Wehrmacht Motorization Effort

[Morshead]

Does anyone have info on German capacity to motorize more of its infantry formations and any stats covering truck production and costs/unit in RMarks?

[John W. Howard]

Hello Morshead:
I am not sure if the issue was really Germany's ability to motorize more of its infantry, or if the issue was finding the fuel to operate any new transportation constructed. Fuel was a critical factor for Germany throughout the war, and the problem only became worse as the war progressed. Best wishes.

[ljadw]

Hm,IMHO,it was more a problem of producing motor vehicles,and,till 1944,there was no shortage of oil .
The total production was(imports included)
in 1940:6868000 tons (consumption:5,856 million)
1941:8,885 (consumption 7,305)
1942:8,8965 (consumption:6483)
1943:10,497(consumption :6971)
1944: 6,504

[John W. Howard]

Hello ljadw:
Regardless of the production figures you quote, there were shortages of fuel at the sharp end of combat units throughout the war. The Germans planned for fuel economy in their campaigns, because they already accepted limited supplies as a fact of life, which may explain some of the figures you quote. A severe shortage of transport was also a problem, as you point out, due to its low construction priority. My point is simply that transport construction and the fuel to run it are linked; I am not sure how having 500 extra trucks in Russia in October 1941 would have helped the Wehrmacht, when they were 24,000 barrels of oil short of the bare minimum needed for the very limited number of vehicles they already had, unless the 500 were oil tankers Best wishes.