In September 1943 the Axis evacuated its forces in the Taman bridgehead to Crimea and started to prepare for the next Soviet assault.
In the night of 31 October/1 November Red Army troops landed south of Kerch and quickly took over village Eltigen. The bridgehead was widened the next day to about 4.5 km and had a depth of 1.5-2 km. Eltigen was in the sector of the 98th German Infantry Division. It was reinforced with a Romanian cavalry detachment from the 6th Cavalry Division: the "Mr. Horia" Detachment (3 cavalry squadrons, 1 MG platoon, 1 battery, one AT platoon). By 5 November the Axis forces managed to contain the Soviet bridgehead. They now had to eliminate it. The 10th Motorized Rosiori (cavalry) Regiment was also assigned to the German unit, for this operation. However, the assault, which was carried out on 7 November, failed.
Because the Red Army made another landing, this time NE of Kerch, the situation was becoming critical for the 98th Division, which also had to defend that sector. The German 5th Corps decided to move the whole Division to face the new threat. The Eltigen bridgehead was going to be taken over by the Romanian 6th Cavalry Division, which was deployed there from 14 November. Initially its mission was to defend against any possible Soviet attacks, but the German command later requested that the bridgehead be eliminated.
After the return of brig. gen. Corneliu Teodorini, the division's CO, the date for the assault was set for 4 December. The division was going to be reinforced with two battalions from the 3rd Mountain Division, one German StuG battalion, 12 German artillery batteries and will also benefit from the support of the Romanian 3rd Dive Bomber Group.
The attack began at 5:00 after a five minute artillery barrage. Only the right wing of the Romanian forces managed to advance. On the left the Soviets put up a heavy resistance, especially near the state farm and on hill 56.7, where they had a pillbox.
The next day, the division continued its attack, on three directions. The main push was made from west to east, from the state farm towards the lighthouse south of Eltigen. From the positions gained the previous day, two attacks were going to be launched: one towards west, in the rear of Soviet positions, and the other from south to north, aiming to clear the southern part of the bridgehead.
The 2nd Squadron/10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment managed to take the pillboxes north of hill 56.7. Thus gen. Teodorini ordered the all-out assault to begin. The forces were split into two groups:
1. Group "Col. Pasa": 9th Rosiori Regiment, 4th Squadron/5th Calarasi Regiment, 1st and 3rd Squadron/10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment, 14th MG Battalion and one German StuG battery. Its mission was to attack towards the lighthouse and then take the heights north of it.
2. Group "Lt. Col. Portasescu": 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment (without the 1st and 3rd Squadron), 5th and 10th Mountain Battalion, two German StuG batteries. Its mission was to take the state farm and then advance towards the lighthouse.
By nightfall (at 15:30) the state farm had been taken, but the Soviet forces at the lighthouse were still holding out.
The division was reorganized into three groups for the battle on 6 December:
1. Group "Col. Pasa": 9th Rosiori Regiment, 4th Squadron/5th Calarasi Regiment and one German StuG battery. Its mission was to assault the hill 37.4
2. Group "Lt. Col. Portasescu": 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment and one German StuG battery. Its mission was to advance occupy the lighthouse and advance towards the heights east of hill 37.4
3. Group "Lt. Col. Borislavski": 5th and 10th Mountain Battalion. Its mission was to take Eltigen, by attacking on the seaside.
The 14th MG Battalion was going to provide support for all three groups.
The vanatori de munte managed to enter Eltigen after heavy fighting. By 14:00 the lighthouse was also taken by lt. col. Portasescu, who started to advance towards the heights north of it. During the night, a group of Soviet troops managed to penetrate through the Romanian lines (14th MG Battalion) and flee towards north.
On 7 December, at 5:30 gen. teodorini ordered the final assault to begin. The 14th MG Battalion took the hill 37.4 along with may POWs, lt. col. Portasescu continued his advance, while col. Pasa took the heightd north of Eltigen. At 7:00 all objectives had been taken and the remaining Soviet forces were surrendering. At 7:15, gen. Teodorini reported to the German 5th Corps that "the Eltigen bridgehead was no more".
The 6th Cavalry Division had suffered 381 casualties (68 KIA and 313 WIA) and the 3rd Mountain Division (the 5th and 10th Battalions) suffered 484 casualties. 2,294 POWs were taken, along with 35 artillery pieces, 21 MGs, 35 mortars, 39 LMGs. The number of dead and wounded was also high.
The Soviet forces that managed to escape took refuge on the Mithridate Hill, south of Kerch. The Romanian troops eliminated this last stronghold on 11 December and captured 820 POWs, one AT gun, 60 MGs, 17 AT-rifles, 720 SMGs. About 1,100 Soviet soldiers were killed.
Also 76 tanks were destroyed and the Luftwaffe and the AAA claimed 251 VVS aircraft.
The eltigen bridgehead-for Bruno
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Victor Nitu
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sid guttridge
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Hi Victor,
I have seen it suggested that the Romanian destruction of the month-old Eltigen beach-head may have the only occasion in the European war that any Axis force ever destroyed an established Allied seaborne landing.
Can anyone find other examples where a long established Allied beac-head was eliminated by Axis forces in Europe?
Cheers,
Sid.
I have seen it suggested that the Romanian destruction of the month-old Eltigen beach-head may have the only occasion in the European war that any Axis force ever destroyed an established Allied seaborne landing.
Can anyone find other examples where a long established Allied beac-head was eliminated by Axis forces in Europe?
Cheers,
Sid.
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Victor Nitu
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sid guttridge
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Hi Victor,
I think that the Feodosiya Beach-head was actually part of the larger Kerch foothold when it was eliminated. I would therefore not count it.
However, the Kerch foothold, which Romanian forces also played a major role in eliminating, may count. It was probably not, strictly speaking, a beach-head, as it was very deep, but it was certainly a seaborne landing that was annihilated after it had been established for a long time.
Cheers,
Sid.
I think that the Feodosiya Beach-head was actually part of the larger Kerch foothold when it was eliminated. I would therefore not count it.
However, the Kerch foothold, which Romanian forces also played a major role in eliminating, may count. It was probably not, strictly speaking, a beach-head, as it was very deep, but it was certainly a seaborne landing that was annihilated after it had been established for a long time.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Victor Nitu
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The Feodosyia beachhead was not the same thing with the Kerch beachhead, although they were launched as part of the same operation (Kerch-Feodosyia).
STAVKA had prepared a really nasty surprise for the German and Romanian troops in the Peninsula. Although initially scheduled for 21 December, the "Kerch-Feodosiya" Operation started on 26, because some of the troops intended for the landings were sent to Sevastopol to reinforce the defenders. About 3,000 troops of the 51st Army landed near Kerch. The only Axis troops in the area were the ones of the German 46th Infantry Division. At 8:30, the Mountain Corps received the order from the 11th Army to prepare the 4th Mountain Brigade and 8th Cavalry Brigade for action. About 7 hours the 8th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to start moving towards Kerch Peninsula, where it was suppose to be subordinated to the 42nd Corps. The 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment (assigned to the 30th Corps, near Sevastopol) was sent to Feodosiya. At midnight the 4th Mountain Brigade was also ordered to join the German forces in the Kerch Peninsula. However, two battalions (18th and 29th) were left behind to guard the Simferopol-Alushta highway.
Things got even worse, when elements of the Soviet 44th Army landed at Feodosiya on 29 December 1941. The German 46th Infantry Division already engaged all its forces and the 8th Cavalry Brigade and the "Korne" Detachment were half way to Kerch. The 4th Mountain Brigade was 20-22 km from Feodosiya. The city's garrison was quickly eliminated and the Red Army gained a strong foothold in Crimea. In his memoirs, von Manstein makes several mistakes (willingly or not). He states that he ordered the Romanian brigades to go to Feodosiya from 26 December. However, Romanian documents show another destination (Kerch Peninsula). Only the 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment was sent directly to Feodosiya. The "Korne" Detachment and the 8th Cavalry Brigade were ordered to turn around and go to Feodosiya. Taking into consideration the fact that the Romanian units marched on considerable distance between 26-28 December (the 4th Mountain Brigade 140 km, the 8th Cavalry Brigade 200 km and the "Korne" Detachment 100 km) in horrible weather conditions (blizzard, -30ºC) and that some of them were initially ordered to go somewhere else, von Manstein's remark that the they arrived late is rather unfair. Maybe an attempt to blame others for the failure of preventing the landings, even though the German command knew about them from 20 December, when a Soviet recon team was captured and interrogated? Who knows?
Following these new events, the 4th Mountain Brigade, the 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment and the 420th AT battalion were subordinated to the Mountain Corps. Its mission was to attack and eliminate the Soviet bridgehead, in cooperation with the 8th Cavalry Brigade which was suppose to regroup near Vladislavovka. In the morning of 30 December, the 8th Cavalry Brigade hadn't reached the designated positions. The left flank of the advancing mountain troops was thus vulnerable. The Soviet troops exploited this situation and, soon, the already exhausted soldiers of the 4th Mountain Brigade were on the retreat. However, in the afternoon, the commander of the Mountain Corps, Maj. Gen. Gheorghe Avramescu, managed to stabilize the front around Starii Krim. In "Lost Victories", von Manstein mentions the fact that the Romanian Mountain Corps' attack was repulsed by a few Soviet tanks. However, Soviet sources state that in the first 3-4 days after the landing, the Red Amy had at Feodosiya 23,000 troops, 127 guns, 211 mortars and 24 tanks. These fresh forces were numerically superior to the tired Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade, which wasn’t even complete due to the fact that it had to leave two battalions behind.
The German 42nd Corps retreated from Kerch and established a new front in the Parpach Isthmus. In the morning of 31 December the Soviets tested the defenses in the Starii Krim area and later attacked in force the positions of the 4th Mountain Brigade, but were repulsed. The same day, Maj. Strempel, the chief of the Operations Bureau of the 42nd Corps visited the Mountain Corps' command point and told Maj. Gen. Avramescu that "the situation of the 11th Army depends of the power to resist of the Mountain Corps". Until 14 January 1942, the Soviets attacked another 7 times. However, the 4th Mountain Brigade held a 20 km front with only half of its forces. The first German unit to reach the Feodosiya front was the 213th Infantry Regiment and some AA, AT and artillery units. Between 5-14 January, the 30th Corps (132nd and 170th Infantry Division) and the Romanian 18th Infantry Division reinforced the front in south-eastern Crimea. The latter had just arrived in the peninsula together with the 10th Infantry Division, after a 20 days march 450 km long in terrible weather conditions.
The 30th Corps (132nd and 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade) received the mission to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead at Feodosiya, while the 42nd Corps (46th Infantry Division, the "Hitzfeld" Detachment and the Romanian 18th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Brigade) held the front in the Parapach Isthmus. The assault started on 15 January. The 4th Mountain Brigade was situated on the corps' right flank. It advanced rapidly from the first hours of the attack, threatening the flank of the Soviet troops facing the 170th Infantry Division. Two mountain companies infiltrated behind a Red Army counterattack against the German division's positions and opened fire causing the enemy to retreat in panic. The brigade continued its advance the next day and encountered a fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. Its already small forces were diminished when the 13th Battalion was sent to Sudak where the Soviets made a new landing. On 17 January, the 17th Battalion reached the seaside at Pavlovka. The following day, Feodosiya fell. The 4th Mountain Brigade cleared the last remaining pockets of resistance in its sector. The brigade's assault and the attacks of the StG 77's Stukas against Soviet positions were decisive in the 30th Corps' success at Feodosiya.
STAVKA had prepared a really nasty surprise for the German and Romanian troops in the Peninsula. Although initially scheduled for 21 December, the "Kerch-Feodosiya" Operation started on 26, because some of the troops intended for the landings were sent to Sevastopol to reinforce the defenders. About 3,000 troops of the 51st Army landed near Kerch. The only Axis troops in the area were the ones of the German 46th Infantry Division. At 8:30, the Mountain Corps received the order from the 11th Army to prepare the 4th Mountain Brigade and 8th Cavalry Brigade for action. About 7 hours the 8th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to start moving towards Kerch Peninsula, where it was suppose to be subordinated to the 42nd Corps. The 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment (assigned to the 30th Corps, near Sevastopol) was sent to Feodosiya. At midnight the 4th Mountain Brigade was also ordered to join the German forces in the Kerch Peninsula. However, two battalions (18th and 29th) were left behind to guard the Simferopol-Alushta highway.
Things got even worse, when elements of the Soviet 44th Army landed at Feodosiya on 29 December 1941. The German 46th Infantry Division already engaged all its forces and the 8th Cavalry Brigade and the "Korne" Detachment were half way to Kerch. The 4th Mountain Brigade was 20-22 km from Feodosiya. The city's garrison was quickly eliminated and the Red Army gained a strong foothold in Crimea. In his memoirs, von Manstein makes several mistakes (willingly or not). He states that he ordered the Romanian brigades to go to Feodosiya from 26 December. However, Romanian documents show another destination (Kerch Peninsula). Only the 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment was sent directly to Feodosiya. The "Korne" Detachment and the 8th Cavalry Brigade were ordered to turn around and go to Feodosiya. Taking into consideration the fact that the Romanian units marched on considerable distance between 26-28 December (the 4th Mountain Brigade 140 km, the 8th Cavalry Brigade 200 km and the "Korne" Detachment 100 km) in horrible weather conditions (blizzard, -30ºC) and that some of them were initially ordered to go somewhere else, von Manstein's remark that the they arrived late is rather unfair. Maybe an attempt to blame others for the failure of preventing the landings, even though the German command knew about them from 20 December, when a Soviet recon team was captured and interrogated? Who knows?
Following these new events, the 4th Mountain Brigade, the 3rd Motorized Roşiori Regiment and the 420th AT battalion were subordinated to the Mountain Corps. Its mission was to attack and eliminate the Soviet bridgehead, in cooperation with the 8th Cavalry Brigade which was suppose to regroup near Vladislavovka. In the morning of 30 December, the 8th Cavalry Brigade hadn't reached the designated positions. The left flank of the advancing mountain troops was thus vulnerable. The Soviet troops exploited this situation and, soon, the already exhausted soldiers of the 4th Mountain Brigade were on the retreat. However, in the afternoon, the commander of the Mountain Corps, Maj. Gen. Gheorghe Avramescu, managed to stabilize the front around Starii Krim. In "Lost Victories", von Manstein mentions the fact that the Romanian Mountain Corps' attack was repulsed by a few Soviet tanks. However, Soviet sources state that in the first 3-4 days after the landing, the Red Amy had at Feodosiya 23,000 troops, 127 guns, 211 mortars and 24 tanks. These fresh forces were numerically superior to the tired Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade, which wasn’t even complete due to the fact that it had to leave two battalions behind.
The German 42nd Corps retreated from Kerch and established a new front in the Parpach Isthmus. In the morning of 31 December the Soviets tested the defenses in the Starii Krim area and later attacked in force the positions of the 4th Mountain Brigade, but were repulsed. The same day, Maj. Strempel, the chief of the Operations Bureau of the 42nd Corps visited the Mountain Corps' command point and told Maj. Gen. Avramescu that "the situation of the 11th Army depends of the power to resist of the Mountain Corps". Until 14 January 1942, the Soviets attacked another 7 times. However, the 4th Mountain Brigade held a 20 km front with only half of its forces. The first German unit to reach the Feodosiya front was the 213th Infantry Regiment and some AA, AT and artillery units. Between 5-14 January, the 30th Corps (132nd and 170th Infantry Division) and the Romanian 18th Infantry Division reinforced the front in south-eastern Crimea. The latter had just arrived in the peninsula together with the 10th Infantry Division, after a 20 days march 450 km long in terrible weather conditions.
The 30th Corps (132nd and 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade) received the mission to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead at Feodosiya, while the 42nd Corps (46th Infantry Division, the "Hitzfeld" Detachment and the Romanian 18th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Brigade) held the front in the Parapach Isthmus. The assault started on 15 January. The 4th Mountain Brigade was situated on the corps' right flank. It advanced rapidly from the first hours of the attack, threatening the flank of the Soviet troops facing the 170th Infantry Division. Two mountain companies infiltrated behind a Red Army counterattack against the German division's positions and opened fire causing the enemy to retreat in panic. The brigade continued its advance the next day and encountered a fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. Its already small forces were diminished when the 13th Battalion was sent to Sudak where the Soviets made a new landing. On 17 January, the 17th Battalion reached the seaside at Pavlovka. The following day, Feodosiya fell. The 4th Mountain Brigade cleared the last remaining pockets of resistance in its sector. The brigade's assault and the attacks of the StG 77's Stukas against Soviet positions were decisive in the 30th Corps' success at Feodosiya.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Victor,
Thanks for that. It is good to have the opportunity to discuss the more positive Romanian military achievements.
I appreciate that the Kerch and Feodosiya landings were separate, but I think the two Soviet footholds were joined when the German 46th Division abandoned the Kerch Peninsula. Thus, when Feodosiya was recaptured, it was just an extension of the much larger Kerch foothold, and not a separate beach-head.
Cheers,
Sid.
Thanks for that. It is good to have the opportunity to discuss the more positive Romanian military achievements.
I appreciate that the Kerch and Feodosiya landings were separate, but I think the two Soviet footholds were joined when the German 46th Division abandoned the Kerch Peninsula. Thus, when Feodosiya was recaptured, it was just an extension of the much larger Kerch foothold, and not a separate beach-head.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Victor Nitu
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I am not so sure the two beachheads were joined. At least this was my impression.
There was another landing at Sudak.
While the battle for Feodosiya was just beginning, the Chernomorskiy Flot made a second landing at Sudak in the night of 15/16 January. The first attempt was only 3 days before and was repulsed by a Romanian company, under the command of Cpt. Tomescu. But this time they were grossly outnumbered by a force made up of two Soviet mountain regiments and forced to evacuate the Taraktash village. However, with the arrival, later that day, of the Romanian 13th Mountain Battalion, of a battalion from the 4th Artillery Regiment as well as of a German battalion, AA company and an artillery battery, the situation stabilized. All the units were put under the command of the German Col. Rusker. On 17 January, the "Rusker" Group attacked and manage to take the eastern part of Traktash. The next day the western part of the village was taken, only to be lost to a Soviet counterattack. The same day, the "Otusi" Detachment was created, with the mission to defend the Sudak-Otusi highway. It was made up of the 4th Mountain Pioneer Battalion, a squadron from the 3rd Motorized Rosiori Regiment, a machine-gun platoon, two German infantry companies and an AA company. The attack was renewed on 20 January, but only the "Otusi" Detachment made any progress. Because the Soviets received a strong support from partisan units in the area, it was decided to eliminate them. Between 21-23 January about 200 partisans were killed in the fights. On 24, with stronger air and artillery support, the group finally managed to take Taraktash. The 17th Mountain Battalion reinforced the Romanian-German formation and on 27 and 28 January the Soviets were pushed back towards Sudak. A company managed to take the city and cut their retreat. 880 prisoners were taken and 770 dead were found on the battlefield. In a report, Col. Rusker mentioned that "the audacious actions of the vanatori de munte won the admiration of the German battalions from the 170th Division, who operated timidly and impressed by the amplified echo of the bombardments".
There was another landing at Sudak.
While the battle for Feodosiya was just beginning, the Chernomorskiy Flot made a second landing at Sudak in the night of 15/16 January. The first attempt was only 3 days before and was repulsed by a Romanian company, under the command of Cpt. Tomescu. But this time they were grossly outnumbered by a force made up of two Soviet mountain regiments and forced to evacuate the Taraktash village. However, with the arrival, later that day, of the Romanian 13th Mountain Battalion, of a battalion from the 4th Artillery Regiment as well as of a German battalion, AA company and an artillery battery, the situation stabilized. All the units were put under the command of the German Col. Rusker. On 17 January, the "Rusker" Group attacked and manage to take the eastern part of Traktash. The next day the western part of the village was taken, only to be lost to a Soviet counterattack. The same day, the "Otusi" Detachment was created, with the mission to defend the Sudak-Otusi highway. It was made up of the 4th Mountain Pioneer Battalion, a squadron from the 3rd Motorized Rosiori Regiment, a machine-gun platoon, two German infantry companies and an AA company. The attack was renewed on 20 January, but only the "Otusi" Detachment made any progress. Because the Soviets received a strong support from partisan units in the area, it was decided to eliminate them. Between 21-23 January about 200 partisans were killed in the fights. On 24, with stronger air and artillery support, the group finally managed to take Taraktash. The 17th Mountain Battalion reinforced the Romanian-German formation and on 27 and 28 January the Soviets were pushed back towards Sudak. A company managed to take the city and cut their retreat. 880 prisoners were taken and 770 dead were found on the battlefield. In a report, Col. Rusker mentioned that "the audacious actions of the vanatori de munte won the admiration of the German battalions from the 170th Division, who operated timidly and impressed by the amplified echo of the bombardments".