My opinion is that had Germany invaded North Africa (shortly after the conclusion of hostilities in France) in force the British would have been powerless to stop them. From Tripoli to the Suez, then on to the oil fields of the Middle East. The loss of the Middle East oil fields plus the axis having complete control of the Mediterranean Sea in theory would have knocked England out of the war. Once the British were out of the Mediterranean, the Balkans would have fallen like dominoes.
In my opinion it was a vast waste of time and resources trying to knock England out of the war directly. A much better strategy would have been to conquer the Mediterranean and the Middle East than trying to invade England.
Whether the USSR would have sat idly by while all this was happening is anyone's guess.
North Africa instead of the Battle of Britian?
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phylo_roadking
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Re: North Africa instead of the Battle of Britian?
In no particular order....
1/ The Italians by the end of the summer refused Hitler a role in the war in the Med, though they did during the winter after accept Fliergrkorps X' assistance. Without the Italians - Germany had NO point of access to land contact with the British....and no way of mounting an operation from the South of France.
2/ It wasn't a straight line from the Armistice with France to the start of the Battle of Britain and the planning for Sealion; for 4-6 weeks after the fall of France Hitler ventured his "diplomatic offensive" regarding Britain....and ONLY issued Directive No.16 in mid-July AFTER it became clear that the British were not interested in coming to terms. That pushes any German ambitions in the Med back even further towards the start of the Italian offensives, and the time at the end of the summer when Mussolini said thanks but no thanks.
3/ The Luftwaffe were already engaged in attacking the British Isles long before the "official" start of the BoB; they began attacks on British ports and industries from the end of June onwards, after they had made up losses from the Battle of France and repositioned themsmevles in Brittany, Normandy and western France. LW tactical planners were firmly wedded to a Douhet-style attack on the British "home base" and seem to have worked on the basis that noone told them NOT to!
As late as 1942, LW officers in training were STILL being lectured on strategic bombing priorities in the UK (John Ray)
4/ as far as "not being able to stop them" - a major land campaign in North Africa would have required a major transfer of men and materiel from Europe to Libya...and left that sea-bridge open to disruption by the RN - who in the shape of Force H and the East Med Squadron were totally UN-attrited at that point. naval events in the Med in 1940 and early 1941 before the major losses around Crete show that 1/ the Italian RM wasn't willing to come out and play, 2/ the RN tried frequently to "persuade" them out...and on the occasion that they did encounter them - bettered them, 3/ were prepared to shell Italian ports etc. and of course 4/ the GERMANS had NO naval assets in the Med at that point...and never managed to bring any there EXCEPT a number of smaller vessels recovered after Toulon in 1942 and a couple of French destroyers that were being built at the time of the Armistice and were finished many years later.
5/ the RAF mounted a small but relatively effective bombing campaign from Malta against Italian ports and cities through the middle of 1940. RAF bomber squadrons en route to the Middle East would stage through Malta....but "rest" there for a couple of weeks, and operating out of Hal Far bomb Italian targets....then fly depart for the Delta - to be replaced by the NEXT RAF squadron en route!
6/ One important thing to remember was that the British were already reading a degree of German "Enigma" encoded material by the summer of 1940 - particularly LW material. Not actual movement orders etc. - these would be sent "hard copy" - but Intelligence reports etc. That's how they knew about the analysis mistakes being made by Beppo Schmidt in Berlin about Fighter Command losses. So the British were bound to get SOME hint of what was coming....and remember by the end of August historically, they had already taken the decision to send troops abroad - four LARGE convoys heading for the Far East but dropping men and materiel in the Middle East on the way...
Without a risk of invasion being maintained, the British are freer earlier to move parts of the re-forming and re-equiping BEF and the 19 divisions in the UK as of the end of June 1940 abroad, along with the Canadian and other Commonwealth forces gathering in England. That for instance frees up the 1st and 2nd Canadian infantry divisions by the middle of the summer, and the two Austalian/New Zealand brigade groups there could go abroad a month to six weeks earlier than historical.
Something that HAS to be remembered is - the British WANTED land contact with the enemy! Which is one of the reasons they took the decision to move troops abroad even though the risk of invasion was still real in August. Here - that risk is diminished, and the British are freer to move sooner.
1/ The Italians by the end of the summer refused Hitler a role in the war in the Med, though they did during the winter after accept Fliergrkorps X' assistance. Without the Italians - Germany had NO point of access to land contact with the British....and no way of mounting an operation from the South of France.
2/ It wasn't a straight line from the Armistice with France to the start of the Battle of Britain and the planning for Sealion; for 4-6 weeks after the fall of France Hitler ventured his "diplomatic offensive" regarding Britain....and ONLY issued Directive No.16 in mid-July AFTER it became clear that the British were not interested in coming to terms. That pushes any German ambitions in the Med back even further towards the start of the Italian offensives, and the time at the end of the summer when Mussolini said thanks but no thanks.
3/ The Luftwaffe were already engaged in attacking the British Isles long before the "official" start of the BoB; they began attacks on British ports and industries from the end of June onwards, after they had made up losses from the Battle of France and repositioned themsmevles in Brittany, Normandy and western France. LW tactical planners were firmly wedded to a Douhet-style attack on the British "home base" and seem to have worked on the basis that noone told them NOT to!
As late as 1942, LW officers in training were STILL being lectured on strategic bombing priorities in the UK (John Ray)4/ as far as "not being able to stop them" - a major land campaign in North Africa would have required a major transfer of men and materiel from Europe to Libya...and left that sea-bridge open to disruption by the RN - who in the shape of Force H and the East Med Squadron were totally UN-attrited at that point. naval events in the Med in 1940 and early 1941 before the major losses around Crete show that 1/ the Italian RM wasn't willing to come out and play, 2/ the RN tried frequently to "persuade" them out...and on the occasion that they did encounter them - bettered them, 3/ were prepared to shell Italian ports etc. and of course 4/ the GERMANS had NO naval assets in the Med at that point...and never managed to bring any there EXCEPT a number of smaller vessels recovered after Toulon in 1942 and a couple of French destroyers that were being built at the time of the Armistice and were finished many years later.
5/ the RAF mounted a small but relatively effective bombing campaign from Malta against Italian ports and cities through the middle of 1940. RAF bomber squadrons en route to the Middle East would stage through Malta....but "rest" there for a couple of weeks, and operating out of Hal Far bomb Italian targets....then fly depart for the Delta - to be replaced by the NEXT RAF squadron en route!
6/ One important thing to remember was that the British were already reading a degree of German "Enigma" encoded material by the summer of 1940 - particularly LW material. Not actual movement orders etc. - these would be sent "hard copy" - but Intelligence reports etc. That's how they knew about the analysis mistakes being made by Beppo Schmidt in Berlin about Fighter Command losses. So the British were bound to get SOME hint of what was coming....and remember by the end of August historically, they had already taken the decision to send troops abroad - four LARGE convoys heading for the Far East but dropping men and materiel in the Middle East on the way...
Without a risk of invasion being maintained, the British are freer earlier to move parts of the re-forming and re-equiping BEF and the 19 divisions in the UK as of the end of June 1940 abroad, along with the Canadian and other Commonwealth forces gathering in England. That for instance frees up the 1st and 2nd Canadian infantry divisions by the middle of the summer, and the two Austalian/New Zealand brigade groups there could go abroad a month to six weeks earlier than historical.
Something that HAS to be remembered is - the British WANTED land contact with the enemy! Which is one of the reasons they took the decision to move troops abroad even though the risk of invasion was still real in August. Here - that risk is diminished, and the British are freer to move sooner.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds