Winter of 1941/42 and the lack of proper equipment

[Einsamer_Wolf]

Hi Kiddies--

I am slowly working on a divisional history of SS Das Riech by James Lucas. I just finished the section on operation typhoon and Das Reich's involvement in that campaign. And I am amazed at how utterly ill prepared German trops were fro one of the worst winters in over a century. The books recounts how the German solider was fighting in the same issue given at the hiegh ot the summer in temperatures as extreme as 50 below. SOme froze to death while defending trenches. Casualies were high.
ANd so it seems that the red army did not beat back ol Hans and Fritz, but nature did. Now my question. It may have been an oversight for the high command to be so arrogant as to not plan for a prolonged campiagn. It was certainl foolish, but no one is perfect. My question is, after it became clear that the German offensive would extend into the winter months, and htat the weather was extreme, why was no attempt made to bete outfit them. I realize supply lines were overextended. But why couldnt thye drop stuff by air. It seems to me that the climate became so severe that somehhing ought to have been done. And yet nothing was. I want to know why.

Warm Regards

EW

[Juha Hujanen]

Germans assumed at the start of Barbarossa,that objectives would have been met and the bulk of army could spend the winter at cities like Moscow,Leningrad etc.2/3 of German army in the East would return to West for winter,leaving 56 Divisions for occupation force.They would get the material of leaving troops.
In September Germans realised that trains would have be increased 50% to chlothe 750 000 men and feed 150 000 horses.Because Russian resistance remained stiff and Leningrad and Moscow remained in Russian hands,Germans realised in mid-December that their whole Ostheer had to stay in East,fight in winter and even new replacements were needed.

Winter clothes were gathered around Reich and send to East by train,but they ended standing to Warsaw and other major railway junctions,because higher priority was reserved to fuel and ammunition trains.There were only 2 major railways towards Moscow,the gauges were different lenghts and had to be widened.Also partisans freqently cut the railway,and locomotives were in short supply.
Roads were in terrible condition and by mid-November Army Group Centre had 50% of its trucks broken and fuel was low.

Airfields in German controll were in bad shape and cold imobilised planes,lubricant oils froze etc.Transport planes were gathered from Norway and from othet places but they were few.Too many Ju-52s were lost in Crete and on earlier campaign..There simply wasn't enough of them.

Cheers/Juha

[Liam]

As far as i am concerned, there are a wide number of reasons why the Germans were so badly affected by the 1941/42 winter. Some of these cover Hitler and the Heer's blind ignorance and/or callousness regarding their troops survival chances in such extreme conditions (the SS and the Luftwaffe generally tried to equip their men better) to the general lack of long-range foresight regarding the campaign in Russia to the sheer problems of supply and demand. The lack of foresight extended not only to winter clothing but to tanks, guns, aircraft and supplies for an extended conflict. Add to this the increasing nightmare of logistics that the Germans faced as they advanced further into Russia in that Autumn and Winter and disaster was always inevitable. Although a harrowing experience, the fact they managed to hold on as they did says something for the German forces' extraordinary professionalism and morale, doesn't it?

[Andreas]

ANd so it seems that the red army did not beat back ol Hans and Fritz, but nature did.

Err, well. I am also sure the Wehrmacht elected to not spend the winter in Moscow, because the German soldiers loved the great outdoors so much. The Soviet resistance and counter-offensive certainly had absolutely nothing to do with it. Also, it is quite well known that mud only affects German vehicles, while Soviet ones hovered above it. The Red Army soldiers just loved to fight in -25 degrees, after all we all know the Russian soldier positively hates warm temperatures... Anything I forgot about those quite dated fairy tales?

The weather was one factor in the German defeat, but it was not the reason. Over-extension, failure to meet up means and ends, and general hybris had a lot more to do with it. Army Group Centre was militarily beaten in front of Moscow, and came within a Gnat's crotchet of being finished off by Zhukov. 18th Army was beaten in Tikhvin and in front of Volkovstroy. 1st Panzerarmy was beaten in Rostov. The weather helped more than it hindered Soviet efforts, and that is all it did. It did not beat the Germans.

The fact that the Germans did hold on was not only due to their professionalism, but also due to mistakes being made by STAVKA, who wanted it all in the winter of 1941/2. If the Soviet forces had been concentrated against AG Centre, they would have finished it there and then. Instead, trying to simultaneously attack and destroy all German army groups was what doomed the Soviet offensive to fail.

[Bruno]

Very good points! I would like to add something though. Winter was not the cause of the defeat ,but was a factor. 100,000 frosbite victims in 1941, oil that froze at -25 stopping tanks,trucks, etc. and Weapons that froze up. In mobile warefare you must be mobile. On top of that the Germans were out number, soviets eventually fielded 34 million troops. STAVKA made mistakes yes but they also did not co-ordinate their battle tactics. The Germans constantly modified their defensive tatics.

[Bittrich]

The Soviet counteroffensive was halted as the Germans partially due to weather. Mud did slow down the Soviet forces in early 1942 just as the cold frozen weather halted the Wehrmacht. Also both overstreached their supply. The one thing that the Soviets were able to overcome during the war was mobility and overwhelming man power. The Germans weren't that moble by December 1941 and had a hard time replacing losses whether to frostbite or combat.

[ljadw]

Compared to total losses/total strength,the frostbite losses were marginal
2 possible explications
1)contrary to the general belief,the assumption that the 1941/1942 winter was the harshest in a century,is wrong
2) contrary to the general belief,the assumption that the Ostheer did not receive winter clothing is wrong:most soldiers did receive winterclothing,but not before the winter(other supplies had priority),but during the winter

[julian]

Compared to total losses/total strength,the frostbite losses were marginal
2 possible explications
1)contrary to the general belief,the assumption that the 1941/1942 winter was the harshest in a century,is wrong
2) contrary to the general belief,the assumption that the Ostheer did not receive winter clothing is wrong:most soldiers did receive winterclothing,but not before the winter(other supplies had priority),but during the winter

Any unit history gives a totally different picture. Frostbite was a major factor in losses during the winter and winter clothing was not there.

[julian]

ANd so it seems that the red army did not beat back ol Hans and Fritz, but nature did.

Err, well. I am also sure the Wehrmacht elected to not spend the winter in Moscow, because the German soldiers loved the great outdoors so much. The Soviet resistance and counter-offensive certainly had absolutely nothing to do with it. Also, it is quite well known that mud only affects German vehicles, while Soviet ones hovered above it. The Red Army soldiers just loved to fight in -25 degrees, after all we all know the Russian soldier positively hates warm temperatures... Anything I forgot about those quite dated fairy tales?

Mud is more a problem for the attacker when he has the defender on the run. The defender gets a reprieve because of it.
And fighting in the winter is a much biggeer problem for an army not equipped for it.

[julian]

A quote from MS D-019 Clothing and equipment in snow and extreme cold by Lothar Rendulic

"The winter of 1941 found the german army in Russia unprepared also in respect to clothing. This was not noticed so much in position warfare as in the mobile warfare , which had just begun in the winter of 1941, when the troops were forced to march,bivouac in the open,to defend their shelterless positions, and also to make attacks. All this when the thermometer in one district in central Russia for instance often registered -35°c ,dropping several times even to -46°C, and the cold lasted from the middle of december 1941 to the second half of february 1942. The effect f this cold was increased by frequent high winds. The snowfall was unusually heavy.
It was possible to requisition some fur and felt boots from the natives for a small fraction of the troops. Winter clothing was also removed from the enemy dead. But it was not until the spring of 1942 that warm underwear,gloves and protectors arrived from home,and sufficed only to supply only a small part of the troops. The bulk of them,during the winter campaign of 1941-1942 did come near to having a complete outfit of winter clothing for each man. At best,they only had some one article.
There were naturally improvisations. If a man had a reserve of underwear he wore two suits. The divisions and army supplied the entire supply of underwear they had on hand. Finally, each man succeeded in providing himself with more protection for his head and ears by using pieces of cloth and waistbands. The most difficult problem, for which there was no solution was footgear. Consequently, there were frozen limbs, especially during the first winter months of operations daily casualties from this cause were as severe as if brought about by heavy fighting."

[ljadw]

If the winter was that harsh as Dr Göbbels claimed,and if the Ostheer received no winterclothing,as all authors are parotting,no German soldier would have survived the winter of 1941/1942.Without winterclothing,no one could survive -30 C
The truth is that the numbers of amputations were 0.5 % of the manpower of the Ostheer =15000 on 3 million .
With,or without winter clothing,there still would be amputations .
In november,the winter clothing was waiting in Poland and Germany (operation Boog),but,because of Typhoon,the soldiers had to wait on the winterclothing,which arrived only partially in december .
Source :winterkleidung oder munition

[ljadw]

There were some 112000 cases of frostbite in the 4 wintermonths (almost 1000 a day)=4% of the strength of the Ostheer,of these,there were some 15000 amputations .And of these,there were an UNKNOWN number of dead.
But,we have one sample :
between 1 and 10 december 1941,there were 2185 frostbite cases,with 103 amputations (=less than 5 %) and 22 dead(=1%)
Thus we can assume that the number of dead from frostbite would be some 3 %(=3000),which is marginal .
OTOH,before the winter,the non combat losses were on average 45000 a month,during the winter,on average 90000,a difference of 45000,of which 30000 frostbite cases.(the others being sick and accident cases).
There also is the fact that wit or without winterclothing,there still would be frostbite cases .
Thus,IMHO,the number of casualties due to the fact that the delivery of winterclothing was late,is marginal .
Other point:the fact that 96 % of the Ostheer did NOT suffer from frostbite is proving
a)that 96% did receive winterclothing
b) that the winter was not that harsh as was(and still is) claimed

[B Hellqvist]

Some weak reasoning there, ljadw. It wasn't as if 100% of the soldiers were standing out in the snow 100% of the time. To claim that 96% of the troops received winter clothing because they weren't incapaciteted by frostbite is laughable, and flies in the face of known facts abut the supply of the troops. If they had all that good winter clothing, then why did they feel the need to steal clothes and blankets from Russian civilians, or throw out civilians in the snow when taking over their houses?

[julian]

If the winter was that harsh as Dr Göbbels claimed,and if the Ostheer received no winterclothing,as all authors are parotting,no German soldier would have survived the winter of 1941/1942.Without winterclothing,no one could survive -30 C
The truth is that the numbers of amputations were 0.5 % of the manpower of the Ostheer =15000 on 3 million .
With,or without winter clothing,there still would be amputations .
In november,the winter clothing was waiting in Poland and Germany (operation Boog),but,because of Typhoon,the soldiers had to wait on the winterclothing,which arrived only partially in december .
Source :winterkleidung oder munition

The severity of that winter is and the lack of winterclothing are welldocumented in contemporary accounts. Denying these wellknown facts is an
exercise in futility. One needs only to google on winter 1941-1942 to find scientific papers about this winter being the severest of the 20 th century.
Not an invention of dr Goebbels but a wellknown scientific fact.

[Ronald Lameck]

I used to slap parts on Chryslers on the assembly line with a guy named Karl Meyer who had a metal plate in his skull. He said he got it when he was with the Germany Army in Jan. 1942 on the front before Moscow. A mortar shell landed nearby and a clod of dirt that it dislodged struck him in the helmet. This would not normally cause injury. However, on that day the temperature was -55F.
Over the years, I have spoken to dozens of "Ostfront" veterans from German, S.U., Finn and Rumanian armies. Every one spoke of how hard that winter of 41-2 was. We all know that ex-soldiers love to exaggerate, but it is unlikely that every one of these men would relate a similar tale of misery if it were unfounded. Statistics I have seen tend to confirm their perception.
In a similar vein, I have seen some try to belittle the weather as an important factor in the failure of the German 1944 Ardennes attack. Whether these amount to breast-beating by the side that won or prompted by the old "Nazi bad, ----- (our guy) good" nonsense, in both cases it is disingenuous.