Hi there.
Does anyone have information regarding the activities of the schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 in Russia during 1943?
I have a picture of an early production Sd.Kfz. 181 Tiger I (#123) in winter pattern cammouflage, and all I known is that it belonged to the 1. Kompanie, sPzAbt 503.
/cesare
1/sPzAbt 503 (Tiger)
Moderator: Tom Houlihan
-
Sturmtiger
- New Member
- Posts: 19
- Joined: Wed Feb 11, 2004 11:37 am
-
Sturmtiger
- New Member
- Posts: 19
- Joined: Wed Feb 11, 2004 11:37 am
Hi corderex,
not easy to answer cause nobody thought it could be a good idea to give the date on the backside of photo it seems
I Think it is photographed in the first six to seven weeks in 43. From later photos it seems at end of Febr.43 was no snow anymore.
Probably the Tiger 123 was also lost in that timeframe cause after 503 change number colour from white with black borders, to black with white borders before summer 43, an other Tiger 123 were seen then.
not easy to answer cause nobody thought it could be a good idea to give the date on the backside of photo it seems
I Think it is photographed in the first six to seven weeks in 43. From later photos it seems at end of Febr.43 was no snow anymore.
Probably the Tiger 123 was also lost in that timeframe cause after 503 change number colour from white with black borders, to black with white borders before summer 43, an other Tiger 123 were seen then.
Sturmtiger
hallo Sturmtiger
Thanks once again for your help.
The time frame you mention coincides with the one I was thinking about.
What's more, if the picture was indeed taken in the general area of Stavropol, I'd even say the date must be no later than the second or third week of January 1943. But then again, who knows?
Thanks a lot Sturmtiger.
Thanks once again for your help.
The time frame you mention coincides with the one I was thinking about.
What's more, if the picture was indeed taken in the general area of Stavropol, I'd even say the date must be no later than the second or third week of January 1943. But then again, who knows?
Thanks a lot Sturmtiger.
Hi
The following is from an american study publicly available on the net. It deschribes some of the actions of sPzAbt 503 in Russia.
Regards eric
S.Pz.-Abt. 503 with Army Group Don in Southern Russia On 27 December 1942, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 was sent to Army Group Don to assist in stabilizing the front.42 This unit was needed to help protect Rostov so that the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies and other German units in the Caucasus could withdraw across the Don River to the Donets River, where the high command planned a new defensive line.43 This battalion arrived at the beginning of 1943 and Army Group Don immediately assigned it the mission of securing bridges across the Manytsch River for use by withdrawing forces.44 By this time there was not a continuous front in the area. German forces defended a series of blocking positions and strong points in an attempt to stop the Soviet advance. These were located at key points at road or railroad junctions and major
51
river crossings. 45 The fighting was characterized by rearguard actions, while the main body of troops took up new positions farther back. S.Pz.-Abt. 503 participated in this fighting from 1 January until 17 January 1943, primarily securing important river crossing sites (see figure 6). However, because of the fluid nature of the battlefield, they were sent from one important area to another and in one instance covered sixty-five kilometers in one day.
Probably the largest single employment of the battalion occurred on 7 January 1943 when the battalion, supported by 2d Battalion of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 128, attacked towards Stavropol. The 1st Company attacked frontally with the battalion of panzer grenadiers, while the 2d Company attacked from the left flank.47 Altogether, the battalion fielded seventeen operational Tigers out of twenty and twenty Panzer IIIs out of thirty-one.48 During the engagement, the Tigers knocked out eighteen Soviet tanks and destroyed an armored car and five antitank guns.49 The enemy retreated and during the
52
pursuit the battalion lost its first vehicle during the entire engagement, a Panzer III to artillery fire.50 Possibly the most important mission given this battalion was its attack to reduce a Soviet bridgehead at Wessley. The battalion fielded eleven operational Tigers and twelve Panzer IIIs and was again supported by the 2d Battalion of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 128 as well as by a battery of light howitzers.51 The attack began in the early morning of 9 January 1943. German forces made three attempts to achieve their objective during the day but the Soviets repulsed all attacks.52 The battalion managed to destroy eight T-34s during the attack but also lost two Tigers and one Panzer III to enemy fire.53 In addition, the nine other Tigers were so badly damaged that the battalion only had one operational Tiger at the end of the day. Two of these Tigers were sent back to Germany for general repairs.54 In the space of six hours, one of these received 227 hits from antitank rifles and was struck 14 times by fifty-two-millimeter and 11 times by seventy-six-millimeter antitank rounds. It is a testament to the vehicle’s durability that despite this damage, the Tiger still traveled back sixty kilometers under its own power.55 On 14 January 1943, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 had the 2d Company of s.Pz.-Abt. 502, also in the region, attached to the battalion. 56 This became the only instance where three companies of the D organization were integrated under one battalion. However, because of losses to the battalion, this organization lasted only eight days and on 22 January 1943, the battalion disbanded the 2d Company. 57 The battalion integrated the remnants of this company into the 3d Company, and continued to operate with only two companies of the D organization. 58
53
After partially rebuilding its strength, Army Group Don assigned the battalion missions that involved securing the important railroad centers around Rostov (see figure 6). The battalion participated in many small local counterattacks that forced it to operate in company and platoon sized units. These elements operated with a wide variety of other units, usually in a subordinate role. In accomplishing these missions, the battalion demonstrated an incredible amount of flexibility in command and control and in company and platoon organizations, repeatedly changing command relationships and composition in order to accomplish the mission. During this fighting, the battalion integrated Tigers and Panzer IIIs in many different ways. On two occasions the battalion formed a light company consisting of all Panzer IIIs and a heavy company with Tigers and the remainder of the Panzer IIIs. This light company primarily covered other units’ withdrawal but did participate in an attack of 8 February 1943 in the northwest part of Rostov, where it destroyed twelve enemy tanks and three antitank guns.59 The battalion commander employed this light company because of the difficult terrain, consisting of many ditches, across which the attacks were carried out. From 19 February to 22 February 1943, the light company, starting with eight Panzer IIIs and two Tigers, conducted local counterattacks and occupied covering positions in the vicinity of Rostov. During this four day period, this company destroyed twenty-three T-34s and eleven antitank guns while losing one Tiger and one Panzer III.60 After an engagement on 22 February 1943, the battalion only had two Tigers and five Panzer IIIs operational and withdrew to an area near Taganrog to refit.61 This battalion was not employed again until Operation CITADEL in July 1943.
54
During the almost two months of combat with Army Group Don, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 destroyed more than seventy-one enemy tanks and fifty-five antitank guns.62 In so doing, they lost around thirteen Panzer IIIs and had three Tigers knocked out due to enemy actions.63 Another Tiger was destroyed, while waiting at the Budenny rail station for transport back to Germany for factory repair, when the battalion was forced to retreat to Rostov. 64 A total of four Tigers were so badly damaged in combat that they were transported back to Germany. 65 This means that this battalion destroyed 23.6 enemy tanks for the loss of each Tiger or 4.4 enemy tanks for the loss of any type tank, Panzer III and Tiger. This battalion was much more effective than the units at Leningrad and in North Africa in recovering disabled Tigers. During combat that always involved retrograde movements, it destroyed only one Tiger to avoid capture. Additionally, this Tiger had already been recovered and loaded on a rail car for transport back to Germany. This battalion was very reluctant to destroy its own vehicles and did everything possible to recover Tigers. In one instance, three Tigers broke down in a withdrawal and instead of destroying them, the crews stayed with the vehicles until they could be recovered, which was over thirty hours later.66 Diary entries are filled with examples of operational vehicles towing damaged vehicles back to the maintenance platoon to be repaired. In another instance, while the rest of the unit withdrew, six eighteen-ton recovery vehicles and two other Tigers recovered a Tiger that broke through the ice of a stream. 67 Despite the great efforts of the recovery elements, this battalion still suffered from a low operational readiness rate of its Tigers. On average, the battalion only maintained around 35 percent of its Tigers operational.68 Probably one of the main reasons for
55
Tigers being in need of repair, was from damage due to enemy fire. Another reason may have been the great distances that it was tasked to cover. In one instance, the 2d company conducted a 107 kilometer roadmarch in ten and a half hours.69 This unit did not lose any vehicles to maintenance breakdowns during the roadmarch, however, probably because the company commander ordered a maintenance halt every twenty kilometers.70 Overall, this unit was very successful in its operations around Rostov. This unit played a large part in protecting the key road and rail networks that allowed the 1st Panzer Army to retreat. Some historians attribute preventing the Soviets in breaking through to Rostov and cutting the road and rail lines, to the actions of this battalion. 71 Changes Before Operation CITADEL A measure of the effectiveness of the heavy tank battalions fighting the Soviets can be ascertained by looking at the number of steps that the Soviets took in response to this threat. They did not have time to develop an armored vehicle to counter the Tiger before Operation CITADEL, but they did begin planning for vehicles such as the T-34/85 and the KV-85 heavy tank. In the interim, the Soviets developed and fielded a heavy self-propelled gun, the SU-152, that was armed with a 152-millimeter gun designed to defeat the German heavy tanks.72 Additionally, the Soviets continued to field the SU-76 and the SU-122, which were armed with a 76-millimeter and a 122-millimeter gun respectively. All of these vehicles were grouped by type into SU regiments. By the time Operation CITADEL began, twenty-one SU regiments were at the front, mainly concentrated in the Kursk area, with three in reserve and seventeen still in training.73
56
Also in response to the Tigers, the Soviets formed antitank battalions and assigned them to tank and mechanized corps. These were armed with an eighty-five-millimeter antiaircraft gun on a special mount with crews trained as antitank gunners. Many, although not all, of the tank and mechanized corps at Kursk had been reinforced with the eighty-five-millimeter antitank battalions prior to the German attack.74 In terms of tanks, the Soviets formed heavy tank regiments to counter the threat of the German heavy tank battalions. Production of the KV-85, armed with an eighty-five-millimeter gun did not begin until August 1943, after the German offensive at Kursk.75 So, the Soviets gathered all available KV1s and KV2s, armed with a 76- and a 152-millimeter gun, respectively, and formed five heavy tank regiments before the German offensive began. 76 None of the new tank regiments took part in the Battle of Kursk, but their availability was an indication of the concern to bolster the defense against the German Tigers and the heavy tank battalions.77 The Russians realized that the Tiger had a powerful long-range eighty-eight-millimeter gun and thick frontal armor, making it superior to their tanks with seventy-six-millimeter guns. They believed that they could “only be fought effectively in close combat, where the T-34 could use its greater maneuverability and direct its fire at the sides of the heavy German tanks.”78 This tactic resulted in the Soviet tanks “charging” at the German Tigers in an attempt to close the range as quickly as possible so the T-34/76 could have a chance of destroying the Tigers. The Germans, for their part, were also busy reorganizing the heavy tank battalions into the E organizations, doing away with all the Panzer IIIs in the battalion. The fact
57
that the Germans deleted the Panzer IIIs from the organization is contrary to almost all of the recommendations in the available heavy tank battalion after action reports.79 The sole exception to the call for Panzer IIIs in the after action reviews was a recommendation from the heavy company of the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. At this time, this unit fielded only a heavy company as part of the regiment, but was soon increased to an entire heavy tank battalion. This report stated: The previous combat actions have shown that the Panzer III, originally intended to be a security vehicle for each Tiger, has not evolved to withstand hits from enemy weapons. The opponent’s defensive weapons take it under fire in preference to firing at the Tiger. In addition, it would aid in improving the number of operationa l Panzers by having a pure company made up of only one type of Panzer. A very inefficient and complicated repair staff for the Tiger Company is necessary only because of transportation of Panzer III repair parts in addition to the difficulties with Tiger repair parts. In this case, it is appropriate to reduce Tiger units to only one type of Panzer – the Panzerkampfwagen VI (Tiger).80 This report was probably more insightful, in retrospect, than the others that advocated retention of the Panzer IIIs. The majority of the recommendations argued for the continued inclusion of the Panzer IIIs so that they could accomplish missions other than those for which they were originally intended; scouting, liaison, evacuation of wounded, and resupply of Tigers. General Guderian, as Inspector of Armored Troops, rejected the majority of the recommendations that advocated continued inclusion of Panzer IIIs and argued for the concentration of Tigers in the E organization. 81 He did, however, see the need for an improved scouting and liaison capability, and requested the creation of a reconnaissance platoon, mounted on armored half-tracks, that became part of the E battalion organization. 82
58
Another report from the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland suggested incorporating a heavy tank platoon into every panzer battalion. 83 Others recommended incorporating a heavy tank company into the panzer regiment of every panzer division. Guderian rejected this, saying “dispersing them [Tigers] . . . is an idiotic squandering of this valuable equipment.”84 The report by the heavy tank company of the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland indicated that the unit was constantly employed as the lead element. This initiated responses from the Chief of the Army General Staff as well as from Guderian, that contradicted the established doctrine for the heavy tank battalions. The Panzer representative to the German Chief of the Army General Staff wrote: Employing Tigers as the lead units is not self-evidently correct. Situatio ns will occur where this is necessary or useful. The controlling factors are the tasks and the number of operational Tigers. If there are [only a few Tigers], their assignment to the point means that the Tigers will not be available when they are needed to attack enemy tanks. Losses will frequently occur due to mines and bridge failure, plus getting hung up in uncrossable terrain. In order to maintain the high operational and production value of the Tigers, it is necessary to concentrate the Tigers in units so that concentrated purposeful employment, maintenance, and care can be achieved.85 This message was followed shortly by another from Guderian who took a similar position that seemed to argue against the use of the heavy tank battalion as the lead element in the attack. He wrote: The Tiger unit is the most valuable and strongest weapon in a Panzer unit. If it is used as the point unit, it will quickly bring localized success because of its high combat power. However, they will have insufficient force at the start of a decisive battle that could mean destruction of the opponent in the depths of his position, because the Tigers will suffer heavy breakdowns due to mines, hits, and terrain obstacles. Therefore, they will enter the decisive phase of the battle already greatly depleted. Fundamentally, point units have increased fuel consumption. Because the Tiger already has a limited radius of action, when it is
59
used as a lead vehicle it will sometimes be short of fuel at the start of the decisive phase of the battle.86 Despite these views, there is no record of any new doctrinal guidance being formally published. In any case, one aspect of the doctrine that clearly did not change was the emphasis upon concentration of the heavy tank battalion instead of dispersing it. Operation CITADEL: The Battle of Kursk Two heavy tank battalions participated in the Battle of Kursk. S.Pz.-Abt. 503 was still in southern Russia as part of Army Group South. It was attached to III Panzer Corps, part of Army Detachment Kempf, during Operation CITADEL as part of the southern pincer attack upon the Kursk salient.87 The other heavy tank battalion involved in this operation was s.Pz.-Abt. 505, attached to Army Group Center.88 Both of these battalions received orders to change from the D organization to the E organization in the Spring of 1943. S.Pz.-Abt 503 had completed this transition and fielded forty-five Tigers in three companies for the operation. 89 S.Pz.-Abt. 505 was still in the process of transitioning to the E organization during Operation CITADEL. They completed forming two E organization heavy tank companies, but the third company did not arrive until 8 July 1943, after the start of the offensive.90 To compensate for this, (Wireless Radio) Company 312 was attached to it. This unit fielded remote controlled Borgward B IV vehicles, carrying 500 kilograms of TNT each, that were remotely maneuvered into position and then exploded to destroy antitank positions and other emplacements.91 This company’s mission was to “conduct aggressive reconnaissance, detecting minefields and clearing lanes through them, destroying hard to overcome positions, such as fortified antitank weapons as well as super heavy tanks.
60
This battalion was also unique because of the way in which they used their Panzer IIIs that they had not yet turned in. They converted their Panzer IIIs into bridging material carriers by removing their turrets and placing planks, beams, and other bridging material on top.93 Although the battalion was ordered to repair these vehicles, they had not repaired or turned them in prior to the start of the offensive.94 These two heavy tank battalions involved in Operation CITADEL, even though similarly equipped, were employed differently. In the North, Army Group Center attached s.Pz.-Abt. 505 to the 6th Infantry Division of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps. This corps consisted of three panzer divisions and one infantry division, and was assigned as the main breakthrough force in the North. 95 In the south, Army Group South attached s.Pz.-Abt. 503 to the III Panzer Corps which also consisted of three panzer divisions and one infantry division. This corps was part of the larger ad hoc organization known as Army Detachment Kempf and initially had the mission of guarding the flank of II SS Panzer Corps from the adjacent 4th Panzer Army. It was also tasked with destroying enemy counterattack forces expected to arrive from the east and the north. 96 In spite of Guderian’s guidance that Tigers be employed in a concentrated heavy tank battalion and against the strong advice of the battalion commander, the III Panzer Corps initially attached one heavy tank company to each of its panzer divisions (see figure 7). The entire southern pincer of the German attack was well equipped with armored units, but had few infantry units. As such, this forced 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf to adopt the tactic of using its tanks in the initial assault on the first day. 97 The area that the III Panzer Corps attacked was an absolutely level flood plain crisscrossed with small tributaries of the Northern Donets and Razumnoe Rivers that was
61
a good natural obstacle. The Soviets reinforced this with mines and other tank obstacles, severely restricting German armored units’ mobility..
Records concerning s.Pz.-Abt. 503 are filled with accounts of Tigers being halted by minefields, tank ditches, and streams and rivers. On the first day of the attack, the 2d Company had thirteen of its fourteen Tigers disabled by a minefield.99 After attempting but failing to ford the Donets River at 2:30 A.M. on the first day of the attack, the 3d Company was finally able to cross early in the afternoon after the engineers built a bridge across it.100 During the first three days of the attack, the heavy tank companies of the battalion supported the three Panzer divisions of III Panzer Corps. During this time, the corps managed to break through the first and second defensive lines but was only about
62
twenty kilometers from their start line, with another one hundred kilometers to go to reach Kursk.101 By 7 July 1943, the success of II SS Panzer Corps to the west had the primary attention of the Soviets. Tasked to protect the flank of II SS Panzer Corps, but still well to the south, this success presented a problem for III Panzer Corps. On 7 July 1943, III Panzer Corps consolidated s.Pz.-Abt. 503 and subordinated it to Panzer Regiment 11 of the 6th Panzer Division. 102 The III Panzer Corps gave 6th Panzer Division the mission of spearheading the attack to link up with II SS Panzer Corps.103 In order to complete this link up, the corps had to cross the Donets River again further upstream. Supported by s.Pz.-Abt. 503, 6th Panzer Division fought through Soviet defenses to Rzhavets across the Donets River, before being detached from III Panzer Corps (see figure 7).104 S.Pz.-Abt. 503 destroyed approximately seventy-two Soviet tanks from the beginning of the offensive until the battalion was taken from III Panzer Corps on 14 July 1943.105 During this time they lost four Tigers in combat and no Tigers had to be destroyed to avoid capture.106 This was primarily due to the fact that the battalion was on the offensive and its maintenance and recovery elements could evacuate and repair damaged and disabled Tigers on the battlefield, instead of having to abandon them as in previous battles involving retreats. This meant that the battalion achieved a kill ratio of 18.0 to 1. In a little over ten days of almost continual combat the battalion was able to maintain 57 percent of its Tigers operational, with the highest number available at one time being forty-two at the beginning of the operation and the lowest number being six, on 14 July 1943
The following is from an american study publicly available on the net. It deschribes some of the actions of sPzAbt 503 in Russia.
Regards eric
S.Pz.-Abt. 503 with Army Group Don in Southern Russia On 27 December 1942, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 was sent to Army Group Don to assist in stabilizing the front.42 This unit was needed to help protect Rostov so that the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies and other German units in the Caucasus could withdraw across the Don River to the Donets River, where the high command planned a new defensive line.43 This battalion arrived at the beginning of 1943 and Army Group Don immediately assigned it the mission of securing bridges across the Manytsch River for use by withdrawing forces.44 By this time there was not a continuous front in the area. German forces defended a series of blocking positions and strong points in an attempt to stop the Soviet advance. These were located at key points at road or railroad junctions and major
51
river crossings. 45 The fighting was characterized by rearguard actions, while the main body of troops took up new positions farther back. S.Pz.-Abt. 503 participated in this fighting from 1 January until 17 January 1943, primarily securing important river crossing sites (see figure 6). However, because of the fluid nature of the battlefield, they were sent from one important area to another and in one instance covered sixty-five kilometers in one day.
Probably the largest single employment of the battalion occurred on 7 January 1943 when the battalion, supported by 2d Battalion of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 128, attacked towards Stavropol. The 1st Company attacked frontally with the battalion of panzer grenadiers, while the 2d Company attacked from the left flank.47 Altogether, the battalion fielded seventeen operational Tigers out of twenty and twenty Panzer IIIs out of thirty-one.48 During the engagement, the Tigers knocked out eighteen Soviet tanks and destroyed an armored car and five antitank guns.49 The enemy retreated and during the
52
pursuit the battalion lost its first vehicle during the entire engagement, a Panzer III to artillery fire.50 Possibly the most important mission given this battalion was its attack to reduce a Soviet bridgehead at Wessley. The battalion fielded eleven operational Tigers and twelve Panzer IIIs and was again supported by the 2d Battalion of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 128 as well as by a battery of light howitzers.51 The attack began in the early morning of 9 January 1943. German forces made three attempts to achieve their objective during the day but the Soviets repulsed all attacks.52 The battalion managed to destroy eight T-34s during the attack but also lost two Tigers and one Panzer III to enemy fire.53 In addition, the nine other Tigers were so badly damaged that the battalion only had one operational Tiger at the end of the day. Two of these Tigers were sent back to Germany for general repairs.54 In the space of six hours, one of these received 227 hits from antitank rifles and was struck 14 times by fifty-two-millimeter and 11 times by seventy-six-millimeter antitank rounds. It is a testament to the vehicle’s durability that despite this damage, the Tiger still traveled back sixty kilometers under its own power.55 On 14 January 1943, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 had the 2d Company of s.Pz.-Abt. 502, also in the region, attached to the battalion. 56 This became the only instance where three companies of the D organization were integrated under one battalion. However, because of losses to the battalion, this organization lasted only eight days and on 22 January 1943, the battalion disbanded the 2d Company. 57 The battalion integrated the remnants of this company into the 3d Company, and continued to operate with only two companies of the D organization. 58
53
After partially rebuilding its strength, Army Group Don assigned the battalion missions that involved securing the important railroad centers around Rostov (see figure 6). The battalion participated in many small local counterattacks that forced it to operate in company and platoon sized units. These elements operated with a wide variety of other units, usually in a subordinate role. In accomplishing these missions, the battalion demonstrated an incredible amount of flexibility in command and control and in company and platoon organizations, repeatedly changing command relationships and composition in order to accomplish the mission. During this fighting, the battalion integrated Tigers and Panzer IIIs in many different ways. On two occasions the battalion formed a light company consisting of all Panzer IIIs and a heavy company with Tigers and the remainder of the Panzer IIIs. This light company primarily covered other units’ withdrawal but did participate in an attack of 8 February 1943 in the northwest part of Rostov, where it destroyed twelve enemy tanks and three antitank guns.59 The battalion commander employed this light company because of the difficult terrain, consisting of many ditches, across which the attacks were carried out. From 19 February to 22 February 1943, the light company, starting with eight Panzer IIIs and two Tigers, conducted local counterattacks and occupied covering positions in the vicinity of Rostov. During this four day period, this company destroyed twenty-three T-34s and eleven antitank guns while losing one Tiger and one Panzer III.60 After an engagement on 22 February 1943, the battalion only had two Tigers and five Panzer IIIs operational and withdrew to an area near Taganrog to refit.61 This battalion was not employed again until Operation CITADEL in July 1943.
54
During the almost two months of combat with Army Group Don, s.Pz.-Abt. 503 destroyed more than seventy-one enemy tanks and fifty-five antitank guns.62 In so doing, they lost around thirteen Panzer IIIs and had three Tigers knocked out due to enemy actions.63 Another Tiger was destroyed, while waiting at the Budenny rail station for transport back to Germany for factory repair, when the battalion was forced to retreat to Rostov. 64 A total of four Tigers were so badly damaged in combat that they were transported back to Germany. 65 This means that this battalion destroyed 23.6 enemy tanks for the loss of each Tiger or 4.4 enemy tanks for the loss of any type tank, Panzer III and Tiger. This battalion was much more effective than the units at Leningrad and in North Africa in recovering disabled Tigers. During combat that always involved retrograde movements, it destroyed only one Tiger to avoid capture. Additionally, this Tiger had already been recovered and loaded on a rail car for transport back to Germany. This battalion was very reluctant to destroy its own vehicles and did everything possible to recover Tigers. In one instance, three Tigers broke down in a withdrawal and instead of destroying them, the crews stayed with the vehicles until they could be recovered, which was over thirty hours later.66 Diary entries are filled with examples of operational vehicles towing damaged vehicles back to the maintenance platoon to be repaired. In another instance, while the rest of the unit withdrew, six eighteen-ton recovery vehicles and two other Tigers recovered a Tiger that broke through the ice of a stream. 67 Despite the great efforts of the recovery elements, this battalion still suffered from a low operational readiness rate of its Tigers. On average, the battalion only maintained around 35 percent of its Tigers operational.68 Probably one of the main reasons for
55
Tigers being in need of repair, was from damage due to enemy fire. Another reason may have been the great distances that it was tasked to cover. In one instance, the 2d company conducted a 107 kilometer roadmarch in ten and a half hours.69 This unit did not lose any vehicles to maintenance breakdowns during the roadmarch, however, probably because the company commander ordered a maintenance halt every twenty kilometers.70 Overall, this unit was very successful in its operations around Rostov. This unit played a large part in protecting the key road and rail networks that allowed the 1st Panzer Army to retreat. Some historians attribute preventing the Soviets in breaking through to Rostov and cutting the road and rail lines, to the actions of this battalion. 71 Changes Before Operation CITADEL A measure of the effectiveness of the heavy tank battalions fighting the Soviets can be ascertained by looking at the number of steps that the Soviets took in response to this threat. They did not have time to develop an armored vehicle to counter the Tiger before Operation CITADEL, but they did begin planning for vehicles such as the T-34/85 and the KV-85 heavy tank. In the interim, the Soviets developed and fielded a heavy self-propelled gun, the SU-152, that was armed with a 152-millimeter gun designed to defeat the German heavy tanks.72 Additionally, the Soviets continued to field the SU-76 and the SU-122, which were armed with a 76-millimeter and a 122-millimeter gun respectively. All of these vehicles were grouped by type into SU regiments. By the time Operation CITADEL began, twenty-one SU regiments were at the front, mainly concentrated in the Kursk area, with three in reserve and seventeen still in training.73
56
Also in response to the Tigers, the Soviets formed antitank battalions and assigned them to tank and mechanized corps. These were armed with an eighty-five-millimeter antiaircraft gun on a special mount with crews trained as antitank gunners. Many, although not all, of the tank and mechanized corps at Kursk had been reinforced with the eighty-five-millimeter antitank battalions prior to the German attack.74 In terms of tanks, the Soviets formed heavy tank regiments to counter the threat of the German heavy tank battalions. Production of the KV-85, armed with an eighty-five-millimeter gun did not begin until August 1943, after the German offensive at Kursk.75 So, the Soviets gathered all available KV1s and KV2s, armed with a 76- and a 152-millimeter gun, respectively, and formed five heavy tank regiments before the German offensive began. 76 None of the new tank regiments took part in the Battle of Kursk, but their availability was an indication of the concern to bolster the defense against the German Tigers and the heavy tank battalions.77 The Russians realized that the Tiger had a powerful long-range eighty-eight-millimeter gun and thick frontal armor, making it superior to their tanks with seventy-six-millimeter guns. They believed that they could “only be fought effectively in close combat, where the T-34 could use its greater maneuverability and direct its fire at the sides of the heavy German tanks.”78 This tactic resulted in the Soviet tanks “charging” at the German Tigers in an attempt to close the range as quickly as possible so the T-34/76 could have a chance of destroying the Tigers. The Germans, for their part, were also busy reorganizing the heavy tank battalions into the E organizations, doing away with all the Panzer IIIs in the battalion. The fact
57
that the Germans deleted the Panzer IIIs from the organization is contrary to almost all of the recommendations in the available heavy tank battalion after action reports.79 The sole exception to the call for Panzer IIIs in the after action reviews was a recommendation from the heavy company of the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. At this time, this unit fielded only a heavy company as part of the regiment, but was soon increased to an entire heavy tank battalion. This report stated: The previous combat actions have shown that the Panzer III, originally intended to be a security vehicle for each Tiger, has not evolved to withstand hits from enemy weapons. The opponent’s defensive weapons take it under fire in preference to firing at the Tiger. In addition, it would aid in improving the number of operationa l Panzers by having a pure company made up of only one type of Panzer. A very inefficient and complicated repair staff for the Tiger Company is necessary only because of transportation of Panzer III repair parts in addition to the difficulties with Tiger repair parts. In this case, it is appropriate to reduce Tiger units to only one type of Panzer – the Panzerkampfwagen VI (Tiger).80 This report was probably more insightful, in retrospect, than the others that advocated retention of the Panzer IIIs. The majority of the recommendations argued for the continued inclusion of the Panzer IIIs so that they could accomplish missions other than those for which they were originally intended; scouting, liaison, evacuation of wounded, and resupply of Tigers. General Guderian, as Inspector of Armored Troops, rejected the majority of the recommendations that advocated continued inclusion of Panzer IIIs and argued for the concentration of Tigers in the E organization. 81 He did, however, see the need for an improved scouting and liaison capability, and requested the creation of a reconnaissance platoon, mounted on armored half-tracks, that became part of the E battalion organization. 82
58
Another report from the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland suggested incorporating a heavy tank platoon into every panzer battalion. 83 Others recommended incorporating a heavy tank company into the panzer regiment of every panzer division. Guderian rejected this, saying “dispersing them [Tigers] . . . is an idiotic squandering of this valuable equipment.”84 The report by the heavy tank company of the Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland indicated that the unit was constantly employed as the lead element. This initiated responses from the Chief of the Army General Staff as well as from Guderian, that contradicted the established doctrine for the heavy tank battalions. The Panzer representative to the German Chief of the Army General Staff wrote: Employing Tigers as the lead units is not self-evidently correct. Situatio ns will occur where this is necessary or useful. The controlling factors are the tasks and the number of operational Tigers. If there are [only a few Tigers], their assignment to the point means that the Tigers will not be available when they are needed to attack enemy tanks. Losses will frequently occur due to mines and bridge failure, plus getting hung up in uncrossable terrain. In order to maintain the high operational and production value of the Tigers, it is necessary to concentrate the Tigers in units so that concentrated purposeful employment, maintenance, and care can be achieved.85 This message was followed shortly by another from Guderian who took a similar position that seemed to argue against the use of the heavy tank battalion as the lead element in the attack. He wrote: The Tiger unit is the most valuable and strongest weapon in a Panzer unit. If it is used as the point unit, it will quickly bring localized success because of its high combat power. However, they will have insufficient force at the start of a decisive battle that could mean destruction of the opponent in the depths of his position, because the Tigers will suffer heavy breakdowns due to mines, hits, and terrain obstacles. Therefore, they will enter the decisive phase of the battle already greatly depleted. Fundamentally, point units have increased fuel consumption. Because the Tiger already has a limited radius of action, when it is
59
used as a lead vehicle it will sometimes be short of fuel at the start of the decisive phase of the battle.86 Despite these views, there is no record of any new doctrinal guidance being formally published. In any case, one aspect of the doctrine that clearly did not change was the emphasis upon concentration of the heavy tank battalion instead of dispersing it. Operation CITADEL: The Battle of Kursk Two heavy tank battalions participated in the Battle of Kursk. S.Pz.-Abt. 503 was still in southern Russia as part of Army Group South. It was attached to III Panzer Corps, part of Army Detachment Kempf, during Operation CITADEL as part of the southern pincer attack upon the Kursk salient.87 The other heavy tank battalion involved in this operation was s.Pz.-Abt. 505, attached to Army Group Center.88 Both of these battalions received orders to change from the D organization to the E organization in the Spring of 1943. S.Pz.-Abt 503 had completed this transition and fielded forty-five Tigers in three companies for the operation. 89 S.Pz.-Abt. 505 was still in the process of transitioning to the E organization during Operation CITADEL. They completed forming two E organization heavy tank companies, but the third company did not arrive until 8 July 1943, after the start of the offensive.90 To compensate for this, (Wireless Radio) Company 312 was attached to it. This unit fielded remote controlled Borgward B IV vehicles, carrying 500 kilograms of TNT each, that were remotely maneuvered into position and then exploded to destroy antitank positions and other emplacements.91 This company’s mission was to “conduct aggressive reconnaissance, detecting minefields and clearing lanes through them, destroying hard to overcome positions, such as fortified antitank weapons as well as super heavy tanks.
60
This battalion was also unique because of the way in which they used their Panzer IIIs that they had not yet turned in. They converted their Panzer IIIs into bridging material carriers by removing their turrets and placing planks, beams, and other bridging material on top.93 Although the battalion was ordered to repair these vehicles, they had not repaired or turned them in prior to the start of the offensive.94 These two heavy tank battalions involved in Operation CITADEL, even though similarly equipped, were employed differently. In the North, Army Group Center attached s.Pz.-Abt. 505 to the 6th Infantry Division of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps. This corps consisted of three panzer divisions and one infantry division, and was assigned as the main breakthrough force in the North. 95 In the south, Army Group South attached s.Pz.-Abt. 503 to the III Panzer Corps which also consisted of three panzer divisions and one infantry division. This corps was part of the larger ad hoc organization known as Army Detachment Kempf and initially had the mission of guarding the flank of II SS Panzer Corps from the adjacent 4th Panzer Army. It was also tasked with destroying enemy counterattack forces expected to arrive from the east and the north. 96 In spite of Guderian’s guidance that Tigers be employed in a concentrated heavy tank battalion and against the strong advice of the battalion commander, the III Panzer Corps initially attached one heavy tank company to each of its panzer divisions (see figure 7). The entire southern pincer of the German attack was well equipped with armored units, but had few infantry units. As such, this forced 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf to adopt the tactic of using its tanks in the initial assault on the first day. 97 The area that the III Panzer Corps attacked was an absolutely level flood plain crisscrossed with small tributaries of the Northern Donets and Razumnoe Rivers that was
61
a good natural obstacle. The Soviets reinforced this with mines and other tank obstacles, severely restricting German armored units’ mobility..
Records concerning s.Pz.-Abt. 503 are filled with accounts of Tigers being halted by minefields, tank ditches, and streams and rivers. On the first day of the attack, the 2d Company had thirteen of its fourteen Tigers disabled by a minefield.99 After attempting but failing to ford the Donets River at 2:30 A.M. on the first day of the attack, the 3d Company was finally able to cross early in the afternoon after the engineers built a bridge across it.100 During the first three days of the attack, the heavy tank companies of the battalion supported the three Panzer divisions of III Panzer Corps. During this time, the corps managed to break through the first and second defensive lines but was only about
62
twenty kilometers from their start line, with another one hundred kilometers to go to reach Kursk.101 By 7 July 1943, the success of II SS Panzer Corps to the west had the primary attention of the Soviets. Tasked to protect the flank of II SS Panzer Corps, but still well to the south, this success presented a problem for III Panzer Corps. On 7 July 1943, III Panzer Corps consolidated s.Pz.-Abt. 503 and subordinated it to Panzer Regiment 11 of the 6th Panzer Division. 102 The III Panzer Corps gave 6th Panzer Division the mission of spearheading the attack to link up with II SS Panzer Corps.103 In order to complete this link up, the corps had to cross the Donets River again further upstream. Supported by s.Pz.-Abt. 503, 6th Panzer Division fought through Soviet defenses to Rzhavets across the Donets River, before being detached from III Panzer Corps (see figure 7).104 S.Pz.-Abt. 503 destroyed approximately seventy-two Soviet tanks from the beginning of the offensive until the battalion was taken from III Panzer Corps on 14 July 1943.105 During this time they lost four Tigers in combat and no Tigers had to be destroyed to avoid capture.106 This was primarily due to the fact that the battalion was on the offensive and its maintenance and recovery elements could evacuate and repair damaged and disabled Tigers on the battlefield, instead of having to abandon them as in previous battles involving retreats. This meant that the battalion achieved a kill ratio of 18.0 to 1. In a little over ten days of almost continual combat the battalion was able to maintain 57 percent of its Tigers operational, with the highest number available at one time being forty-two at the beginning of the operation and the lowest number being six, on 14 July 1943
I hate disclosing my sources!!!
But okay. It's Fort Leavenworth's Digital Library. Quite interesting stuff there 
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/c ... m/home.htm
But okay. It's Fort Leavenworth's Digital Library. Quite interesting stuff there
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/c ... m/home.htm
But I found someone that can do better than that!
The 1.Ostpreussische Division by Werner Richter. Try not to get too excited. This is truly a ridiculous price.
http://www.abebooks.de/servlet/SearchRe ... n&sortby=3
The 1.Ostpreussische Division by Werner Richter. Try not to get too excited. This is truly a ridiculous price.
http://www.abebooks.de/servlet/SearchRe ... n&sortby=3
