An Amicus Brief for Neville Chamberlain

[pzrmeyer2]

An interesting take on Chamberlain, Churchill, and possibly who turned the "last European War" into a World War.

Seventy Years Later, An Amicus Brief for Neville Chamberlain
By Patrick J. Buchanan
On Sept. 30, 1938, 70 years ago, Neville Chamberlain visited Adolf Hitler's apartment in Munich, got his signature on a three-sentence declaration and flew home to Heston Aerodrome.
"I've got it," he shouted to Lord Halifax. "Here is a paper which bears his name." At the request of George VI, Chamberlain was driven to Buckingham Palace, where he joined the king on the balcony to take the cheers of the throngs below. An unprecedented honor.
Then it was on to 10 Downing Street, where, to choruses of "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow," Chamberlain declared: "This is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time."
This was Munich, the summit of infamy, endlessly invoked as the textbook example of how craven appeasement leads to desperate war.
That is the great myth. And like all myths, there is truth to it.
Chamberlain had indeed signed away the Czech-ruled Sudetenland to Germany,, rather than risk a new war like the one of 1914-1918 that had taken the lives of 700,000 British and 1.3 million Frenchmen.
Modernity spits on the name of Neville Chamberlain. Yet, consider the situation confronting the British prime minister that September.
The seeds of Munich had been planted at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, in the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon.
Though Germany agreed to an armistice based on Wilson's 14 Points and principle of self-determination, millions of Germans had been consigned to alien rule. Some 3.25 million Bohemian Germans (Sudetenlanders) were handed over to Prague, as were 2.5 million Slovaks, 800,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ukrainians and 150,000 Poles.
Germans will be "second class" citizens, President Masaryk told his parliament. Not a single German was in the National Assembly that drew up the constitution. Repeated protests by the German minority to the League of Nations were made—to no avail.
Lloyd George said the Czechs had lied to him at Paris when they had promised to model Czechoslovakia on the Swiss Confederation, with autonomy for ethnic minorities.
By the 1930s, most British and the Tory government believed an injustice had been done to the Sudeten Germans that must be rectified by diplomacy if a new war was to be averted.
After the Saar voted 90 to 10 to rejoin the Reich, and Austria had been annexed, the Sudeten Germans began to agitate for secession and annexation by Germany. And as Chamberlain wrote his sister, he "didn't care two hoots whether the Sudetens were in the Reich or out of it." The issue was not worth a European or world war.
As Britainn had no alliance with Prague nor any vital interest in East-Central Europe, where no British Army had ever fought before, what was Chamberlain even doing in Munich?
He feared that if war broke out between Czechs and Germans, and Praguee invoked its French alliance, a Franco-German war might follow, dragging Britain in as it had in 1914.
Three times that September, Chamberlain flew to Germany to negotiate the peaceful transfer of the provinces of Czechoslovakia where Germans were in the clear majority. After his second trip, to Bad Godesberg, where Hitler had threatened to march, Chamberlain had ordered mobilization of the fleet.
Hitler had backed down and urged Chamberlain to continue his pursuit of a negotiated settlement, which was finalized at Munich.
Why did Chamberlain not tell Prague to defy Hitler and commit Britain to fight for a Czech Sudetenland?
Because Britain was utterly unprepared for war. The Brits had not a single division in France, no Spitfires, no draft and no allies save France. Britain's World War I allies were gone. Italy was with Hitler. Japan was now hostile. Russia was lost to Bolshevism. Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa were unwilling to fight, if the issue was keeping Germans under Czech rule.
And the Americans had gone home. Indeed, FDR had warned, "Those who count on the assured aid of the United States in case of a war in Europe are totally mistaken." Roosevelt's aides informed Paris that, if war broke out, America, under the neutrality acts, would not even deliver the planes France had already purchased.
Why should Britain declare a war it could not win for a cause—Czech control of 3.5 million Germans—in which it did not believe, a war certain to bring death to millions and the ruin of Britain?
We Americans did not go to war for the Czechs in 1938, or the Poles in 1939, or the French in 1940, or the Hungarians in 1956. Last month, Russia marched into Abkhazia and South Ossetia—the Sudeten lands of Georgia. Did we declare war?
If the Russian majorities in east Ukraine or Crimea demand the right to secede and return to Mother Russia, will we go to war to keep these millions of Russians under Ukrainian rule?
If not, upon what ground do we stand to condemn Chamberlain?
Chamberlain's failure was that he trusted Hitler at Munich—as his great rival Winston Churchill would trust Joseph Stalin at Moscow, Tehran and Yalta.

[Paddy Keating]

When Britain and France effectively forced a war with Germany over the invasion of Poland in 1939, they studiously ignored the simultaneous invasion of that country by Germany's ally, the USSR. Britain's motives for picking a fight with Hitler were largely similar to the motives that led to war with Bonaparte. Britain has always been hostile to any European nation moving to increase its power and influence. Yet Britain was prepared to get into bed with the USSR and, afterwards, the USA, both of which represented a serious and ultimately fatal threat to the British Empire. Of course, they don't teach it in those terms at school but that's about the size of it. A new German Empire in the East might eventually have posed an economic threat to British imperial hegemony but then again, perhaps not. Had London concluded a pact with Berlin in 1939, instead of pushing yet another fratricidal war that cost the Nordo-Celtic nations dearly in terms of the genetic pool and a massive overall debt to the financial institutions of the USA, Britain would still have the Empire, the Yanks would have stayed "over there" on the farm, the Bolsheviks would have been suppressed, China would still be a chaotic jumble of regions ruled by local despots and the world might be more stable than it is today. Of course, there would have been a moral price. There again, perhaps not. We might have done a deal with the Germans and given them a large chunk of Australia, permitting them to relocate all the people deemed undesirable, just as we relocated our undesirables to Australia in the past. We might even have exerted some pressure upon them to consider this as an alternative to butchery. Who knows? But the decision to force a war with Hitler in 1939 resulted in the world we have today, which is well on its way to Hell in a handcart. Of course, it's alright for the people who have amassed huge fortunes with our money during the past two decades of anarchy in the financial institutions. They'll all be fine because we have allowed ourselves to be emasculated and, moreover, here in Europe, disarmed, which is the first act of any dictatorship.

PK

PK

[pzrmeyer2]

When Britain and France effectively forced a war with Germany over the invasion of Poland in 1939, they studiously ignored the simultaneous invasion of that country by Germany's ally, the USSR. Britain's motives for picking a fight with Hitler were largely similar to the motives that led to war with Bonaparte. Britain has always been hostile to any European nation moving to increase its power and influence. Yet Britain was prepared to get into bed with the USSR and, afterwards, the USA, both of which represented a serious and ultimately fatal threat to the British Empire. Of course, they don't teach it in those terms at school but that's about the size of it. A new German Empire in the East might eventually have posed an economic threat to British imperial hegemony but then again, perhaps not. Had London concluded a pact with Berlin in 1939, instead of pushing yet another fratricidal war that cost the Nordo-Celtic nations dearly in terms of the genetic pool and a massive overall debt to the financial institutions of the USA, Britain would still have the Empire, the Yanks would have stayed "over there" on the farm, the Bolsheviks would have been suppressed, China would still be a chaotic jumble of regions ruled by local despots and the world might be more stable than it is today. Of course, there would have been a moral price. There again, perhaps not. We might have done a deal with the Germans and given them a large chunk of Australia, permitting them to relocate all the people deemed undesirable, just as we relocated our undesirables to Australia in the past. We might even have exerted some pressure upon them to consider this as an alternative to butchery. Who knows? But the decision to force a war with Hitler in 1939 resulted in the world we have today, which is well on its way to Hell in a handcart. Of course, it's alright for the people who have amassed huge fortunes with our money during the past two decades of anarchy in the financial institutions. They'll all be fine because we have allowed ourselves to be emasculated and, moreover, here in Europe, disarmed, which is the first act of any dictatorship.

PK

PK

the decision to force a war with Hitler in 1939 resulted in the world we have today, which is well on its way to Hell in a handcart.

interesting. we might not have Ipods and plasma tv's, but then again, would we have had Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, the Cultural Revolution, the Congo, Rwanda, Cambodia either? what exactly was Churchill & Co thinking? It is plain to see from the archives that war between the UK and Germany was absolutely the last thing Hitler wanted, even well into 1941.

[Cott Tiger]

Hi Guys,

I don’t think the vast majority of Dutch, French, Norwegian or the rest of the occupied nations citizens shared your obvious disappointment at the catastrophic failure of National Socialism or that “the world went to hell in a handcart” because Britain and her Allies kicked the Nazi’s out of Western Europe.

Of course Hitler would have preferred to have not gone to war with Britain in 1939. He and the Nazis would have much preferred to murder and loot their way across Western Europe unhindered.

As for Britain “picking a fight with Hitler”, I suggest you re-examine Chamberlain’s policy towards Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939. As we all know full well, it was a policy of appeasement.

Regards,

André

[Paddy Keating]

I think you've misunderstood the thrust of the commentaries here, André. I wouldn't want to ruled by someone like Hitler and his goons! Apart from anything else, they betrayed their own revolution so they were a pretty shady lot to begin with. I will admit to feeling that we might be in better condition if it were still the case that the sun never set on the British Empire.

I don't think Hitler was all that interested in Western Europe as a conqueror. His neo-imperialist ambitions were firmly focused eastwards. As for the failure of National Socialism, it was bound to fail in the hands of a dishonest, dysfunctional mob like Hitler and his inner circle. Like Latins who talk incessantly about honour, Germans who talk about order ad infinitum tend to be in denial about the fact that they are, as a nation, a rather disorderly if not chaotic collection of people. If they were as orderly as they think themselves to be, we wouldn't have been to chant "two world wars and one world cup!" at them, would we? They'd have won. Mind you, they did win the footie recently, didn't they?

Anyway, National Socialism worked quite efficiently in Argentina, Egypt and Iraq, to cite some examples, until those countries were sabotaged, blockaded and, in two cases, invaded by armies sent by politicians controlled by "anglo-saxon" Big Business. Perón's Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world until he annoyed Britain and the US by deciding to nationalise Argentine resources. Nasser's Egypt may not have been terribly wealthy but it was invaded in 1956 by British, French and Israeli troops when the Suez Canal was nationalised, and many Egyptians were killed. As for Iraq, well, Saddam was not a nice man but the country was a better place under his rule and he certainly kept radical Islam at bay.

As for Chamberlain and his appeasement policies: please don't patronise me. The fact is that Britain (and France) imposed an ultimatum on Hitler over Poland. Now, I think the Poles have long had a raw deal and I think German treatment of them from 1939 to 1944 was incredibly stupid, even by the standards of the Hitler regime. However, Hitler's eastwards march was really no more than an example of the kind of imperialist expansionism practiced by all of the European nations for centuries. The fact that he and his henchmen were about as good at establishing empires as the Americans today, in that they took no lessons from successful imperialists down the ages when it came to managing the natives, doesn't alter the fact that he was merely doing what we had all done, attempted genocide included. I am not excusing him but I do think there's an awful load of humbug about this period and no amount of calling me a Nazi is going to convince me otherwise, old chap.

PK

[pzrmeyer2]

Hi Guys,

I don’t think the vast majority of Dutch, French, Norwegian or the rest of the occupied nations citizens shared your obvious disappointment at the catastrophic failure of National Socialism or that “the world went to hell in a handcart” because Britain and her Allies kicked the Nazi’s out of Western Europe.

Of course Hitler would have preferred to have not gone to war with Britain in 1939. He and the Nazis would have much preferred to murder and loot their way across Western Europe unhindered.

As for Britain “picking a fight with Hitler”, I suggest you re-examine Chamberlain’s policy towards Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939. As we all know full well, it was a policy of appeasement.

Regards,

André

Andre, The point is had Britain and France not delared war on Germany,The Germans might not have been in western europe to begin with. Germany's intentions were firmly directed eastward, in locations where France had not been since 1812 and Britain never was. As it was, each of the majorities of the countries you named settled in quite nicely once German authority was established.

it was a policy of appeasement.

and i might add, a policy of preservation of the British Empire and countless lives in it and on the continent. Lets compare the "give in" strategy of the Czechs vs the defiance strategy of the Poles when it came to the redress of German territorial grievances. how did the latter work out for the Poles?

[phylo_roadking]

Just to pick up on a couple of points in this thread...

When Britain and France effectively forced a war with Germany over the invasion of Poland in 1939, they studiously ignored the simultaneous invasion of that country by Germany's ally, the USSR.

...isn't correct. The British actually at various times through the Autumn and early winter came up with various plans to enter the war directly against the USSR in Finland...incidently invading Norway and possibly Sweden along the way LMAO - even though their agreements with Poland only involved protecting and guaranteeing Poland's WESTERN borders. Thus the UK wasn't actually "at war" with the USSR after 3rd September, but were still planning with various degrees of enthusiasm to actually be the AGGRESSORS by coming to the assistance of Finland...

As for Britain “picking a fight with Hitler”, I suggest you re-examine Chamberlain’s policy towards Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939. As we all know full well, it was a policy of appeasement

The only Appeasement between 1937 & 1939 was at Munich, and not making any protest when the rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied. After Munich - when it should be noted Chamberlain actually ordered the UK's armed forces onto a war footing...even though in the case of the RAF the Air Staff protested it wasn't ready...there was very little appeasing to actually be done! Hitler had got very much of eveything he had been aiming for between 1936 and Munich...with Poland firmly in his sights after that.

Appeasement after that was only political appeasement; the air parity and disarmament talks had been abandoned earlier in the decade, the aerial bombing addendum to the HRLW had been abandoned without agreement, Britain was rearming as fast as it could, and most importantly the RAF had been rearming specifically named as being against Germany since 1933. After all, you can hardly call Chamberlain's stance over Poland between 1st and 3rd September 1939 as being "appeasing"...and THIS was the next big political test after Munich.

[pzrmeyer2]

The only Appeasement between 1937 & 1939 was at Munich, and not making any protest when the rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied.

good point, but I think the problem is that the word "appeasement" has completely negative conotations today. Chamblerain correctly surmised the overwhelming mood of the British public to avoid war, the strength of Britain's forces to not be up to par to take on Germany militarilty, and he also understood that Britain really had no compelling national interest to fight over the Sudentenland, which he himself felt was an unjust consequence of Versailles/St Germain. II'm not sure what other options he had on the table.

[phylo_roadking]

the strength of Britain's forces to not be up to par to take on Germany militarilty

...at that point. And only her Air Force; certainly the Royal Navy outmatched anything that Nazi Germany floated, and a full war would require some two years for the full planned-for mobilisation of the British Army after commencing cpnscription again. One of the things that often ignored is how far from behind the RAF came from a standing start in 1933 - in capability terms compared with the size and capabilities of November 1918 But unlike the other services, the Junior Service required a much more integrated development plan for the ENTIRE service - see John James The Paladins - before it could contemplate war.

The British Army could shrink after the First World War...but it could be "grown" again beginning with a simple act of Parliament imposing Conscription; in the meantime a minimum could be retained at home, and a cadre in the Empire. The Royal Navy didn't actually really shrink in real terms; it had to find the extra cost of very regular refits for its carrier force. But Naval shore establishments, though run down, didn't actually vanish in the way they have since 1945. it was was RAF that needed time to grow - for it had to grow EVERYTHING from the standing start of 1933. Number of fields, ground staff, training schemes for ALL skills, Auxiliary and Reserve units - let alone pilots and aircraft LOL

Obviously - THIS both promised a British government's ONE chance of hitting out and destroying a continental enemy from Day One of any war...AND its best means of defending it's citizens from the same. But it required TIME - and the government of the day in 1933 was told that the RAF could and would be in a position to fight a european enemy by the late summer of 1939. But NOT before - which is why the Air Staff got in the way of a military answer to Italian aggression in Abyssinia in 1935, and a full war option being available at Munich. They didn't want that growth, already constrained down to a financial minimum by the Cabinet, prejudiced by early losses and wastage.

When you look at "appeasement" you have to look at WHY they were buying time...

[statemachine]

Ask yourself why Britain would consider a military answer to Italian aggression in Ethiopia.If Britain had been willing to share,this war would likely never had taken place.As it is,nothing has been settled,has it?

[phylo_roadking]

Actually, they did "share" LOL the French were apparently willing to provide ground forces.The main sticking point was the Air Staff came out against it, saying that they were entirely unready to defend the British Isles against aerial attack at that point. As it was, four RAF squadrons were temporarily transferred to the Middle East - and back again LOL