) through Switzerland - highly unlikely due to the terrain. (b) through the Maginot Line - only an utter lunatic would even consider this. (c) through Belgium and the Netherlands. Which, of ocurse, happened.
The Belgians were not idiots. They knew what happened in 1914. They wanted to stay formally neutral in hope of not incurring needless wrath should some other solution arise that left them out of the mix. The West had all manner of offensive plans of their own - hit Germany in the rear through Scandanavia, attack the Ruhr therough Belgium, attack the remote east flank through Greece and the Balkans, cut off the oil supply by attacking the Soviet Caucasus - in all cases, neutralities be damned.
I reiterate: the West superiority in heavy artillery was more than compensated for by the German superiority in the air, in automatic weapons, and armour tactics. A breakthrough might have taken a bit longer - but only by a few days. The further north and east the West forces could be drawn, the better this would have served the German cause. If the British army had advanced to the Belgian-Dutch border, it would have been encircled and destroyed in central Belgium. A more direct repeat of the WWI Schlieffen Plan may have drawn a more complete result.

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd: I realise after sending the above that I overlooked your notion of Norway joining the West in war with Germany, had the Nazis invaded Denmark & Netherland in Oct. '39.
Given numerous West plans to ignore Norway's neutrality and sovereignty to invade across it, ostensibly to aid Finland in the Winter War, or to cut off Germany's supply of Swedish iron ore, or to attack directly at Germany; given numerous West violations of Noway's neutrality and sovereignty by laying mines in its waters and the "Altmark" affair; given the fact that the West already had troops about to load on ships to invade Norway when the Wehrmacht beat them to the punch on 9 April 1940; and given the existence of the small but noisome nationalist-fascist led by Quisling, I rate the likelihood of Norway joining the West as extremely low.
Small nations who are not being harmed, but in fact economically helped by a larger nation (the Swedish ore passed through Norway) that is at war with other larger nations tend to keep the nose clean and head down and hope the storm passes by them. Norwegians have always been a determined but peaceful people. They did not go to war with the S.U. when it threatened their borders by attacking Finland. They would not join the West over Denmark or Netherlands, two nations to which the Nazis could make a legitimate claim of common ancestry.
Finally, I strongly doubt that bombing attacks at German cities would arise from a Norway-West alliance. Historically, no bombing of cities that were not active military targets (Warsaw, Rotterdam) occurred in that war until Dusseldorf was bombed by the R.A.F. on 11 May 1940 on the order of Churchill.

[lwd]

For lwd: I think we both acknowledge:
We have drifted so far off the originating question as to be in another ocean.
We agree our answer to "Was it due to Italy Germany lost the war?" is an emphatic "No".

Agreed.

Re: Had Poland and Germany allied in 1939.
It was proposed as early as their 1934 Non-aggression Pact. Its likelihood was suggested in 1938 when, as Czechoslovakia was carved up, Poland helped itself to a chunk (Hungary's later alliance with Germany arose at least partly from Czech real estate IT acquired at that time courtesy of Germany.). If a P-G alliance was made, it would negate Chamberlain's foolhardy "guarantee." Hitler would be tacitly given the "free hand in the East" that was all he really wanted.

I'm not at all sure such a pact could have lasted. Hitler wanted the Ukraine and Poland was in the way. Furthermore I've seen absolutely nothing to indicate any thought given to such a pact in 38. Furthermore Chamberlain's guarantee was hardly "foolhardy" indeed it was almost required. Hitler ignoring it was on the other hand.

Re: Nazi-Soviet Pact.
The Pact really only affirmed intentions long held by Hitler and Stalin. Hitler aimed to crush Bolshevism and build a Grossdeutschland in the East, similar to the U.S. in N. America.

I see no way that Hitler's vision of the Third Reich was anything like the US.

Re: Barbarossa "surprise" & Stalin Line
FAR too much is made by (mostly Soviet) authors on these points. Only an idiot would have been surprised by the Nazi attack.

Not so. Certainly Stalin expected the Nazi's to if not attack at least think about it very hard. However he did not expect an attack in the spring of 41. The fact that he was still sending resources to Germany when the attack occured is evidence of that. There's plenty more.

Re: French navy.
Perhaps the most contentious point of those I raised. By the historic surrender date, over half of France was over-run. I doubt the French army, with the scant resources it had left, could have held on more than a few weeks. Surrender of the fleet could have been made a surrender condition.

And what if the government evacuates to Africa? Then there is no formal surrender. Even if it does if the fleet has already moved to British or US ports not much the Germans can do about it.

It had a large number of bombers. Quality aerial torpedoes or not, as U.S. Gen. "Billy" Mitchell showed in 1925, bombs sink ships too.

That was a rigged test. In any case the only battleships sunk by bombs in WWII were stationary and sunk by other than normal bombs. Bombs weren't particularly effective at sinking battleships and it took a lot to sink even smaller ships if they were underway and had a decent amount of AA ammo. Furthermore the Germans didn't have any aircrews trained in antishiping strikes early in the war.

... Re: Crews for French ships
Britain was able to put 50 U.S. "Lend-Lease" destroyers it was gven in 1940 into service very quickly. The Soviets quickly employed H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, donated by Britain in 1944. Ships are ships just as cars are cars. Getting them operational is not that complex.

DD's are a bit simpler than BB's. Britain also had the willing cooperation of the USN and US industry in the matter as well as sharing a common language. As for the Soviet's quickly employing Royal Sovereign. Here's what wiki says about that:

Arkhangelsk ran aground in the White Sea in late 1947; the extent of damage, if any, is unknown.[63] The Soviet Navy returned the ship to the Royal Navy on 4 February 1949 after the former Italian battleship Giulio Cesare was transferred to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.[61] The Soviet Navy had initially sought to avoid sending the ship back, claiming that she was not sufficiently seaworthy to make the voyage back to Britain. After an inspection by a Royal Navy officer, however, the Soviet Navy agreed to return the vessel in January 1949. Upon returning to the Rosyth naval base, Royal Navy personnel thoroughly inspected the ship and found much of her equipment to be unserviceable. It appeared to the inspectors that the main battery turrets had not been rotated while the ship was in Soviet service, and were jammed on the centreline.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Royal_Sovereign_(05)#Service_with_the_Soviet_Navy
i.e. it's not at all clear that it was ever truly operational in Soviet service.

The main purpose for obtaining the French fleet would be political and propaganda benefit. The "paper strength" of a Kriegsmarine refurbished or even fattened by French ships would help to make others think about a peace settlement (Britain), staying with the Axis (Yugoslavia) or not fighting at all (Greece may have accepted occupation). You omit the French Dunkerque class, which would have well-complemented the German battlecruisers, and were superior to the Graf Spee class.

I don't see adding them tot he KM having that much impact politically or propaganda wise among naval professsionals or those listening to their advice. Germany didn't have any battle cruisers and certainly even small battleships are superior to old cruisers.

Re: "1st-line R.N."
I apologise profoundly for my early-morning sleep-induced failure of Geography. I confused Oran (Algeria) and Rabat (Morocco). Of course Hood was there, shooting at the French fleet in 1940. But I don't rank ships built before or during WWI as "1st-line." They would have been scrap metal before Germany's 1st-line (Bismarck and Tirpitz).

Then there aren't many first line ships in 1940 are there? Indeed that leaves the British with Nelson and Rodney doesn't it?

The 'carriers would have been just 'ein leckerbissen' [a snack] to a capital ship. (Think of H.M.S. Glorious and its fate against Scharnhorst & Gniesnau.)

Historically that didn't prove to be the case though did it? Litterio was out of action for several months due to carrier aircraft and Vitterio also took a plane launched torpedo which had her out of action for a while. Furthemore the RN could afford to escort said carriers with a more than adequate escort.

You give more value to the old R.N. ships against Italy's Vittorio Veneto or Littorio than is warranted.

Do I? I don't think so. While they were fine ships they were seldom in service at the same time and neither could have stood up well to two of the older British battleships and of course the old Italaian battleships weren't even really up to Renown. Put Nelson or Rodney in the mix and the Italians are in serious trouble.

I'm certain that fuel for an enlarged Axis Mediterranean fleet could have been found in 1940.

Where?

Re: instead of "sitzkrieg"
By the time the S.U. joined the invasion of Poland on 17 Sep., the issue was already decided. On 18 Sep, the government and military high command escaped into Rumania. On 28 Sep, Warsaw fell. On 5 Oct. the last sizable group of Polish troops surrendered. Although some guerilla action continued into the winter, it would have been easy for the Nazis to detach a large number of troops and aircraft fo ruse elsewhere.

I think you underestimate how easy it would have been to shift fronts with a sizeable force espeically when it has to be reconditioned after combat.

In April 1940, Denmark was occupied in an afternoon by a handful of troops. It would have been as easy in Oct. 1939. In May 1940, the Netherlands fell in 5 days. It would fall as easily in 1939. It only involved 9th Armoured Division, four parachute battalions and about 10 infantry divisions.

Perhaps. I'm not sure if the paratroopers were up to strength yet but that might be to Germany's advantage. But now Belgium is expecting an attack isn't it? It's not just France and Britain.

It is absurd to speak of any "surprise" about the Germans attacking through Belgium. The only options possible were (a) through Switzerland - highly unlikely due to the terrain. (b) through the Maginot Line - only an utter lunatic would even consider this. (c) through Belgium and the Netherlands. Which, of ocurse, happened.

Indeed but the fortifications in Belgium were undermanned at the time and an attack through the Ardennes with armor was not expected. So no it's not absurd to speak of surprise.

I reiterate: the West superiority in heavy artillery was more than compensated for by the German superiority in the air, in automatic weapons, and armour tactics. A breakthrough might have taken a bit longer - but only by a few days. The further north and east the West forces could be drawn, the better this would have served the German cause. If the British army had advanced to the Belgian-Dutch border, it would have been encircled and destroyed in central Belgium. A more direct repeat of the WWI Schlieffen Plan may have drawn a more complete result.

I'm not aware that the German's had all that much of a superiority in automatic weapons care to go into some details? Certainly they had a superior armored doctrine. A "few days" however could have been critical. One of the major effects of the supperior German doctrine was the "got inside the decision cycle" of the French. In some cases a day or two may have been all they needed to shore up the defence.

[lwd]

For lwd: I realise after sending the above that I overlooked your notion of Norway joining the West in war with Germany, had the Nazis invaded Denmark & Netherland in Oct. '39.
Given numerous West plans to ignore Norway's neutrality and sovereignty to invade across it, ostensibly to aid Finland in the Winter War, or to cut off Germany's supply of Swedish iron ore, or to attack directly at Germany; given numerous West violations of Noway's neutrality and sovereignty by laying mines in its waters and the "Altmark" affair; given the fact that the West already had troops about to load on ships to invade Norway when the Wehrmacht beat them to the punch on 9 April 1940; and given the existence of the small but noisome nationalist-fascist led by Quisling, I rate the likelihood of Norway joining the West as extremely low. ....

This rather ignores the fact that the allied operations had the tacit aproval of the Norwegians. Now if the Germans continue to ignore the French and British and invade two more neutral countries and the Norwegians have time to think about it some more ...

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd:
Re: possible German-Polish alliance.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact shows a deal can be quickly offered and accepted. The "3 Colonels" aimed to expand Poland westwards, but enticing offers in the east were possible (e.g; Belorussia). They had no love for the S.U:
"With the Germans we risk losing our liberty, with the Russians we lose our soul." - Eduard Smigly-Rydz, Marshal of the Polish Army, March 1939.
Upon a G-P caused Soviet demise, Germany could reach the Ukraine via Leningrad. Or a deal on a link by rail & road could be made, such as the Nazis had said would solve the "Danzig problem" that was the cause for 1939's "Fall Weiss." A G-P alliance need not long endure. Upon eliminating the S.U., I'm sure both would have happily gone their ways. After all, Britain and the S.U. were not friendly after 1945.
Chamberlain's "guarantee" was a similar complete change of position. Lloyd George called it "demented" in Parliament. It put Western destiny in the hands of unstable Polish leaders, but could not be fulfilled without S.U. aid. But nothing was done to assure the S.U. would give aid, or that Poland would accept it. Maximum temptation + manifest provocation = DUMB.
The West fought to fulfill its guarantee of Poland's independence and to remove a potential menace to ensure long-term security. It failed dismally. Poland was overrun and partitioned between the S.U. and Germany. After history's bloodiest war, it had to agree to S.U. domination of not just Poland, but all eastern Europe. It abandoned its pledge to the Poles who fought by their side. The effort to overcome Hitler left Europe devastated and weak before a much greater menace. Britain's empire dissolved, and the U.K. spent decades as a poor dependent of the U.S.

Re: Hitler's eastern vision
Hitler' wanted to do in the east what the U.S. did in its west - massive ethnic cleansing; forced movement of native people to "reservations; " population reduction by outright massacres, deliberate spreading of disease, and playing one group against another; and establishing paternalistic administrative control. The new Germanic settlers would rule as lords of a quasi-feudal society until cities, roads, etc. could be built.

Re: "Barbarossa" surprise?
And the Nazi's still sent goods to the S.U. What of the vaunted Soviet intelligence network and spies like the "Rote Kapelle?" Where did they think the 140 divisions of "Fall Gelb" were? This is ostrich politics to mask that the S.U. came within a whisker of destruction in 1941. Only Hitler's lack of a clear strategic goal saved the situation. It was much more that Hitler lost rather than Stalin won.

Re: French navy
As I said: my most contentious point. Impossible to prove either way, we have only opinions. Mine is that in June 1940, almost all French people were DONE with war. They had fought honourably but lost. The Cabinet could fly to Africa, but the millions of people could not. The Cabinet rejected Churchill's offer of a Franco-British Union. Even if it moved to Africa, I think only a handful of the military would have joined it. I doubt it would retain legitimacy. The Nazis would portray this as abandonment. The whole French empire may well have collapsed years before it historically did. We could debate eternally on this and never settle it. Maybe the historic solution was the best that could have been after all.

Re: Bombing moving ships
But who knew this in summer 1940? I doubt the R.N. would risk capital ships where there was serious risk that they might be lost. Although it expressed disdain for airpower in the 1930's, it was quite hesitant, cautious and reluctant to risk its ships under airpower in the Norway battles. The later attacks on French ships in Africa occurred in an aircraft-free environment. The Crete debacle arose from the dire need to try to save 50,000 British and Greek troops who had been out-fought there. The political effect of serious loss of ships in an attack under enemy air superiority could be devastating to the new, un-elected P.M.

Re: Crews
The Kriegsmarine had sailors experienced with the cruisers and heavy cruiser lost in "Weserubung," and some from "panzerschiff Graf Spee." The adaptation would not be extreme. And who can say how much aid they might receive from the French? They could also give the ships to Italy, which had more sailors with capital ship experience.

Re: Royal Sovereign/Archengelsk
The reports are typical of much "Lend-Lease" materiel sent to the S.U. Convoy crews commonly reported goods - even tanks and trucks - unloaded from previous convoys that still sat on the docks. The ship was mostly used for training, as there wasn't any serious Kriegsmarine action for it to be used against. The generally poor education of many Soviet citizens at that time meant that much equipment sent to the S.U. was mis- or under-used. The ship was used, just not very intelligently.

Re: Purpose for acquiring French fleet
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were considered "battlecruisers" by the Allies. The addition of French ships may have influenced Franco to greater Spanish involvement. He may have agreed to Unternehmen "Felix", which would have chased the R.N. out of Gibraltar. The French ships could have been a "bribe" to Spain - "let us take Gibraltar and you get ..." The R.N. would not like to see the Kriegsmarine replace its Norway losses and gain still more. It would have some influence on military, and hence, political planning in Britain. At some point, even the most strident hawk would have to consider easier ways out.

Re: "1st-line R.N (1940)."
Nelson, Rodney, Hood, King George V, Prince of Wales (nearly finished), Duke of York (building), the aircraft carriers, about 36 cruisers and about 100 destroyers. The rest (Repulse, Barham, etc.) basically cannon (or torpedo) fodder.

Re: 'carriers & Regia Marina
Littorio was damaged by air-dropped torpedoes when docked at Taranto. Vittorio Veneto did get minor damage from an air-dropped torpedo. But no 'carrier captain in his right mind would put it in the range of battleship guns. Aircraft trumped ships in WWII, but not when the weather was poor. The R.N. ability to escort did not help then. Glorious and its destroyers were gunnery practice for the German battlecruisers.

Re: older R.N. vs. Italian 1st-line
Rodney, Nelson & Hood could be a decent match for the newer Italian ships due of their armour protection, but the old Queen Elizabeth's or Renown/Repulse couldn't take many 380 mm (15 in.) hits. The Italian ships would have been about on a par with Bismarck/Tirpitz in battle. Bismarck, with only a heavy cruiser in support, sank Hood and sent Prince of Wales running. If it had not lost its steering (to give you a point, due to an air-dropped torpedo), it may have inflicted like damage on King George V and Rodney a few days later and made it to Brest.

Re: fueling an enlarged Axis fleet
Fuel oil/diesel fuel are much less-refined than gasolines. With a bigger fleet, Hitler/Germany could delay delay "Barbarossa" for a while. The S.U. would continue to send fuel as part of the 1939 Pact. Many Luftwaffe aircraft could be grounded, and the aviation gasoline not made could produce a larger quantity of fuel oil. The material was there if the use was correctly ordered and scheduled. Hitler's problem was lack of patience and a clear plan. Indeed, he had no plan for war with Britain at all.

Re: instead of "Sitzkrieg"
Troops and ordnance could have began movment from Poland by mid-September. Of some 2000 tanks used, I'm sure 200 could have been put into one division and some infantry divisions added to attack Netherlands. Denmark fell to less than 2 divisions. In late January 1945, Sixth (S.S.) Armoured Army was moved from the Ardennes across Germany to Hungary, and began Unternehmen Fruhlingserwachen in mid-March. That was with rail delays due to bomb damage, and involved two entire armoured corps as well as other troops. A switch of a limited force to the Netherlands border could have been easily done.

Re: Belgium
From the moment war was declared, anyone in Belgium who did NOT seriously prepare for a likely invasion could only be negligent or a fool - or both. The French already attacked (unsuccessfully) along the German border in mid-September. To say that the Belgian forts were undermanned in the light of this is only proof of my first sentence. What were they waiting for? The Belgians and Dutch both held to strict neutrality, and would not allow West troops to cross their borders unless and until they were attacked by Germany. Yet, by September 1939, they had agreed to "plan ''D'", or "the Dyle Plan," by which the West armies would advance to the Dyle R. No, there was no surprise in May 1940, save the surprise of how well the Wehrmacht fought.

Re: German superiorities
From an article "The Fall of France", by Albert A. Nofi in Strategy & Tactics #27 (1971), in a table on Equipment available: The Battle for France, Spring 1940
Class French British Belgian Dutch Total
M.G. 153,700 11,000 3,600 3400 171,700
However, some 60% of French machine guns were really automatic rifles, and Dutch the figure includes weapons in its colonies - 10% to 20%. Thus the West total is about 120,000. The same table shows German strength of 147,700 .
The Wehrmacht also had a huge numeric and quantitative air superiority.
An edge for the Wehrmacht was that, by "Fall Gelb", it had already fought a successful campaign. The psychological/emotional advantage of this is unmeasurable, but surely significant. I believe that it still would have broken through the West lines. Its massed armour tactic was novel, and the West lacked the tactical sense to hold the shoulders of the breakthrough and lacked the mobile forces to make a successful counter-attack.

Re: Norway joins West?
While Germany's Admiral Wilhelm Canaris warned the Norwegian government of the impending Nazi attack (as he also did Belgium and Netherlands), I find no evidence of any "tacit" agreement by Norway to any of the West plans. In Jan. 1940 the West planned to send a force to aid Finland and also to seize the Swedish iron mines at Gallivare and establish a postion that threatened Germany''s northern flank. This notion was strenuously objected to by both Norway and Sweden, and so did not materialise before Finland collapsed. Norway was NOT happy about the West laying minefields in its waters in April 1940, but had no power to resist the action. Better for a minor neutral to avoid the war completely than to risk aligning with the losing side. Also, Norway and Sweden both profitted by selling and shipping the iron ore to Germany. On the heels of the Great Depression, could either nation risk losing this income to involve in a war that was not their affair - and maybe on the losing side? That would be political suicide within their borders.

[lwd]

Re: possible German-Polish alliance.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact shows a deal can be quickly offered and accepted.

Not a bad analogy.

.. A G-P alliance need not long endure. Upon eliminating the S.U., I'm sure both would have happily gone their ways. After all, Britain and the S.U. were not friendly after 1945.

You are correct about it not enduring long but by far the most likely end would be that if the USSR was "eliminated" Poland would follow in short order. Poland was in Germany's way. They might have used Poland while it was convient to do so but that's about it.

Chamberlain's "guarantee" was a similar complete change of position.

Indeed he had trusted Hitler up to the invasion of Checkoslavakia after that it was clear that Hitler's word was worth about as much as used toilet tissue.

Lloyd George called it "demented" in Parliament.

Why don't I find it surprising that political posturing happened in the British Parliament.

It put Western destiny in the hands of unstable Polish leaders, but could not be fulfilled without S.U. aid. But nothing was done to assure the S.U. would give aid, or that Poland would accept it. Maximum temptation + manifest provocation = DUMB.

Wrong. Hitler clearly did not want war with Britain at that time. A rational leader would have listend to France and Britain and at least consolideate his gains for a while. But Hitler sees to have assumed that they were bluffing. They simply couldn't afford to let Hitler continue to expand his empire unchecked. There was still some hope that he could be convinced not to thus the "line in the sand". Unfortunately for many it didn't work.

The West fought to fulfill its guarantee of Poland's independence and to remove a potential menace to ensure long-term security. It failed dismally.

Did it? That's strange I thought the Nazi's lost WWII.

After history's bloodiest war, it had to agree to S.U. domination of not just Poland, but all eastern Europe. It abandoned its pledge to the Poles who fought by their side. The effort to overcome Hitler left Europe devastated and weak before a much greater menace.

Much greater? I'm not so sure of that. The Soviets may have inflicted even more damage than the Nazis but they did it over a longer term and to their own people. Now just how much the allies had to accpet as far as the Soviet domination of eastern Europe is an interesting question. FDR seems to have misjedged Stalin for much of his time as president and Truman was pretty much left with a fate acompli but if they had listened more to Churchill from the beginning in regards to the Soviets it's not at all clear what would have happened.

Britain's empire dissolved, and the U.K. spent decades as a poor dependent of the U.S.

The Empire was dissolving prior to the start of WWII and would have done so even without the war. I would hardly characterize the British as a "poor dependent of the U.S." in any case. Both countries accepted that they had a lot of mutual interest and worked together well. That's not the same thing.

Re: Hitler's eastern vision
Hitler' wanted to do in the east what the U.S. did in its west - massive ethnic cleansing; forced movement of native people to "reservations; " population reduction by outright massacres, deliberate spreading of disease, and playing one group against another; and establishing paternalistic administrative control. The new Germanic settlers would rule as lords of a quasi-feudal society until cities, roads, etc. could be built.

That's a rather warped way of looking at it IMO. Not to mention factually wrong or at least suspect in several particulars.

Re: "Barbarossa" surprise?
And the Nazi's still sent goods to the S.U.

With declineing regularity. Indeed from what I've read the Germans were considerably in arrears with respect to their trade deal with the USSR.

What of the vaunted Soviet intelligence network and spies like the "Rote Kapelle?" Where did they think the 140 divisions of "Fall Gelb" were?

Again from what I've read some reports of the German preperations were making it to Moscow. Stalin simply didn't believe Hitler was dumb enough to start a two front war.

This is ostrich politics to mask that the S.U. came within a whisker of destruction in 1941. Only Hitler's lack of a clear strategic goal saved the situation. It was much more that Hitler lost rather than Stalin won.

This has been dealt with on a number of threads in several forums. Your opinion is in a very small minority in this regards. The problem wasn't "Hitler's lack of a strategic goal" it was the resistance and resiliance of the Red Army compounded by a poor logistics position on the part of the German army and planning that failed to credit the former.

... Impossible to prove either way, we have only opinions. Mine is that in June 1940, almost all French people were DONE with war. They had fought honourably but lost. The Cabinet could fly to Africa, but the millions of people could not. The Cabinet rejected Churchill's offer of a Franco-British Union. Even if it moved to Africa, I think only a handful of the military would have joined it. I doubt it would retain legitimacy.

The Dutch governement didn't loose it's legitimacy. Furthermore they would have had time to move more than a handful of military to Africa. Admiteedly most of the population would still be in France but the French fleet and most of the French airforce would not be.

The Nazis would portray this as abandonment.

Indeed they might of. What difference would it make however?

The whole French empire may well have collapsed years before it historically did.

That's a possiblity. It's also possible it would have lasted longer but irrelevant to this thread in any case.

Maybe the historic solution was the best that could have been after all.

Or not. Were you aware that the governements of France and Britain almost became united just before the fall of France?

Re: Bombing moving ships
But who knew this in summer 1940? I doubt the R.N. would risk capital ships where there was serious risk that they might be lost.

Well it was pretty clear from what had happened so far. Indeed prewar the thought was that AA fire would be even more effective than it was and the claims right up through late war supported this assessement. And the British historically had been willing to risk their capital ships.

Although it expressed disdain for airpower in the 1930's, it was quite hesitant, cautious and reluctant to risk its ships under airpower in the Norway battles.

Not from my reading.

The Crete debacle arose from the dire need to try to save 50,000 British and Greek troops who had been out-fought there.

Then why did they commit them even before there was a need to rescue anyone? Look what happened to the naval aspect of the Crete invasion.

The political effect of serious loss of ships in an attack under enemy air superiority could be devastating to the new, un-elected P.M.

Or not. By the way what British P.M. was elected?

The Kriegsmarine had sailors experienced with the cruisers and heavy cruiser lost in "Weserubung," and some from "panzerschiff Graf Spee." The adaptation would not be extreme. And who can say how much aid they might receive from the French? They could also give the ships to Italy, which had more sailors with capital ship experience.

Let's see looking at: http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ ... tions.html
Tirpitz is commissioned in February of 41 and is ready for operations in January of 42 almost a year to come up to speed on a German built battleship. Then there's: http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ ... tions.html
Bismarck is commisioned in August of 40 and not ready for operations until May of 41. I make that around 3/4 of a year again on a German built ship. I can't see them or the Italians comming up to speed on French ships any quicker. Indeed I'd expect one to have to add several months to the time line. Especially since they are using a lot of thier crews with their own ships at this time. Then there's the question of what ships and where. Certainly the two new French battleships aren't going to be ready any time soon.

... The ship was used, just not very intelligently.

Well my point is that it wasn't used as a warship. As for how intelligently it was used that's another matter. Putting it into action with a poorly trained crew would have been a mistake. Using it for training and to get some experiance with a decent battelship on the otherhand wasn't a bad idea.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were considered "battlecruisers" by the Allies.

By some perhaps but the Germans considered them battleships.

The addition of French ships may have influenced Franco to greater Spanish involvement. He may have agreed to Unternehmen "Felix", which would have chased the R.N. out of Gibraltar. The French ships could have been a "bribe" to Spain - "let us take Gibraltar and you get ..."

Unlikely. Spain was dependent on fuel and food from overseas. She was in even worse shape than the Italians fuel wise by the way. Then there's the problem that if Franco joings the axis the long and possibly even short term effects are to put the axis in a weaker position.

Re: "1st-line R.N (1940)."
Nelson, Rodney, Hood, King George V, Prince of Wales (nearly finished), Duke of York (building), the aircraft carriers, about 36 cruisers and about 100 destroyers. The rest (Repulse, Barham, etc.) basically cannon (or torpedo) fodder.

Welll the KGV wasn't commissioned until Dec of 40 which means she wasn't worked up at that point so I'd hardly consider her first line in 1940. PoW and DoY are still under construction so they don't qualify. The British did operate a fair number of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers in the Med along with Hood. The older battleships were probably the best of the WWI erra battleships. In 1940 what other opposition do they have in European waters?

Littorio was damaged by air-dropped torpedoes when docked at Taranto. Vittorio Veneto did get minor damage from an air-dropped torpedo. But no 'carrier captain in his right mind would put it in the range of battleship guns. Aircraft trumped ships in WWII, but not when the weather was poor. The R.N. ability to escort did not help then. Glorious and its destroyers were gunnery practice for the German battlecruisers.

Indeed no carrier capatain wants to be in range of the guns of any opposing warship. But in the Med they could and did have battleships operating in conjunction with carriers which can allow the carriers to escape. Indeed Glorious's meager escort didn't help her much against the German battleships but Taffy 3's DD's and DE's did a pretty good job protecting their carriers from a much more potent force. Now add battleships and cruisers and the carriers are hardly sitting ducks. It should also be noted that Glorious was lost in part because she didn't have a CAP up that would have alerted her to the German ships and allowed her to avoid them as well as potentially launch strikes against them.

Rodney, Nelson & Hood could be a decent match for the newer Italian ships due of their armour protection, but the old Queen Elizabeth's or Renown/Repulse couldn't take many 380 mm (15 in.) hits. The Italian ships would have been about on a par with Bismarck/Tirpitz in battle.

I think you somewhat over rate the Italian ships. Certainly they had one of the most advanced armor schemes of any of the modern battleships but even their thickest armor was subject to penetration by the British15" guns at around 22,000 yards. See:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/Pe ... ritain.htm
And since they are an all or nothing design parts of them would be vulnerable at even greater ranges. I'd rate then better than the old British BBs but I'd give three of the old British BB's a better than even chance of taking out 2 of the Italian BBs. The dispersion problems suffered by the Italians could also mean that they don't show up as well as expected. Of course the Italian battleships aren't really operational until late in the year either. Here's a rather interesting if somewhat dated battleship comparison page you might want to take a look at.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm
I think they rather underestimate the German firecontrol and possibly the Italain armor scheme so those ships should probably rate a bit higher. However it's not going to move them anywhere near the top. Unfortunatly it doesn't rate the older battleships.

Bismarck, with only a heavy cruiser in support, sank Hood and sent Prince of Wales running.

And was very lucky to do so. It also took a mission killing hit from POW in the process. POW wasn't fully worked up either and only ran until she could get some of her guns back in operation. The gunnery problems were not due to anything the Germans did by the way.

If it had not lost its steering (to give you a point, due to an air-dropped torpedo), it may have inflicted like damage on King George V and Rodney a few days later and made it to Brest.

Put Bismarck in the historical situation only without the steering problem and she gets sent to the bottom in approximately the same time fram 9 times out of 10. She probably would inflict more damage on the British but possibly not. Of coure if you had a very accurate simulation of Denmark straits and ran it a hundred times I doubt even one would have the Germans coming out of the encounter as well as they did historially.

Re: fueling an enlarged Axis fleet
Fuel oil/diesel fuel are much less-refined than gasolines. With a bigger fleet, Hitler/Germany could delay delay "Barbarossa" for a while. The S.U. would continue to send fuel as part of the 1939 Pact. Many Luftwaffe aircraft could be grounded, and the aviation gasoline not made could produce a larger quantity of fuel oil.

But aren't you going to need those LW planes for shipping strikes? In any case I think you fail to comprehend just how much fuel a battleship can burn. If you look at: http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm it notes that a Kongo class battleship can burn almost 10 tons and hour at cruising speed and that consumption can tripple in going from 16 to 25 knots. So if your new battleships are training just during daylight hours they can be burning 100-300+ tons of fuel a day. Burn at the 300 ton rate and in 3 months they will have burned up 1% of the German oil production for the year (1940 oil productioin was ~3,300,000 tons Wages of Destruction). The older battleships will probably be about the same so 10 battleships training for 3 months = 10% of the yearly fuel production. Given that it took 9 months or so at a minimum to get a well trained crew and you have burned almost a third of the years oil production! It's also not clear how much longer the Soviets would continue to ship oil to the Germans as the latter had fallen significantly behind in their deliveries from what I've read.

The material was there if the use was correctly ordered and scheduled.

That's not at all clear.

Hitler's problem was lack of patience and a clear plan. Indeed, he had no plan for war with Britain at all.

It wasn't so much his lack of patience. His economic and political policies had put Germany in a bind. After 1940 they would have fallen progressivly behind the allies as far as military production and prepairedness went. Germany was nearly bankrupt in the late 30's and probably would have been by the early 40's even with the infusion of the gold reserves of Austria and Checkoslavakia. He had created a situation where it was now or never and of course he didn't really want to go to war with the British and viewed them as a potential ally (his inability to take out Britian being another reason that Chamberlains promise wasn't all that bad of idea.

Troops and ordnance could have began movment from Poland by mid-September.

Some possibly, how many is an open question.

Of some 2000 tanks used, I'm sure 200 could have been put into one division and some infantry divisions added to attack Netherlands.

Just how quickly do you think they could do this? Do you have any idea of what this takes logistically?

In late January 1945, Sixth (S.S.) Armoured Army was moved from the Ardennes across Germany to Hungary, and began Unternehmen Fruhlingserwachen in mid-March. That was with rail delays due to bomb damage, and involved two entire armoured corps as well as other troops.

Rail delays aren't usually the main problem. This was a unit moving as such. They also had a lot of practice by then. Out of curiosity how many tanks were in said armored corps?

A switch of a limited force to the Netherlands border could have been easily done.

The question isn't whether it would have been easy or not it's how long would it have taken.

From an article "The Fall of France", by Albert A. Nofi in Strategy & Tactics #27 (1971), in a table on Equipment available: The Battle for France, Spring 1940
Class French British Belgian Dutch Total
M.G. 153,700 11,000 3,600 3400 171,700
However, some 60% of French machine guns were really automatic rifles, and Dutch the figure includes weapons in its colonies - 10% to 20%. Thus the West total is about 120,000. The same table shows German strength of 147,700 .

That doesn't look like all that much of a superiority to me. Especially for an attacking force.

... the West lacked the tactical sense to hold the shoulders of the breakthrough and lacked the mobile forces to make a successful counter-attack.

Yet the British made at least one that was partially successful. Give them a bit more time and who knows.

Re: Norway joins West?
While Germany's Admiral Wilhelm Canaris warned the Norwegian government of the impending Nazi attack (as he also did Belgium and Netherlands), I find no evidence of any "tacit" agreement by Norway to any of the West plans.

Well this page: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/ju ... ay-02.html states that the Germans believed it was going to happen. That of course doesn't mean that it was but it certainly raises the possibility. I'll look a bit more and see what I can find.

I should point out that we are getting way off topic here and the posts are getting longer. Perhaps it would be a worthwhile to ask one of the admins to seperate this into another thread.

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd:
Re: G-P alliance future
Poland crushed after an S.U. demise? Maybe not. Nazi ideology flexed to suit the purpose. It tolerated Wends (Sorbs), of whom 60,000-90,000 still live in Sachsen and Brandenburg. It ignored their Slavic heritage, calling them "Wendish-speaking Germans." Himmler enticed Yugoslav Muslims into the S.S. He ignored their Slavic heritage, saying they were descended from Goths.
If Poland was later crushed, its fate could scarcely be worse than what was visited upon it by WWII and the aftermath. Alliance with the Nazis (the "3 Colonels" had a similar ideology) would at least buy a few years for some people to get out. Perhaps some of my 36 relatives who vanished near the end of WWII may have survived.

Re: Lloyd George
Churchill, of Chamberlain's own party, also roundly excoriated the "guarantee" in his magnum opus "The Second World War", Vol. 1 (pp. 311-2 Houghton-Mifflin 1948-54 edition).

Re: guarantee
You express what may have been Chamberlain's intent upon making the guarantee but, like him, overlook its implications. It left Hitler unable to retreat from his stance without "losing face." He was eager to prove the futility of the unsupported and ill-considered guarantee. The "3 Colonels" were encouraged to not even bother to negotiate. The rash, undiplomatic move only guaranteed war.

Re: Western failure
The Nazis lost the war, but so did Poland and the West. Poland's independence - a West cause for war - was lost for 50 years as it became an unwilling, exploited colony of totalitarians. Whether misery visits from west or east, it is still misery. The other West cause for war was to ensure its security. Yes, the West overcame Beelzebub. But it had to ally with Satan to do so. All east and central Europe was thereby victimised for 50 years. The West - and the world - was forced to confront a much larger menace than it faced in 1939. Britain has since been just a shadow of its former self. Ditto for France. Today, Germany is Europe's dominant economic and political entity - which the West tried to prevent in 1939, just as it did in 1918 and 1648. So yes, the West failed, and it failed dismally. I wonder: when Hitler gets a break from painting the walls of Hell, does he have a good belly-laugh about this?

Re: S.U. menace
Absolutely EVERY person I have ever spoken to who lived under any of the Fascist and then the Soviet regimes said their sense of freedom, quality of life, and economic security were much higher under Fascism. The difference is that the Nazi aim was eastward. The only threat to the West was to lose their economic hegemony. Due to, and since WWII, they have lost it anyway.
The S.U. aimed to absorb western Europe. Who knew what Stalin would have done had he lived a few more years? And so N.A.T.O. kept thousands of mechanised troops in western Europe for 40 years. A possible WWIII was the subject of many books. in fiction, S.U. conquest of Europe was why the "droogs" in Burgess's "A Clockwork Orange" used an argot with many words of Russian origin. It was why my (Canadian) home town had an air-raid siren test every Saturday at 1 p.m. and why we did air-raid drills in school 4 times a year in the 1950's and '60's.
F.D.R. was unskilled in world politics, and may have had dementia in his last couple of years. But bi-polar Churchill spoke out of both sides of his mouth. What would have happened had CHURCHILL listened to Churchill about the S.U. right from the start? - He would not have enticed Britain into allying with them. Then, maybe east and central Europe would not have been Soviet colonies for 45 years. He said he had no with to be the King's First Minister during the dismemberment of the British empire, but who did more to assure that dismemberment? In 1947, he said "We killed the wrong pig." Did he speak of Hitler, Stalin, or himself?

Re: British dependence
N. America shipped millions of C.A.R.E. packages to Britain in the 1950's. Many thousands of British emigrated to Canada. To a person, the ones I know or have met spoke of years of going to bed to dream of meat and the vastly better, higher living standard here. Britain had U.S. military bases on its soil for decades. Latterly, it is a shameless catamite for "Yankee Imperialism" masquerading as "security." Its empire may have been fading pre-WWII, but its government had delusions of grandeur that led to a deleriously optimistic foreign policy. The empire died by suicide. Britain and France would have fared much better by standing aside to let the Nazis and S.U. beat each other to death.

Re: Hitler's eastern vision and U.S.
Your opinion on "how the West was won" in the U.S. is painfully naive. Custer was not bringing free beer, pizza and ice cream to the natives camped at Little Big Horn. Read Dee Brown's "Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee" as just one example.

Re: "Barbarossa" surprise
Yes, Germany allegedly was in arrears on its 'Pact shipments. Had Stalin not wilfully self-deceived, he would, upon that realisation, suspect that something was rotten south of Denmark. As I said before: no surprise save for how badly the Red Army was slapped around. On your faith in other opinions, I remind that it is not a popularity contest. With a cogent German strategic plan, the S.U. may well have fallen in 1941. E.g.; if the time/energy spent on Kiev was used towards Moscow, THAT city would have fallen, and Kiev may have had to be abandoned without a fight, all months before Sorge's intelligence let the S.U. move its Siberian Front westward.

Re: Soviet intelligence & Stalin
Was it that Stalin didn't think Hitler "dumb", or that he knew the Red Army was still in poor shape and wished - to the point of denying reality - that an attack would not come until 1942? That's better explains his three week disappearance from view and inactivity after 22 June. It's called "nervous dysentery."

Re: French move to N. Africa
The Dutch government retained authority because its monarchy (the people loved the queen) did not want war, and hoped it would pass by as iin 1914. The French government declared war on Germany, although this was widely unpopular with its people. By mid-June 1940, its army was melting away like the snow each day as soldiers removed uniforms and "walked off the job." Much of its air force was in pieces on the French soil and most of what remained was decidedly inferior to the Luftwaffe. Most of the Cabinet wanted peace and Reynaud resigned. Significant French continuation in the war after this was unrealistic. Had Britain been equally over-run, I think it would have surrendered too, quite irrespective of what Churchill was smoking in his cigars.

Re: effect of Nazi propaganda
On French retreat to N. Africa, a propaganda campaign accusing the government of abandoning the people would resonate within any military that was moved. These soldiers, with family and friends in now-occupied France, would know the danger to these citizens that continued fighting would bring. Morale would be low, desertion rife, and overall fighting quality very poor. Most people, most of the time, do not need to be told when the situation is hopeless.

Re: Anglo-Franco Union
Was I aware of this possibility? Yes. I wrote that it was REJECTED by the French Cabinet, but am do not recal specifics of the offer. Based on the Anglo-Franco Union I live in (Canada), I doubt it would have come to pass. It only exists here because Britain defeated France in the Seven Year's War. The Quebecois still moan 250 years later. Today, Britain and France are daily at loggerheads in the E.U. The Union idea would be like re-starting the Napoleonic Wars.

Re: R.N. willingness to risk capital ships
The R.N. would risk in clear need (e.g; Crete evacuation) but wasn't reckless. To attack a hypothetical surrendered French fleet at Toulon in July 1940 that lay under a Luftwaffe/Italian umbrella would epitomise "reckless." The R.N. did not risk capital ships to attack the German ships at Brest or during the 1942 "Channel dash" - too much Luftwaffe around.

Re: R.N. at Norway 1940
"The British countermoves were slow, hesitant, and bungled [at Norway].
When it came to the point of action the Admirality, despite its pre-war
disdain for airpower, became extremely cautious and shrank from risking
ships at the places where the intervention could have been decisive." -
Liddell Hart, "Histopry of the Second World War", Putnam, 1970, p. 52.
There are others.

Re: Crete & R.N.
Small R.N. ships tried to prevent re-supply/re-inforcement by sea, with mixed results, as the battle was still contested. But the dung really hit the fan when Gen. Freyburg reported that the British position was hopeless and evacuation began.

Re: Parliamentary politics
No P.M. is elected by popular vote. Each party enters an election with a leader chosen by the party. The leader of the party that obtains the most seats is asked by the monarch (G.G. here in "the colonies") to form a government and sits as P.M. A leader can be replaced. Save in exceptional circumstances (e.g; war), any new leader almost always calls an election to secure legitimacy from the electorate. On the first opportunity (after 5 years) British electors had to declare their opinion of Churchill as P.M., he was GONE. Very few would risk the political repercussion of sending the fleet where its chance of incurring heavy losses was high, except in a desperate act in lieu of surrender. Britain's July 1940 situation would not have been so dire even if the entire French fleet fell to Germany.

Re: Readiness of surrendered ships
You assume time from commissioning to operational service for a new ship to be the same as for ships already in service (e.g.; Dunkerque). But operational ships would not need this much time. Yes, a lengthy period would be needed for the incomplete Jean Bart. I'm sure Mussolini would gladly pull crews from his pre-WWI ships to man newer French ships.

Re: use of Royal Sovereign/Archangelsk
This is like the situation I describe above. Poorly-trained crew or not, if the S.U. position was dire, I'm sure the ship would have been sent into action. Suppose the S.U. got the ship in 1941: If no other purpose, its 15 in. guns could have been used to bombard German units in the Murmansk-Petsamo area.

Re: Scharnhorst und Gniesenau
Called "schlachtschiffe" in Nazi propaganda to impress the yokels, but faster than almost all battleships and armed with only 280 mm. main guns (although excellent weapons), they were truly battlecruisers. Had the mid-war plan to replace their 280's with 380's came to pass, THEN they would truly be battleships.

Re: Spain & Gibraltar
I grant this is an extreme possibility: Spain was in disarray after its civil war. But Franco may have "accepted a gift" while staying neutral just to get Britain out of Gibraltar He only had to allow transit across Spanish land. He could even plead military weakness to prevent it.

Re: 1st-line R.N. (1940)
Granted not much significant opposition. It would be interesting to know how the Renown vs. Scharnhorst/Gneisenau would have ended, had they met in fair weather. This reinforces the importance if the Axis had acquired the French capital ships.

Re: Littorio etc.
WWII was the swan song of the capital ship. The fate of the giant Japanese battleships against airpower assured that. But the fact remains even today - if one big-gunned ship gets through the escort, a 'carrier is a floating coffin.

Re: Rodney, Nelson et.
We must acknowledge too much speculation. The ideal conditions for a "duel" of big ships rarely arose, and it isn't sport anyway. A lot of poor souls died in such ships. Certainly Italy's Roma (sister of Littorio & Vittorio Veneto) sank rather quickly when hit by a guided bomb. I hold the R.N. ships in low regard because it lost ships at Jutland in WWI from weak deck armour and Hood's fate shows the flaw was not fixed 25 years later. The Queen Elizabeth's were proven torpedo fodder, and Nelson would have been too, but for defective German torpedoes.

Re: Bismarck fights
Bismarck was better-armoured and fired a heavier shell than its R.N. foes. Ii could take their best and return more than they could handle. I don't see Denmark Strait as "luck" for Bismarck. Rather, it was for Prince of Wales, because it should have been pursued and sunk too.
In its duels, Bismarck fire was mostly directed on the ship with the biggest guns (Hood & Rodney). Against an undamaged Bismarck, Rodney would not have fared any better against its 380's than Hood did. When Ballard examined the Bismarck wreck, he noted many 14 in. (Prince, King) shell dents - they just bounced off. Besides damage from the Denmark Strait fight or Swordfish attacks, Rodney fired 380 X 16 in. and 716 X 6 in. shells at Bismarck. King fired 339 X 14 in. and 660 X 5.25 in. It is believed there were about 300 hits. Finally, after about 10 torpedoes hits, it does seem Bismarck was scuttled to sink it. No R.N. ship could endure like pounding.

Re: Axis fuel supply
Without "Barbarossa", About 1/2 of the Luftwaffe could be temporarily grounded, as could the air forces of the lesser Axis allies. In particular, most of the fighters could sit. Big ships are thirsty, but only at sea. Fleets spend most of the time in port. Despite its bleating about fuel, the Kriegsmarine always seemed to find fuel to sortie about as many submarines as it could get built. Every organisation has more actual resources than it admits to head office. Accurate, honest accounting, less upper echelon extravagance, and actual planning rather than the haphazard emotionalism that plagued Axis "strategy" could have achieved much. The problem is that this is a very difficult, if not impossible point to empirically prove.

Re: Hitler, patience and German economy
Economically, Germany wasn't any worse off than most nations in the late Depression era. Its main shortcoming was the neo-Victorian Nazi "motherhood" ideology that kept most women and many other able workers out of the productive labour force. Far too many were in service industry work.
From Britain's perspective, there was much to value in letting Hitler go his way in the east. Eradicating Bolshevism may have diminished the militancy in the labour force. Assurance that Germany looked only east would let Britain leave continental Europe to its own designs and shore up its empire, shaping a "Commonwealth" several years sooner than it did (which was too late). The flaws of Chamberlain's Polish
"guarantee" leave it an illogical course to pursue. It was inexpedient and only caused a huge number of people to die unnecessarily.

Re: unit transfers to Netherlands border from east
This would not have been difficult. About five infantry divisions could be taken from 5 Armee, already on the west border. Another five infantry divisions and an armoured division could easily have been spared to move west by mid-September. If needed, the armour could be obtained by pulling one regiment from a few divisions. The German rail net was superb, and the army had great experience amassed since before WWI at rapid transfer of troops and materiel. In 1939, there were no bombed junctions or risk of attack by enemy aircraft to impede progress. I did not suggest that Netherlands HAD to be attacked on 1 October, but I think that date could have been met. As noted before, on 24 January 1945, ALL of 6 Armoured Army, with I and II S.S. armoured corps (larger than average divisions) was rail-shipped from the Ardennes to Hungary and was in the line within three weeks, despite the severely disrupted rail net and frequent Allied air attacks. I can not find records on how many of the much larger and heavier late-war tanks/assault guns were with the Armee. Unternehmen Fruhlingserwachen began on 6 March 1945 with 900 tanks and 877 assault guns, but it is unclear how these were apportioned among the armies involved.

Re: German 1940 machine gun superiority
My mistake. I got the numbers backwards. French Army machine guns were about 61,500, NOT 92,200 as I originally counted. Add British, Belgian and assume 90% of Dutch, this is about 79,100 for the Allies. The Germans had 147,700, a nearly 2 to 1 edge, exacerbated as most German guns were the excellent MG-34, but almost all French/Belgian/Dutch were WWI vintage. Most of the British weapons were newer.

Re: British counterattack
It is invalid to put faith on a partly successful counterattack and assume that it might be fully successful with a few more days time to prepare. That's like the guys I used to drag-race who lost, but their car "wasn't running right." The next time, they had a new excuse. More time would also mean more time for the free-wheeling German tanks to fully encircle the British Army and ensure that nobody broke out.

Re: Norway
A lot of revisionism seems to attach to Norway over WWII. Some of this tries to pretend that it seriously contemplated joining the West. This is likely the greatly exaggerated wish of a limited number. It would be countered by the pro-Nazi group led by Vidkun Quisling. There's a film about some Norwegian super-hero resistance fighter. So how about a film about the 12,000 children born in Norway to German soldier fathers and Norwegian mothers? It could explain why, after the war's end, almost all of these children were taken into government custody and many of the women were confined in psychiatric hospitals. But truth hurts, so don't expect to see such a film any time soon.

[lwd]

Per our private discussion I'm asking the mods to split this into one or more appropriate threads.

[ljadw]

I see that the monster of Loch Ness (the myth of the importance of the Guarantee to Poland) has appeared again.
In contrast to what is saying Ronald Lameck<The guarantee was a complete change of position<,after the guarantee,appeasement continued :Chamberlain was no Saul,who ,having seen the light,had become a Paul.In fact,the importance of the guarantee was that small,that one can say the guarantee was unimportant .
It did not influence the policy of Britain,neither the policy of Germany,neither the policy of Poland ,and thus,it was not influencing what was to come .There also is no proof that the Polish government was considering the guarantee as something important .
If we are looking on what was happening,the picture becomes clear.
After the coup of Prague,irresponsable British jounalists (a tautology)in search of something sensational,were writing that a German attack was imminent on Poland,Romania,Belgium,Holland,and,even Britain (of course,the usual jounalistic BS).HMG,as always afraid of Fleet Street (I don't know why)replied by giving a guarantee to Poland and Romania (also in the name of the nothing knowing French).As there was no German attack,every one was saying that Hitler was shrinking back because of the roaring of the British Lion ,who had said :Fido,quit ,back in the kennel,and,as the elections were nearing,it would secure a lot of marginal districts (which,IMHO,was the principal reason of the guarantee).
After the guarantee,it was business as usual:appeasement ,till the end of august (the Wohlstadt talkings).
With or without the guarantee,there would be a war between Germany and Poland,and Britain would be involved .
Last point:it was not so that in 1939,Chamberlain was taken up by the quarrel between Germany and Poland,he was taken up by the nearing elections,after all,he was PM and party leader.His foreign policy was subordinated to,conditioned by the most important thing for a politician :winning the elections .

[ljadw]

And,a German-Polish alliance (against the SU) :another fish of Loch Ness:that would be very stupid of Poland (as would be an alliance with the SU against Germany) :such an alliance would result in to Poland becoming a German /Soviet satellite .It would destroy the statu quo,and the survival of Poland as an independant state .
Why was there between 1919/1939 an independant Polish state ? Because the 2 hostile neighbours of Poland (Germany and the SU) were neutralizing each other:Germany could not attack Poland because of the SU,and the SU could not attack Poland because of Germany .If one of both fell away,Poland would be at the not tender mercies of the other ,as did happen in 1945.

[Ronald Lameck]

For ljadw:
You are misinformed. In the Great Depression, a National Government was formed in Britain. It was legitimised by election in 1931. It was a coalition of the Conservatives, most of the Labour Party, and some others and formed a huge majority in the House of Commons.
It was re-elected in Nov. 1935 with Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister and more than 75% of the seats in the House. In May, 1937, after George VI's coronation, Baldwin resigned as P.M. and as a Member of Parliament. The government selected Neville Chamberlain as the new P.M.
Britain has never had a formal, written constitution. It operates by tradition and precedent. Barring a crisis of confidence, the government is never compelled to have a general election. However, to ensure legitimacy, it generally calls one about every 5 years. In a proclaimed national emergency (e.g; war), there can be many years between elections. From 1935, there was NO general election in Britain until after the end of WWII in Europe. The Labour Party quit the coalition and demanded an election, which was held in July, 1945.
There was NO election or related political posturing for Chamberlain to concern himself with. His party had a massive majority, and would have little to no concern about the results of any by-elections. He made his guarantee on 31 March 1939. There were ZERO "acts of appeasement" by Britain's government after that date. The guarantee was regarded as an act of aggression by the Nazis. It spurred Hitler to make a deal with the S.U., which was completed on 23 August 1939. When the British heard of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (most of its particulars were NOT revealed), the Foreign Office made some drastic offers to try to steer the Nazis away from marching the Wehrmacht. These included offering to return German colonies in Africa that were given to Britain in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that formally ended WWI.
For a concise review of the 12 months before the outbreak of WWII, there are numerous books you may read. Off hand, I suggest "On Borrowed Time" by Leonard Mosley, published c. 1970.

[ljadw]

No,the last elections were in 1935,that means that the would be elections before june 1940(the commons could "sit" only for a maximum of 5 years,and,everything is indicating that Chamberlain would dissolve parliament and call new elections in 1939(he could do this when he liked).
The Tories were already preparing these elections,immediately after the 1935 elections.The guarantee woulf secure a lot of conservative marginal constituencies(a swing of a few % could result in a defeat for the Tories),because,the perception of the guarantee was,that it had made Hitler shrinking,and that it had saved peace (as Munich)
The guarantee(end march) had nothing to do with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (end august) .
As the Polish Author Anna Cenciala was writing (in :Poland and the Western Powers,1938-1939):(p 225)
The guarantee was more the result of political pressure on Chamberlain than of any fear of immediate German attack on Poland.
The PM and his advisers did not see the guarantee as a radical change of policy
and on P 227:
the guarantee was neither a rigid commitment to Poland nor was it conceived to imply any possibility of direct military aid ,and at best,it was seen as a diplomatic deterrent .
The whole guarantee thing is( to paraphrase Shakespeare):a lot of blahblah about nothing .