Was it due to Italy Germany lost the war?

[phylo_roadking]

One OTHER major advantage to having Italy neutral...apart from the no drain to resouces by not spending two years in North Africa; They're far to big militarily to attempt a "Norway" taking the war to Germany via a neutral country. By simply BEING there as neutrals the entire italian campaign from Sicily forward simply never happens. For Britain its wait for a Second Front or attempt the far more difficult option of Churchill's "Soft underbelly of Europe" strategy via the Balkans...

[Jock]

Uli, I was asking, ironically, if the Russians attacked the Romanian lines by chance. Your gargantuan post only confirms my earlier, concise statement.

Carl, Phylo, for Italy to have remained a true neutral, they would have had to erase the 1930's, Mussolini, and the Spanish Civil War. No matter who's side they declared themselves on, they had backed the Axis side thoughout the 30's, and would have always been considered dictatorial, therfor, seen as the enemy, or at best, suspect.

Cheers,

[phylo_roadking]

You're right...in the sense that the pre-Spring 1940 gave a more precise "definition" of "neutral"....we too often use the wrong terms.

"High Contracting Powers" were nations that had signed up to the Hague Convention/Hague Rules on Land Warfare. To declare war, set conditional ultimatums etc. they had to do it by the terms of the Convention.

BUT

"Neutral Powers" were nations that had signed to Convention but declared their intent to the Dutch Government in the Hague, as offical monitors of the Covention..to, well, remain Neutral LOL and govern THEIR behaviour in time of war or declaration of war according to the role set out for them as "Neutral Powers" in the Convention.

IIRC Italy was a "High Contracting Power" in the sense of what WE nowadays would call "Aligned". They weren't "neutral"....they just weren't at war with anyone until June 10th 1940!!!

WE tend to think of Neutral and Combatants....because THAT is how it was by May 1945. But when the war started, there were in-effect THREE groupings Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Neutrals.

[Uli]

Uli, I was asking, ironically, if the Russians attacked the Romanian lines by chance. Your gargantuan post only confirms my earlier, concise statement.

Carl, Phylo, for Italy to have remained a true neutral, they would have had to erase the 1930's, Mussolini, and the Spanish Civil War. No matter who's side they declared themselves on, they had backed the Axis side thoughout the 30's, and would have always been considered dictatorial, therfor, seen as the enemy, or at best, suspect.

Cheers,

My apologies, Jock: I didn't realize that Feldgrau.com exercised a word-limit on response entries. Since you asked in an earlier post if indeed the Russian counterassault on Stalingrad (Operation Uranus) fell on the Rumanian lines merely by chance, I'll reconfigure my response to read, simply--"No, it wasn't by chance."

[Jock]

And I would counter, anyone who can sense the nuance of a sentance, wouldn't have written a long winded, "look at my knowledge" reply.

Lets imagine an Ost front novice, (Not you Uli, I'm being rhetorical again *edit*) who somehow stumbles on the question that the Romanians may have been at fault. And now, lets imagine a young(ish) lad whose area of interest is the Ost front, asking a rhetorical question.

***Edit***

[Jason Pipes]

Jock, your response is uncalled for and I don't appreciate your tone or attitude. We are placing you under review.

Uli, please accept our apologies.

[Jock]

Fair enough, Jason. It was a strongly worded comment, and I'll remove it.

[Uli]

Jock, your response is uncalled for and I don't appreciate your tone or attitude. We are placing you under review.

Uli, please accept our apologies.

Thank you, Jason--though no apologies are necessary.

As the Commissar has recently said, we're on the cusp of a new year, and it's time to start things off on a happier note. I'm guilty of perhaps belaboring discussions on the Holocaust, and for that I'll freely admit here that I was wrong in doing so.

Jock has retracted his words, and that was big of him to do so. I appreciate it.

Merry Christmas to all.

[Kelvin]

Hi all,

What do you think about this question? Was it due to the ill performing italians that The Reich got involved in fighting in the Balkans first, and later had to send in troops to Africa to bail out the italians?
Had the italians performed better, the germans would have been able to start Barbarossa sooner and thus had more time before the winter started AND would not have faced the british empire for a short while.

Well, what's your opinion? Am I too far off?

Piet

German reinforcement to Italian in North Africa was insignificant : only two divisions in initial period while German engaged 150 division for war in Russia. The coup in Yugoslavia forced Hitler must occupy the Balkan, so the delay of Barbarossa was inevitable. Sometimes, when Hitler conquered some countries, he will think more deeper than his generals. Hitler want to protect Sweden's quality iron ore supply by conquering Norway against British attack and he also took Norway's heavy water plant for his atomic project and Kanben molybdenum ores ( molybdenum is important resouces to armour protection, in the later period of war, Tiger II 's armour was weaker than its design because of lack of molybdenum ), By conquering Yugoslavia and Greece, Hitler possessed the largest copper ore in Europe : Bor copper mines and the second largest lead ore in Europe : Trepca lead ore in Yugoslavia and also rich Bauxite deposit in both Yugoslavia and Greece. And securing of Balkan flank to help protect British air attack o Polesti oilfield in Romania and Grant bauxite ore( the largest in Europe) in Hungary.

And terrain of Italy only made allied put many troop engaged in Italy. 18 German divisions stopped allied troop in central Italy for two years because of Italian terrain while 58 divisions in France cannot stop allied advance in France.France was liberated within 3 months.

[Ronald Lameck]

Germany lost the war mostly because of an almost non-existent grand strategy. Hitler did not expect that Britain and France to fight over Poland. He had a hard enough time understanding why Poland's government would resist him. It could/should have allied to Germany in 1939. That would have added about 40 divisions to an attack at the U.S.S.R., and placed the initial front 600 Km. further east.
Hitler should have taken Denmark and the Netherlands immediately after defeating Poland in the fall of 1939. There would have been nothing that the western Allies could have done to prevent it, and it may have dampened their notions of invading Norway. The battle for Norway was much more costly for the Kriegsmarine - it ended the campaign comparatively weaker to the Royal Navy than it was at the start.
Hitler had almost no joint planning or discussion with Mussolini. He did not expect and did not need the Italian "help" against France in June 1940. He had expected Italy to remain neutral until 1942.
He made a too-hasty and generous peace with France. He should have insisted on receiving the French navy as reparations. If this kept France in the war a bit longer, that would not be a problem. It was already beaten.
The same week Italy jumped in, he should have set Unternehmen Merkur in motion and seized Malta. The Mediterranean would be an Axis lake, and Britain would have been the one with no viable supply line in the area. With all of this, even a war-monger like Churchill might have decided that a peace with honour was a good way out.
Then the U.S.S.R. would definitely have been defeated (barring some truly STUPID German action). There would likely not have been the "need" for the death camps. Eastern Europe would not have become Stalin's colonies, there would have never been a "Cold War." If an Israel existed today, it might be on Madagascar, as Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf years earlier. Many people not under the pressure of ultimatums might have acted very much differently. All these "what ifs" point to how the world today could have been much more peaceful, happier, and healthier if only a handful of people in positions of power had let their heads rule their emotions instead of the opposite.

[Kelvin]

Germany lost the war mostly because of an almost non-existent grand strategy. Hitler did not expect that Britain and France to fight over Poland. He had a hard enough time understanding why Poland's government would resist him. It could/should have allied to Germany in 1939. That would have added about 40 divisions to an attack at the U.S.S.R., and placed the initial front 600 Km. further east.
Hitler should have taken Denmark and the Netherlands immediately after defeating Poland in the fall of 1939. There would have been nothing that the western Allies could have done to prevent it, and it may have dampened their notions of invading Norway. The battle for Norway was much more costly for the Kriegsmarine - it ended the campaign comparatively weaker to the Royal Navy than it was at the start.
Hitler had almost no joint planning or discussion with Mussolini. He did not expect and did not need the Italian "help" against France in June 1940. He had expected Italy to remain neutral until 1942.
He made a too-hasty and generous peace with France. He should have insisted on receiving the French navy as reparations. If this kept France in the war a bit longer, that would not be a problem. It was already beaten.
The same week Italy jumped in, he should have set Unternehmen Merkur in motion and seized Malta. The Mediterranean would be an Axis lake, and Britain would have been the one with no viable supply line in the area. With all of this, even a war-monger like Churchill might have decided that a peace with honour was a good way out.
Then the U.S.S.R. would definitely have been defeated (barring some truly STUPID German action). There would likely not have been the "need" for the death camps. Eastern Europe would not have become Stalin's colonies, there would have never been a "Cold War." If an Israel existed today, it might be on Madagascar, as Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf years earlier. Many people not under the pressure of ultimatums might have acted very much differently. All these "what ifs" point to how the world today could have been much more peaceful, happier, and healthier if only a handful of people in positions of power had let their heads rule their emotions instead of the opposite.

40 less motorized Polish divisions were of unimportance to Hitler 's campign in Russia. The main goal for Hitler in Barbarossa was annhilation of Russian troop west of the Dnieper before the call up of her vast reserves within 2 -3 month. By 01st August 360 Russian divisions were mobilized and by early Dec, over 600 divisions existed. If adding 40 Polish divisions to Hitler 's invading force only made less than 250 division altogether. So that assumption is groundless.

Another assumption from you is conquest of the Netherlands and Denmark after the fall of Poland in late 1939, it will provoke the prompt action from the allies, the Manstein plan was not yet approved, the result is stalemate again between Hitler and the allies like in WWI.

The campaign for Norway was must as the allies planned to occupy some part of Norway like Narvik to block the Swedish supply of high grade iron ores to Nazi Germany, in this moment, Swedish iron ore was of vital importance to German war industries before the occupation of Lorraince iron ores. though it was costly, it must been carried out without delay. And please in bear in mind, allied troop were kicked out of Norway and Hitler won in this round.

In June 1940, it was Mussolini himself want to join the war as he could sit on the negotiation table to demand Corsica and Nice. But at least it give more direct political pressure to force France to capitulate.

The forces acquistion of French navy only forced the French navy to join the Royal Navy and scuttled themselves like what they had done in Nov 1942. Although the French was routed in her homeland , she still had a large colonial empire in Africa , what Hitler wanted was Political Conclusion. Her generous offer of peace to Great Britain also like this.

Not only did Hitler need to capture Malta, but also needed to occupy Gibraltar and Suez so as to become Axis lakes. Regarding Gibraltar, without Franco support, Hitler had difficulty in carrying out the Operation Felix. With regard to Suez, Italian tried to do that and the result was disastrous for the Axis and this forced Hitler to send Rommel for aids.

Without unlimited Russian manpower, German absolutely cannot defeat Russia in 1941 even though German decision making was faultless. Despite the fact that German scored a series of victories in Russian like Uman, Minsk, Kiev and Azov, Russian divisions were flown into the battlefield. The operation Barbarossa was doomed to failure, even Hitler did not divert his troop down south Kiev. German thrust have been stopped already in August when new Russian reserves arrived.

Operation Typhoon was only Hitler' s last gamble to try to win this war in 1941 by capturing Moscow. In spite of tremendrous German effort, German still cannot capture Moscow in front of huge Russian reserves.

Just my 2 cents.

[Ronald Lameck]

Re: Kelvin's reply.

Had Poland's "Three Colonels" been wise, they would have allied with Germany in 1939. There would not have been war with Britain and France. That would have meant no need for any westward action by Hitler. There would have been NO Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Whether the Soviets would have still tried to occupy the Baltic states is uncertain, but there would almost surely have been no "Winter War" with Finland. It is also doubtful that the Soviets would have tried to occupy Rumanian Bessarabia.
In this event, the 40 Polish divisions would have been very important. Starting 600 Km. further eastward, the Nazis could have invaded the S.U. in 1940. Although they may have been able to start as early as mid-May, let us assume an identical 22 June start date. The shorter distance and extra Polish troops would have meant that, even with only 10 Armoured divisions, Leningrad could almost surely have been invested or even captured. That would radically shorten supply lines and provide a base. Moscow would have been reached by late-September/early October. The attackers would not be exhausted, the weather would be milder, and there would NOT be 30 Siberian divisions to re-inforce the Red Army. Finally, the Red Army would still be feeling the effects of Stalin's 1937-8 purges. Command quality would be about as poor as historically shown in the Winter War. There would not be any "Lend-Lease" convoys to bring aid to the Soviets or to distact the Luftwaffe.
Would Rumania and/or Hungary be active allies in this event? Who knows. But a shorter, more concentrated front would be to the advantage of the more mobile German units. It would have been possible to conduct virtually all of the campaign north of the Pripet Marshes. Because Finland would likely NOT have been attacked by the Soviets in 1939, it would likely NOT be involved in this campaign. German forces that historically occupied Scandinavia could have fattened the strategic reserve. The German Parachute forces would not Crete, and would be available for use. Meanwhile, the Soviets would have to commit forces to the north coast to guard against parachute or sea invasion around Murmansk. Personally, I can't see the S.U. surviving in this case.

Alternatively, had there been a war with "The West", had Hitler taken Denmark and Netherlands in October 1939, there is little to nothing The West could have done about it - just as occurred historically. They would also be powerless to meaningfully invade Germany. No matter where the Wehrmacht schwerpunkt was in this version of Fall Gelb, the West forces could not have prevented a breakthrough. But, this time, the B.E.F. would be in central Belgium, far from seaports. When it inevitablty got surrounded, it would have been destroyed. The 300,000 who historically escaped at Dunkirk would be P.O.W.'s. I think Britain would be a lot moer interested in discussing peace in the situation.

Had Hitler insisted upon surrender of the French fleet, it might well have scuttled, as it historically did in 1942, or as the German High Seas Fleet did after WWI. But, with the thought of all of France being over-run, maybe it would just surrender. Certainly, the French colonies would not have tried to pursue war with no fleet or national leadership. This French fleet, added to Italy's. would have kept Britain's nose out of the Mediterranean. Had Unternehmen Merkur been sprung in 1940, Malta would have fallen, as its garrison at the time was much smaller than it subsequently became..

The trouble with any "what if" hypothesising is that it is speculative. All manner of unforeseeable other variables could come into play.
I still hold that the real reason Germany lost the war was the lack of a grand strategy. The old adage "if you don't know where you're going, don't be surprised if you don't get there" holds true. It's easy to defend against and defeat an opponent like Hitler, who didn't have a clear plan.

All this said, the lack of communication betwen Hitler and Mussolini was a great detriment to both. Not so much that Germany lost due to Italy, but more that they did almost nothing to help each other, and so wasted the efforts and lives of thousands of men. The simple numerical superiority lined up against the Axis, and its great disadvantage in metals, chemicals and food supply meant that the only hope to win was by "blitzkrieg" with a co-ordinated plan. But that did not exist.

[lwd]

... Had Poland's "Three Colonels" been wise, they would have allied with Germany in 1939.

That is a hypothesis on your part and by no means certain.

... Had Hitler insisted upon surrender of the French fleet, it might well have scuttled,

Or it may have sailed for Britain or the US.

... Certainly, the French colonies would not have tried to pursue war with no fleet or national leadership.

That seems rather contrary to what happened historically.

This French fleet, added to Italy's. would have kept Britain's nose out of the Mediterranean.

Not really. If it surrendered it would be a significant period of time before Germans or Italians could operate it and t hey would still have the fuel problem that plagued both navies.

[Ronald Lameck]

For lwd:

The view on what Poland's gov't. should have done is hardly MY hypothesis. In fact, it seems to have been a seerious consideration by many authors I have read. Let's just leave it that, as an absolute minimum, Poland would sure have fared no worse than it did.
What the French fleet would have done is always subject to speculation, but it's view may have been much more limited with the whole of France occupied in June/July 1940. Certainly, there would have been a constellation of opinions among its admirals and also among the average sailors. I doubt that more than a small number of ships would have been able to rely upon an obedient crew to sail off to Britain or elsewhere.
The French colonies did nothing meaningful until AFTER the clearing of N.Africa. But it may never have been cleared if the whole of France was occupied in 1940 and the fleet stayed in Axis hands.
The Axis would continue to have fuel problems, but the fuel could be dispensed among the "capital" ships. Britain never used any of its 1st-line ships in the Mediterranean, and the addition of many more big-bore guns via the French navy would have opened up the possibility of a Jutland-like battle for dominance there.
But: my contention remains. Germany did not lose the war because of Italy. It lost due to lack of a grand strategy. It needed to act quickly to overcome its huge material and manpower disadvantage. The "Sitzkrieg" wasted a lot of valuable time.

[lwd]

The view on what Poland's gov't. should have done is hardly MY hypothesis. In fact, it seems to have been a seerious consideration by many authors I have read. Let's just leave it that, as an absolute minimum, Poland would sure have fared no worse than it did.

That also is conjecture. While they probablly wouldn't have faired much worse under the Germans if as is likely the Soviets ended up in control things could have been significantly worse as they would have been viewed as a nation of collaborators at best.

What the French fleet would have done is always subject to speculation, but it's view may have been much more limited with the whole of France occupied in June/July 1940. Certainly, there would have been a constellation of opinions among its admirals and also among the average sailors. I doubt that more than a small number of ships would have been able to rely upon an obedient crew to sail off to Britain or elsewhere.

Historically some did. In this case the incentive is even greater. My understanding is that there was considerable thought to them sailing for the US historically as well. It's not at all clear how many would have been left to the axis and of course the Brtish would have had even more incentive for destroying what ships didn't leave or scuttle.

The French colonies did nothing meaningful until AFTER the clearing of N.Africa. But it may never have been cleared if the whole of France was occupied in 1940 and the fleet stayed in Axis hands.

I disagree with your initial assesement although the actions of the Vichy colonies may have been more significant during that period. However said colonies may also have had more incentive to go "Free French" in these circumstances. As for North Africa staying under even partial axis control that would have been very unlikely.

The Axis would continue to have fuel problems, but the fuel could be dispensed among the "capital" ships.

The Italians had to minimize thier use of their battleships due to the fuel shortage. Captial ships without escorts are vulnerable to a number of threats. Of course it's not just fuel. How long would it take the axis to get a well trained crew on the French ships and how well could they have maintained them during this period and after.

Britain never used any of its 1st-line ships in the Mediterranean,

That is simply not correct.

and the addition of many more big-bore guns via the French navy would have opened up the possibility of a Jutland-like battle for dominance there.

Many more? The French had some old battleships and the two light battleships. Richeleu was down a couple of guns and having disperison problems and her sister was along way from being finished. A long way from enough to challenge the RN in the Med and if they wait until 42 it's not just the RN.

But: my contention remains. Germany did not lose the war because of Italy. It lost due to lack of a grand strategy.

I can agree with that.

It needed to act quickly to overcome its huge material and manpower disadvantage. The "Sitzkrieg" wasted a lot of valuable time.

But what could it reasonably do that could produce a win? Acting just to act can easily result in simply digging oneself into a deeper hole.