Hard Question: 1945 Panzer Div. Strength

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Hello Kamen, thank you for joining in this discussion. Having read your post, am I correct in drawing the conclusion that the TO&Es expressed as Panzer Division 44 and 45 are simply suggested, ideal organizational charts?
(This practice differs radically with American Unit organization in World War II and this difference may be why I am having such a hard time with the concept.)
Also, if I am correct in my reading of your post, each individual Panzer Division in the German Army, especially in the late war period, can only
be analyzed according to the units actually assigned to it. That is to say, that each Division was unique in terms of number, type and size of units it contained as well as equipment?
I thank you for clarifying this issue. My remaining questions are those that Qvist mentions in his post. I am having difficulty classifying different strength reports for Muncheberg. I accept wholeheartedly your figure of slightly less than 7,000 men for the Division's overall strength. (Although I am astonished that so much responsibility was placed on a unit of this size!) Can you give me an understanding of the meaning of the lesser numbers?
Again, Kamen, my thanks for your sharing your information and participating in this discussion. Very Best Regards, David

[Christoph Awender]

As there seem to be many "versions" of how Müncheberg was organized I think it was not a division organized as Pz.Div.45 or Kpfgr.Pz.Div.45 but a special mixture. It seems to have 2 Pz.Abteilungen but just one Pz.Gren.Rgt., a Nachr.Kp. like the Kpfgr. for example.
It could well be a special organization exception. Due to the lack of documents about this unit it will be very hard to find out.

Christoph

[Christoph Awender]

According to a Gliederung of Müncheberg David sent me we can say following men-strength (SOLLSTÄRKE) for its special Gliederung:

Divisionskommando: 420 (some men minus for the missing Kartenstelle)
1 Panzerabteilung (just three companies): appr. 680
1 Radfahr-Pz.Gren.Rgt.: 1170 (without M.G.Kp.(mot.), s.Kp.(mot.))
1 Pz.Gren.Rgt.(mot.): 1170
1 Pz.Jg.Kp.(8,8): ~ 150
1 Pz.Sp.Wg.Kp.: ~ 130
1 PzArt.Rgt. with H.Flak-Art.Abt., Pz.Art.Abt.: ~ 550
1 Pz.Nachr.Kp.: 237
1 Pz.Pi.Kp.: ~ 120
1 Kf.Park.Tr.: ~ 90
Pz.Nachsch.Tr.: ~ 90
1 Feldpostamt: 18
San-Truppen: ~ 200

which makes:
fighting elemets: 3947
Supply-troops: 398
Total: 4345

Don´t know is this sounds more "fitting" to you.

This is just a rough estimation without looking on the actual KStN´s of the various units taking in consideration Stab-Kompanien and Züge etc.....

Christoph

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Many Thanks for Looking At That Christoph!

My poor little Panzer Division is shrinking further!!!

Well, it is better to find the truth. This is becoming a VERY interesting Thread! Very Best Regards, David

[Piet Duits]

Hello Kamen, thank you for joining in this discussion. Having read your post, am I correct in drawing the conclusion that the TO&Es expressed as Panzer Division 44 and 45 are simply suggested, ideal organizational charts?

You are correct. Use it as a guide on how things should have looked like. Waffen-SS formations also had their equivelant of the Panz.Div. 44 and Panz.Gren.Div. 44, with other numbers of men etc. Basicly the same as the Heer-counterparts, but at least with the addition of extra Dentists for Battalion-sized units. Confusing, isn't it!

Funny you mention the allied T/O&E's, as I have switched interest for a while: after years of working on the KStN's I am now working on Canadian, British and US War Establishments/ Tables of Organisations (and Equipments) and found out that even the US Army did not always followed their T/O&E... And they were at the winning side! Not to mention the British and Canadian units.

:)

Piet

[Christoph Awender]

David you have to face it... At the beginning of the war you would have needed a barracks-complex to house a Panzerdivision.
In 1945 it would fit into a school building and the tanks on the teachers car park.

Christoph

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Hi Piet, well, if you ever want a really thrilling experience, try matching the official U.S. Army TO&E's of 1949 with the Army Divisions fielded in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War!!! The TO&E's are specific down to the last .45 cal. pistol, but did any of them match a single Division that fought in Korea? Heck No!!! Not even close. I and a friend once spent a couple weeks trying to figure out the number of Tanks in a Tank Battalion attached to a particular Infantry Division, aw what fun, what thrills!!!

Hey Christoph, I know I'm being naive and I've read a lot of the literature on the Oder Front, but what was the German High Command thinking? I mean, how could they possibly have expected to prevent the Soviet Army from breaking through the Oder Front when a major German Division--a Panzer Division--a pillar of Ninth Army was at such a low troop strength??? It bogles the mind!

Very Best Regards, David

[Piet Duits]

David,

The german High Command probably lived in a oxygen capsule: they expected way too much from the available troops.
But surprise, surprise: how well did these sparcely available troops fight!! They did a very good job, even with the low numbers of men and available equipment.

I have heard a story once that not the lack of material was the reason Germany lost the war, but the lack of men using the material.


Piet