Were thre Greek volunteers in Wermacht or Waffen SS?
If yes - how many?
Thanks at advance.
Greek volunteers
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sid guttridge
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There is a book by Axis Europa that covers exactly this subject.
From memory, I think the Greek security battalions raised by the Germans in 1943-44 enlisted in total about two-thirds as many men as the Greek Communist partisans had at their peak before the Germans withdrew.
This was common all over the Balkans. For example, there were probably still more Slovenes in German-sponsored units at the end of 1944 than there were in the four Yugoslav Communist Partisan divisions operating in the same country at that time. Shortly before Italy's fall in September 1943 there were almost as many men in Italian-sponsored Albanian units as there were active Albanian guerrillas of all political persuasions combined. The Croat armed forces were always more numerous than Tito's partisans operating in the country before September 1944 at the earliest.
Of all the underground forces in the Balkans only the Chetniks were always significantly more numerous in Serbia and Montenergro than local German-sponsored collaborationist forces and at times it was a debatable point where the Chetnik organisation ended and the collaborationist forces began.
Cheers,
Sid.
From memory, I think the Greek security battalions raised by the Germans in 1943-44 enlisted in total about two-thirds as many men as the Greek Communist partisans had at their peak before the Germans withdrew.
This was common all over the Balkans. For example, there were probably still more Slovenes in German-sponsored units at the end of 1944 than there were in the four Yugoslav Communist Partisan divisions operating in the same country at that time. Shortly before Italy's fall in September 1943 there were almost as many men in Italian-sponsored Albanian units as there were active Albanian guerrillas of all political persuasions combined. The Croat armed forces were always more numerous than Tito's partisans operating in the country before September 1944 at the earliest.
Of all the underground forces in the Balkans only the Chetniks were always significantly more numerous in Serbia and Montenergro than local German-sponsored collaborationist forces and at times it was a debatable point where the Chetnik organisation ended and the collaborationist forces began.
Cheers,
Sid.
Hi Vladimir
David Littlejohn, (Foreign Legions of the Third Reich vol.3, page 92-95), only a brief describtion of Greek volunteers.
It appears that the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece formed volunteer Gendarmerie units (Ethelontiki Chorophylaki). These units was mainly outfitted with German police and military uniforms and wore a national flag on the upper left arm.
One of the units (often named after its individual commander) was called Poulos Verband.
All the best
Chris
David Littlejohn, (Foreign Legions of the Third Reich vol.3, page 92-95), only a brief describtion of Greek volunteers.
It appears that the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece formed volunteer Gendarmerie units (Ethelontiki Chorophylaki). These units was mainly outfitted with German police and military uniforms and wore a national flag on the upper left arm.
One of the units (often named after its individual commander) was called Poulos Verband.
All the best
Chris
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas
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Vic Nicholas
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The Poulos Verband were blood thirsty murderers who because of their repulsive actions actually created more enemies than friends....
I know a fair bit about this topic in general....the Greeks were first class collaborators....behind you when you are winning changing sides and stabbing you in the back when you are losing.
Real reliable, honest types.
Vic
I know a fair bit about this topic in general....the Greeks were first class collaborators....behind you when you are winning changing sides and stabbing you in the back when you are losing.
Real reliable, honest types.
Vic
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sid guttridge
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Hi Vic,
I think you do the Greeks an injustice. In WWII Royalists, Republicans and Communists were in the Allied camp. The problem was that they were not all in the same Greek camp themselves. As a result they tended to spend a great deal of time squabbling and fighting amongst themselves and were rather less use to the Allies in the second half of the war than they might have been. (There is no doubting the courage and sacrifices made by Greek soldiers in the winter of 1940/41 or Greek civilians in the famine of 1941/42).
It should also be noted that armed collaboration with the Germans did not begin when the Allies were losing (i.e. before Novmber 1942) but afterwards, when the success of the Communists in inter-Greek fighting drove many non-Communist andartes into German ranks out of sheer self preservation.
Cheers,
Sid.
I think you do the Greeks an injustice. In WWII Royalists, Republicans and Communists were in the Allied camp. The problem was that they were not all in the same Greek camp themselves. As a result they tended to spend a great deal of time squabbling and fighting amongst themselves and were rather less use to the Allies in the second half of the war than they might have been. (There is no doubting the courage and sacrifices made by Greek soldiers in the winter of 1940/41 or Greek civilians in the famine of 1941/42).
It should also be noted that armed collaboration with the Germans did not begin when the Allies were losing (i.e. before Novmber 1942) but afterwards, when the success of the Communists in inter-Greek fighting drove many non-Communist andartes into German ranks out of sheer self preservation.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Greek-Australian clash, Crete, May 1941
Just an answer, gentlemen. David Irving (un unconfotable, maybe, but impressive historian) wrote in his Hitler's war, Macmillan, 1885, vol. I, pg. 257, that at Iràklion (Crete) some Greek comanies had joined the German paratroopers fighting the British. When I visited the local, little museum, ten years ago, I heard that there were, really, some serious problems; the origin, they said, was a too much "Sahib and Colonial" attitude of the Commonwealth soldiers towards the "natives". As Vic is Australian perhaps he can know something more about this subject.
I think too that the Greek volounteers (interesting the detail of the Greek flag on the arm. A square flag or a shield? And , above all, with or without the crown? I think that it had to be without it but being without any hard evidence on this subject any news is a precious one) were picked up after the Italian armistice as the Italian government (adding shame to shame on itself) had forbidden any Greek Army Armistice Army, except for a company of Euzones guards in Athen. Bye EC
I think too that the Greek volounteers (interesting the detail of the Greek flag on the arm. A square flag or a shield? And , above all, with or without the crown? I think that it had to be without it but being without any hard evidence on this subject any news is a precious one) were picked up after the Italian armistice as the Italian government (adding shame to shame on itself) had forbidden any Greek Army Armistice Army, except for a company of Euzones guards in Athen. Bye EC
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Vic Nicholas
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Dear Sid,
I am impressed with your remarkable knowledge on all facets of WW2....but, I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you.
The Rallis government eagerly collaborated with the Germans. Their armed henchmen and lackies were already settling old scores with those that they despised either politically, or personally.
Sid, if their is one topic that I might be qualified to talk about, it is Greek collaboration.
ELAS spent more time fighting against other Greeks than ever fighting against the Germans. The various Greek-nazi groups happily murdered with impunity outside of their jurisdiction and in a manner that even appalled the Germans.
The myth that the Greeks resisted the Germans is just that - a myth. Other than 3 days at Fort Rupel which was couragous, but not quite in the same league as the Poles for example....the Greek army folded and then turned on its own people and then on itself in a farcicle manner that would have done justice to an ancient comedy or tragedy.
Gen.Metaxas (Dictator of Greece 1936-41) was a Germanophile and a fanatical fascist that saw nothing in locking up Macedonians and other dissidents in concentration camps even before WW2....
Sid, you truly have under-estimated the natural opportunistic streak in the Greek psyche....
Regards,
Vic
I am impressed with your remarkable knowledge on all facets of WW2....but, I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you.
The Rallis government eagerly collaborated with the Germans. Their armed henchmen and lackies were already settling old scores with those that they despised either politically, or personally.
Sid, if their is one topic that I might be qualified to talk about, it is Greek collaboration.
ELAS spent more time fighting against other Greeks than ever fighting against the Germans. The various Greek-nazi groups happily murdered with impunity outside of their jurisdiction and in a manner that even appalled the Germans.
The myth that the Greeks resisted the Germans is just that - a myth. Other than 3 days at Fort Rupel which was couragous, but not quite in the same league as the Poles for example....the Greek army folded and then turned on its own people and then on itself in a farcicle manner that would have done justice to an ancient comedy or tragedy.
Gen.Metaxas (Dictator of Greece 1936-41) was a Germanophile and a fanatical fascist that saw nothing in locking up Macedonians and other dissidents in concentration camps even before WW2....
Sid, you truly have under-estimated the natural opportunistic streak in the Greek psyche....
Regards,
Vic
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
I would be interested to know Irving's sources. Anything is possible but I wonder whether there wasn't some mix up with a small Greek collaborationist unit used by the Germans on Crete later in the war. One also wonders why, if it really happened, no propaganda use was made at the time of Greeks fighting beside the Germans in 1941 and why it did not result in a collaborationist unit being formed.
The British were not completely insensitive to Greek feelings and also had to take into account Greek prejudices as well. For example, no Indian Army Divisions were sent to Greece until after the Germans had evacuated in late 1944 because the Greek leadership was reluctant to see its country liberated by non-white troops. This was one reason why Rhodes was not attacked, even though there were at least half a dozen Indian Army Divisions available in Syria-Iraq-Iran for much of the war and an under nourished British brigade that had been garrisoning Malta under siege for three years was instead used to occupy the Dodecanese in late 1943, with disasterous results.
Crete had supplied the 5th Division to the campaign in Albania but it had been lost on the mainland. The British estimated that there was sufficient Cretan manpower left to rebuild at least one and possibly two divisions, but little of it was adequately trained. Moreover, there was almost no equipment available. Italian weapons captured in Libya were sent from Egypt, but the Greeks on Crete were still woefully ill equipped when the German paratroops landed. Despite this, they put up courageous resistance in several places. This certainty must be put against the possibility raised by Irving.
Two aspects of the Crete Campaign are little known. Crete was where the Greeks held the Italian prisoners of war they captured in Albania. As a result, when the Greek government fled to the island in late April 1941 it found itself with more Italian prisoners than Greek soldiers under its control. When the island was captured in May by the Germans and Italians nearly twice as many Italians prisoners were released as the Germans suffered casualties. The other forgotten aspect is the totally successful improvised Italian seaborne invasion of the eastern end of Crete, where only a few Greeks were stationed.
Cheers,
Sid
I would be interested to know Irving's sources. Anything is possible but I wonder whether there wasn't some mix up with a small Greek collaborationist unit used by the Germans on Crete later in the war. One also wonders why, if it really happened, no propaganda use was made at the time of Greeks fighting beside the Germans in 1941 and why it did not result in a collaborationist unit being formed.
The British were not completely insensitive to Greek feelings and also had to take into account Greek prejudices as well. For example, no Indian Army Divisions were sent to Greece until after the Germans had evacuated in late 1944 because the Greek leadership was reluctant to see its country liberated by non-white troops. This was one reason why Rhodes was not attacked, even though there were at least half a dozen Indian Army Divisions available in Syria-Iraq-Iran for much of the war and an under nourished British brigade that had been garrisoning Malta under siege for three years was instead used to occupy the Dodecanese in late 1943, with disasterous results.
Crete had supplied the 5th Division to the campaign in Albania but it had been lost on the mainland. The British estimated that there was sufficient Cretan manpower left to rebuild at least one and possibly two divisions, but little of it was adequately trained. Moreover, there was almost no equipment available. Italian weapons captured in Libya were sent from Egypt, but the Greeks on Crete were still woefully ill equipped when the German paratroops landed. Despite this, they put up courageous resistance in several places. This certainty must be put against the possibility raised by Irving.
Two aspects of the Crete Campaign are little known. Crete was where the Greeks held the Italian prisoners of war they captured in Albania. As a result, when the Greek government fled to the island in late April 1941 it found itself with more Italian prisoners than Greek soldiers under its control. When the island was captured in May by the Germans and Italians nearly twice as many Italians prisoners were released as the Germans suffered casualties. The other forgotten aspect is the totally successful improvised Italian seaborne invasion of the eastern end of Crete, where only a few Greeks were stationed.
Cheers,
Sid
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sid guttridge
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Hi Vic,
I don't think that there is a myth about Greek resistance to the Germans in 1941. Apart from Fort Raupel, almost nothing has appeared in English on the subject to creat such a myth.
The first thing to note is that Greece had been engaged in a bloody war in Albania against a potentially much stronger opponent for nearly six months before the Germans attacked in April 1941. If one excludes prisoners, Greek battle casualties had been almost as heavy as Italian. The Poles, with whom you compare the Greeks unfavourably, were fresh and had their whole army present against the Germans.
As a result of the Albanian campaign the vast majority and the best units of the Greek army were in Albania and were never able to face the Germans.
The small segment of the Greek army facing the Germans on the Bulgarian border largely consisted of divisions already badly mauled in Albania or formed since the outbreak of war. It also included unreliable minorities like the Greek Turks and untrained but enthusiastic Greek volunteers from Turkey.
Despite this, they held the frontier fortifications against the Germans so determinedly for several days that one German officer at Fort Raupel described it as the toughest fight the German army had yet faced since the outbreak of war.
The Greek fortification line on the Bulgarian frontier was eventually lost because it was outflanked. On a tactical level this was because there were very few interval troops available between the forts as most of the Greek army was in Albania.
On a strategic level it was because the Greek fortifications on the Bulgarian frontier were cut off when Salonica fell to German troops advancing from Yugoslav Macedonia - an area supposedly covered by Yugoslav forces raised in Macedonia. This last factor certainly partly explains the poor Yugoslav Army performance in Macedonia.
There was only one other significant action between the Germans and Greeks, when the right wing of 1st SS Division clashed with the Greek Cavalry Division on the eastern flank of the Greek armies retreating from Albania. It was again a hard fought action, which the Greeks lost to a mechanised opponent.
Thereafter the Greek armies retreating on foot from Albania found that they could not outpace the mechanised Germans, who cut them off from the faster retreat of the mechanised British. They surrendered after the British decision to evacuate Greece but against the orders of their own government, which wanted them to hold out longer to help cover the evacuation. In the event, their premature surrender did not affect the evacuation in any way.
Metaxas certainly was Germanophile and it was sheer stupidity for Mussolini to have attacked a natural Axis ally like him. Nevertheless, Metaxas did resist and the Greeks did show a united front to the Italians. Metaxas died in early 1941, before Germany attacked Greece. The united Greek front began to fall apart during the German invasion. The premature surrender of the Greek armies retreating from Albania, which were largely led by Republican generals appointed by Metaxas, against the orders of the Royal government was a key moment.
The inter-Greek squabbling, mutinies and and even open fighting, later joined by the Greek Communists, continued in exile and under Axis occupation. As a result, neither the conventional Greek forces in exile, nor the andartes at home in Greee pulled their full weight against the Germans later in the war.
I appreciate that Macedonians have their resentments against the Greeks. However, it serves no purpose to exagerate their failings or belittle their genuine achievements.
Cheers,
Sid
I don't think that there is a myth about Greek resistance to the Germans in 1941. Apart from Fort Raupel, almost nothing has appeared in English on the subject to creat such a myth.
The first thing to note is that Greece had been engaged in a bloody war in Albania against a potentially much stronger opponent for nearly six months before the Germans attacked in April 1941. If one excludes prisoners, Greek battle casualties had been almost as heavy as Italian. The Poles, with whom you compare the Greeks unfavourably, were fresh and had their whole army present against the Germans.
As a result of the Albanian campaign the vast majority and the best units of the Greek army were in Albania and were never able to face the Germans.
The small segment of the Greek army facing the Germans on the Bulgarian border largely consisted of divisions already badly mauled in Albania or formed since the outbreak of war. It also included unreliable minorities like the Greek Turks and untrained but enthusiastic Greek volunteers from Turkey.
Despite this, they held the frontier fortifications against the Germans so determinedly for several days that one German officer at Fort Raupel described it as the toughest fight the German army had yet faced since the outbreak of war.
The Greek fortification line on the Bulgarian frontier was eventually lost because it was outflanked. On a tactical level this was because there were very few interval troops available between the forts as most of the Greek army was in Albania.
On a strategic level it was because the Greek fortifications on the Bulgarian frontier were cut off when Salonica fell to German troops advancing from Yugoslav Macedonia - an area supposedly covered by Yugoslav forces raised in Macedonia. This last factor certainly partly explains the poor Yugoslav Army performance in Macedonia.
There was only one other significant action between the Germans and Greeks, when the right wing of 1st SS Division clashed with the Greek Cavalry Division on the eastern flank of the Greek armies retreating from Albania. It was again a hard fought action, which the Greeks lost to a mechanised opponent.
Thereafter the Greek armies retreating on foot from Albania found that they could not outpace the mechanised Germans, who cut them off from the faster retreat of the mechanised British. They surrendered after the British decision to evacuate Greece but against the orders of their own government, which wanted them to hold out longer to help cover the evacuation. In the event, their premature surrender did not affect the evacuation in any way.
Metaxas certainly was Germanophile and it was sheer stupidity for Mussolini to have attacked a natural Axis ally like him. Nevertheless, Metaxas did resist and the Greeks did show a united front to the Italians. Metaxas died in early 1941, before Germany attacked Greece. The united Greek front began to fall apart during the German invasion. The premature surrender of the Greek armies retreating from Albania, which were largely led by Republican generals appointed by Metaxas, against the orders of the Royal government was a key moment.
The inter-Greek squabbling, mutinies and and even open fighting, later joined by the Greek Communists, continued in exile and under Axis occupation. As a result, neither the conventional Greek forces in exile, nor the andartes at home in Greee pulled their full weight against the Germans later in the war.
I appreciate that Macedonians have their resentments against the Greeks. However, it serves no purpose to exagerate their failings or belittle their genuine achievements.
Cheers,
Sid
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Greece 1940-1941
Hello Vic, it'a pleasure to hear you again. I was going to believe you were quite a serious Mediterranean War expert but reading your accurate Greek campaing digest I'm now really sure you are a true scholar ready not to forget the correlate logistical and political backgrounds. It's a pleasure to see that there are Britons not only of the usual Colonel Blimp export type we are accostumed to see and hear here on the Continent about military history and this is a quite good piece of news.
a) The German ediction of Signal quoted the Crete Greek "rebellion" or mutiny, as you prefer, and this same exploit is told in a post war German novel about the German paratroops I read when I was a child. hitler too was very gentle about the Greek performance speaking in June 1941 at the radio.
b) As I said before the Italian Government, not acting as a gentleman, forbidden, against the German will, to maintain a small Greek armistice Army like the Vichy one. After the 8th Sept. 1943 Italian armistice Greeks could, at least, go under the German colours to fight their own civil war with the greatest enthusiasm. if I remember well Col. Grivas, the Fifty leader chief of the Cyprus fighting against the British garrison was an officier of these German Police battalions.
c) Mussolini's idea (and his favoured Army generals "yessir" type too) to invade Greece was an idiot one but NOT for political reasons. It was a strategical suicide to attack, in Autumn, on these mountains and through the so called roads of that country with 8 two regiments (brigades, according the British equivalent) divisions a mobilized Army strong of about 15, classic three regiments divisions (not to mention the training aspect, as the only Euzones mountain light division present on the border line during the first week of war was able to defend effectively the crucial Metzovo pass and road in front of the quite less professional Italian forces sent in that direction) but the invasion was, however, a necessity according the Italian point of view. First as it was a long (bad) planned idea which started in March 1939 (the first, serious programs are dated 1933), second because the Italian general opinion - which lasted until late May 1941 - was that the British, after the fall of Athens, would, at least, agree about a general, favourable peace in the Mediterranean and - third - as the Royal Navy used openly the Greeks harbours and facilities (I'm quoting A.B. Cunningham A Sailor's Odissey, for istance). The German veto, in August 1940, to let Italy attack Greece and the following, Mussolini's bad idea that it would be necessary only to say "Booh" to rush the Greek government to sign a total surrender with the only hope to get Cyprus, after the war, as a bonus, were so the last steps of a long, Italian military wrong road to blame and shame.
Next time EC
a) The German ediction of Signal quoted the Crete Greek "rebellion" or mutiny, as you prefer, and this same exploit is told in a post war German novel about the German paratroops I read when I was a child. hitler too was very gentle about the Greek performance speaking in June 1941 at the radio.
b) As I said before the Italian Government, not acting as a gentleman, forbidden, against the German will, to maintain a small Greek armistice Army like the Vichy one. After the 8th Sept. 1943 Italian armistice Greeks could, at least, go under the German colours to fight their own civil war with the greatest enthusiasm. if I remember well Col. Grivas, the Fifty leader chief of the Cyprus fighting against the British garrison was an officier of these German Police battalions.
c) Mussolini's idea (and his favoured Army generals "yessir" type too) to invade Greece was an idiot one but NOT for political reasons. It was a strategical suicide to attack, in Autumn, on these mountains and through the so called roads of that country with 8 two regiments (brigades, according the British equivalent) divisions a mobilized Army strong of about 15, classic three regiments divisions (not to mention the training aspect, as the only Euzones mountain light division present on the border line during the first week of war was able to defend effectively the crucial Metzovo pass and road in front of the quite less professional Italian forces sent in that direction) but the invasion was, however, a necessity according the Italian point of view. First as it was a long (bad) planned idea which started in March 1939 (the first, serious programs are dated 1933), second because the Italian general opinion - which lasted until late May 1941 - was that the British, after the fall of Athens, would, at least, agree about a general, favourable peace in the Mediterranean and - third - as the Royal Navy used openly the Greeks harbours and facilities (I'm quoting A.B. Cunningham A Sailor's Odissey, for istance). The German veto, in August 1940, to let Italy attack Greece and the following, Mussolini's bad idea that it would be necessary only to say "Booh" to rush the Greek government to sign a total surrender with the only hope to get Cyprus, after the war, as a bonus, were so the last steps of a long, Italian military wrong road to blame and shame.
Next time EC
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Greece 1940 again
Sid, sorry for the name lapsus; I was going to say Sid, not Vic (who deserves my utmost respect, of course), Sorry again EC
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
I agree that the military aspects of the invasion of Greece were appallingly handled. On factor not often recognised is that the Italians attacked Greece using under a quarter of the trained manpower available to the Greeks when fully mobilised and were outnumbered for the first two months. The front in Albania only stabilised when Italian reinforcements created something approaching numerical parity.
The largely mountain trained Greek troops did prove superior to the largely non-mountain trained Italians, but the battle casualty figures imply that there was not a great deal of difference.
I did not mention in my earlier post, but the Greek Army facing the Italians in Albania was very seriously stretched even before the Germans attacked and the rapidity of German success against Greece owed much to the sacrifices made and casualties extracted by the Italians in the previous six months.
I would guess that, had the Germans and British not intervened on the ground, the sheer weight of force that the Italians were able to bring against the Greeks in the summer of 1941 would have worn the latter down and resulted in an Italian victory that year.
Cheers,
Sid.
I agree that the military aspects of the invasion of Greece were appallingly handled. On factor not often recognised is that the Italians attacked Greece using under a quarter of the trained manpower available to the Greeks when fully mobilised and were outnumbered for the first two months. The front in Albania only stabilised when Italian reinforcements created something approaching numerical parity.
The largely mountain trained Greek troops did prove superior to the largely non-mountain trained Italians, but the battle casualty figures imply that there was not a great deal of difference.
I did not mention in my earlier post, but the Greek Army facing the Italians in Albania was very seriously stretched even before the Germans attacked and the rapidity of German success against Greece owed much to the sacrifices made and casualties extracted by the Italians in the previous six months.
I would guess that, had the Germans and British not intervened on the ground, the sheer weight of force that the Italians were able to bring against the Greeks in the summer of 1941 would have worn the latter down and resulted in an Italian victory that year.
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
I have had a look at p.257 of Volume I of Irving's "Hitler's War". Irving gives no reference at all for the reported incident of several Greek companies at Iraklion joining the German paratroops in fighting the British.
I have checked with three British books on the Crete fighting (Clark, Mc????? and Beevor), and none of them seem to mention the incident. The consensus of British sources seems to be that the Greeks fought better against the German paratroops than the British had expected.
So, we are left with the report in the propaganda magazine "Signal", which is of questionable relability; a reference in a book of fiction; and Irving's unsourced statement. Both the latter may originate in the "Signal" article.
None of this proves that the incident did not happen, but I would require rather firmer evidence before I could accept it.
Has anyone got any further sources?
Cheers,
Sid
I have had a look at p.257 of Volume I of Irving's "Hitler's War". Irving gives no reference at all for the reported incident of several Greek companies at Iraklion joining the German paratroops in fighting the British.
I have checked with three British books on the Crete fighting (Clark, Mc????? and Beevor), and none of them seem to mention the incident. The consensus of British sources seems to be that the Greeks fought better against the German paratroops than the British had expected.
So, we are left with the report in the propaganda magazine "Signal", which is of questionable relability; a reference in a book of fiction; and Irving's unsourced statement. Both the latter may originate in the "Signal" article.
None of this proves that the incident did not happen, but I would require rather firmer evidence before I could accept it.
Has anyone got any further sources?
Cheers,
Sid
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Crete 1941
Hello Sid, I have not any other source about this particoular subject and, as a matter of fact, I was the first to ask, in my previous open letter, some help about this matter but, unfortunatly, it did not yet materialized.
Maybe, in future, something can appear; at the little Heraklion History Museum, however, there is a small room dedicated to the German invasion of May 1941 and the Secretary confirmed me, on July 1990, the a.m. accident. In that same exibithion there were too some crude photoes where was possible to see both German paratroopers bodies lynched by civilians and British POWs used, in May and June 1941, by the Germans (mountain troops, I think) as "pack-animals", according the captions. I think so that there are still many things about that campaing which have yet to be discovered. Greetings EC
Maybe, in future, something can appear; at the little Heraklion History Museum, however, there is a small room dedicated to the German invasion of May 1941 and the Secretary confirmed me, on July 1990, the a.m. accident. In that same exibithion there were too some crude photoes where was possible to see both German paratroopers bodies lynched by civilians and British POWs used, in May and June 1941, by the Germans (mountain troops, I think) as "pack-animals", according the captions. I think so that there are still many things about that campaing which have yet to be discovered. Greetings EC