The Polish Campaign

[Der Untermensch]

Hello Sir, I was away for a few days I could not give your post the attention it undoubtedly deserves. Apologies. Here it goes; enjoy!

I'm afraid that your timeline is a bit skewed. Before Beck made his unfortunate remarks in March, 1939 Hitler had not made any bellicose public pronouncements against Poland

bullseye. Mr Chancellor Hitler made it clear in almost every speech he delivered, be it either to his sidekicks or to the faithful Nuremberg crowd, that he considers the Versailles outcome a shame and a disgrace, to be reverted as soon as possible. Which country do you think these references were pointing to? Do you think Lebensraum was about Kazakhstan, Kirgistan and Uzbekistan?

Until then the only issues were the extra-territorial railroad and autobahn across the Polish Corridor and the return of Danzig, period.

bullseye. The question of German minority in Poland and the German property in Poland has been a key issue in mutual realtions long before Mr Chancellor Hitler thought he might fancy his beloved autobahn. And I like the word “only” for the autobahn and Danzig claims.

I'm sure that if Beck had been more astute Hitler would have abandoned the extra-territorial connections with East Prussia and settled for Danzig.

I’m sure you’d better not be that sure. There were some guys who tried to run an “astute” policy; this is known as an “appeasement”. Before bullseying, suggest you make yourself familiar with what this police has led to.

Your answer is difficult to understand in view of the fact that it was the policy adopted by the steemed FM of the Polish state that resulted in the death of millions. IMO, if the Poles had allied themselves with Germany it would have placed France and England in a position of allying with Soviet Russia. What would happene afterwards would make a neat "what if?" scenario.

Good, so your pick is named “Germany”. Here is the outcome: Germany retakes all territories lost in 1919 and conscripts all males, of which 0.3m die in the USSR later on; Poland is made to invade the USSR with a quarter of its GDP serving the Nazi war machine; 0.6m Polish soldiers die in Russia; 0.5m Poles are dead when the Soviet army rolls across Poland on their way to Berlin and the country is plundered even more than it actually was in 1944-1945; 1m Poles from the East are resettled to Siberia and Kazakhstan, a significant share of them dies; after WWII, Poland is reduced to a buffer state. And, of course, all the independent and daring thinkers would feel free to brand the Poles a criminal bunch, which decided to rock the world for the sake of pursuing their imperialist ambitions to rule over the Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Russians. Now easier to understand?

[Yes, I can see that. I'll try using a crayon next time.

Try the capitals, bullseying looks more bullseyish then.

The Czech army was quite modern and their fortifications were of high quality. You know about the Czech tanks, the PT-35 and 38 models were as good as the German panzers. While I would not consider these forces, combined with those of Poland and Lithuania, as war winning they would have made Hitler think twice before launching any attacks on Czechoslovakia.

Bullseye. I have told you already nothing would have made the Czechs get trapped in an alliance with Poland, regardless of how good their tanks and fortifications were. By the same token, one could claim that in order to prevent Anschluss, the Austrians should have formed a military alliance Czechoslovakia.

Again, your timeline is skewed. Before Poland grabbed Teschen during the Munich crisis there were many opportunities for an alliance with Czechoslovaki, Romania and Yugoslavia. Don't forget that the Czechs, Slovaks, and many of the Yugoslavs are Slavs, or as you would call them, brother untermensch.

Again, you are bullseying here, Sir. I have asked you for listing these “opportunities” and you failed to deliver a single one.

A non-answer.

which answers all the questions

????????? Try again.

Is there a point trying?

Again, tell me. What was so rational or realistic about Beck's policy? Poland ended up being re-partitioned a fourth time and lost it's independence for 50 years! Along with millions of lives!!

It seemed pretty rational and realistic to rely on a military alliance with two global superpowers. And definitely not less realistic than to give away a half of your country to one of your neighbours and than attack another.

Can't you get that through that thick, Neanderthal skull? Well, apparently not.

So, this is what your independent and daring thinking leads to? Look out, someone might be tempted to confuse your approach with being racist and pro-Nazi. And I am afraid you are loosing your temper, Sir. Have a sit, get a coffee, breath normally. If all this fails, call a doctor. Bullseying is curable, I think.

Forget it. I give up.

Prefer to be counted as POW or MIA?

Yeah, Gydnia. Small mistake.

Bullseying at its best. First, you can not distinguish between cities which are pivotal for understanding the German-Polish relationships. Second, you independently and daringly embark on lecturing the others on the topic. Third, when proven wrong you pretend nothing had happened. Fourth, you are still unable to get the name right. Have a try, maybe the third time it will finally work!

Get the timeline straight!! BTW, before April, 1939 when did Hitler ever make any public statements as to his designs on Poland other than those already mentioned?

As above. By the way, what was the point of all that NATO? Has the USSR ever raised any territorial claims against any NATO member? In public, almost everyone is as peace-loving and moderate as Kim Dzong Il. Wars break out because the narrow-minded stubborn fools refuse to concede this one, small thing.

An evasive answer. Good material for our politicians in the US though.

For independent, daring and bullseying thinkers as well.

It did in 1939 - 45.

So this is what “eventually” means in English… something which happened 65 years ago and lasted for less than 6 years.

[Der Untermensch]

I have come across many times as appearing pro-Nazi becuase I dare to question what's held as the common and acceptable view and I'm afraid that these two posters of Polish extraction are trying to paint anyone who thinks differently than what common wisdom allows as pro-Fascist, or worse

Does this mean I am allowed to say I represent "common wisdom", "common view" and "acceptable view", which you dare to question? In my humble opinion, apart from being an independent and daring thinker, it is also useful to be a sensible thinker from time to time.

And do not flatter yourself by saying I bothered to paint you as pro-Fascist.

Dear der Untermensch.

In order to be representative of any particular sample one must be part of that sample. In your case, being that you recognize your limitations, being part of a "wise" sample is not possible.

Oscar

This is what I was afraid of, being der Untermensch and forming a community of my fellow subhumans, I am unable to share common wisdom. The only comforting thing is that now also the Czechs, Slovaks and "many of the Yugoslavs" are counted in. Go on trying, and maybe you will be awarded the titles you are so hard trying to deserve.

[Pirx]

Dear Pirx,

Who said "I will wage war, but I will not declare war."?

Regards,

Oscar

Maybe Adolph H? If i'm right, Adolph was honest politician. He said before war that he will not declare war. Real pacifist. Adolph never declare war against the Netherlands, and Denmark. As he promised.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Bullseye,

I take it that you now accept that Hitler acted illegally with regard to the premature renunciation of the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Freiritter]

Honestly, can anyone expect someone who espoused a totalitarian regime in order to solve national problems, while using the democratic system to undermine it, to honor international treaties? Of which, one he made as a vital part of his program to rip up. As for this row over the French, look, understand that the French had suffered massive losses during WWI. This alone would scar an entire nation. Simply put, the French didn't want to fight another war, with the ensuing horrors. The British were spread thin around the world with their imperial commitments and their League of Nations mandates in the Middle East. So, the British were hoping for a peaceful settlement of the German question. Now, I don't know what was happening in Eastern Europe, aside from that any nation west of the Soviets were worried about the Reds and the Hungarians and the Romanians were in a rivalry over territory.

[4444]

It has been asked a few times within this thread already what the real intention of the French was. The question is whether: A. they indeed planned an onslaught against the Germans in the West and it was the unexpectedly fast collapse of Poland which rendered such an attack pointless; B. the French have never had any intention to launch an offensive and were misleading the Poles all way long; C. anything in-between.

Please let me recollect some bits and pieces which might facilitate an answer.

On May 4, following the Italian takeover of Albania, the French and Brititsh general staff representatives concluded their two-week London consultations, dedicated to working out a common strategy for a would-be military conflict in Europe. Both parties agreed that there were two likely theathres of war: the West and the Mediterranean. The conclusion was that the common allied policy should focus on the Mediterranean, adopting a fairly passive approach in the West. Both staffs agreed that the allies were by no means ready to invade Germany, and that in case of war, no major ground attack in the West was feasible. The Poles were not informed about the strategy adopted.

On May 17 the French and the Polish General Staff representatives agreed a military protocol (so-called “Gamelin-Kasprzycki Protocol”), which specified that the French general offensive (“les gros de ses forces”) should commence 15 days following the mobilisation (the “1+” formula). When the ink on the document was still wet, Gamelin considered the document invalid and refused to sign it. He queried at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was assured that the military agreement was not binding unless the political one is signed. Only after that, the French CiC signed the protocol on May 19. The air convention was signed May 27. The “political agreement” Gamelin referred to was definition of casus foederis; it was signed by the French and the Poles on Sep 4.

On May 31 the French general staff issued an order, which complimented a general drill envisioned for an attack on Germany (issued Jun 8, 1938). The order envisioned an attack along the Metz-Sarrlouis-Mainz axis, executed by 5 armies with 2 more in reserve. The order focused on phasing the French action and did not go further than discussing advance towards and reconnaisance of the Westwall. It definitely did not cover any attempt to attack the Westwall.

On Jul 11 Ironside, already awaiting his new role as head of the British staff, departed for Warsaw to discuss with the Poles any details of the Anglo-Polish military co-operation. Before this, he studied the French military documents and noted no trace of any plan for a general offensive. All he found were sketchy guidelines, hardly deserving the name “plan”, for engineering a limited shallow penetration into Germany. “The French lied to to the Poles. They have no intention to mount an attack” – Ironside noted allegedly. However, he did not share his comments with the Poles.

On Jul 22 Georges and his staff, working to produce a detailed plan of the French offensive as outlined by Gamelin late May, concluded their work. The plan was formalised as “directive no 1”. It envisioned a punch delivered by the 2. Army Group, commanded by Pretelat, and in particular by the 3., 4. and partly 5. Army; the offensive was planned along the entire French-German border except for the Strasbourg area. In line with the French military doctrine, the order focused on meticulous and systematic preparations. Two days later the plan was approved by Gamelin.

In mid-August Churchill visited the French border. Having spoken with commander of the North-Eastern Front Georges and other high ranking French generals he allegedly realised that the French neither planned nor wished to mount any significant offensive. According to his post-war publications, Churchill found the French unlikely to take any major military initiative, though standing firmly on the defensive grounds.

On Aug 22 head of the French military mission to Poland, general Faury, was about to leave Paris for Warsaw. Before that he asked both Gamelin and Georges when a French offensive might be expected. He was told bluntly that no offensive was planned and it was impossible to define such a date. “Poland must withstand” – this was allegedly what Gamelin uttered.

On Aug 23 the French foreign minister Bonnet called for the Defence Council; during the sitting he asked two questions: whether France should attempt to liberate herself from the obligations already undertaken towards Poland, and whether the French army can deliver on its commitments. The first question was unanimously answered to the negative. The second one was dealt with by Gamelin. Sources differ widely as to his response; according to some (Roton, “Annees cruciales”, Gamelin, “Servir”) Gamelin said the French army would not be able to mount a successful offensive earlier than in two years; according to the others (Bonnet, “Defence de la paix”) Gamelin assured the gathering that the French forces were well prepared.

On Aug 27 France began “couverture generale”; on Sep 1, 9:30 PM ambassador Coulondre together with his British partner handed Ribbentropp the Anglo-French note; on Sep 2 the general mobilisation followed (in line with the May protocol, this set the date of the French general offensive for Sep 17); on Sep 3 Coulondre handed the French ultimatum to the Germans; it was due 5 PM. This evening France was already at war with Germany. Having received the allied notes, Hitler seemed turned into stone. Following a long minute of overwhelming silence, he allegedly turned to Ribbentropp: “What now?”

On Sep 1 Gamelin ordered to commence limited offensive action on Sep 6. Two days later he issued a somewhat more detailed order to Georges. “Our first task in these preparatory phase is to get in contact with the Siegfried Line fortifications” – wrote he;. Than he dwells on different hypothethical versions of how this task is best to be achieved, depending on the stand adopted by the German army; whether Wehrmacht would defend their positions ahead of the main defence line, or whether the Germans would rather set back and avoid engagement in any serious combat before the French reach their main trenches. On Sep 3 afternoon the first French patrols crossed the border; on Sep 4 other minor French units followed.

On Sep 4-6 members of the allied Supreme War Council met in Paris. Gamelin, Ironside and Newall agreed that for the time being Poland had to withstand the German pressure, and no general offensive was possible in the West. In loose comments, exchanged during the meeting, most taking part agreed that Poland would probably lose the campaign and would be overrun by the Germans; its independence would be restored after the war. During this and the following meetings air strikes against targets in Germany were branded as pointless and spelling the threat of German retalliation against the French civilian population.

On Sep 7 units of the French 3., 4. and 5. Army, 9 divisions in total, crossed the border along the 60-km long front and following some skirmishes, advanced 5-9 km into Germany. On Sep 9-10 the French approached the Siegfried Line. On Sep 10 Gamelin notified the Polish commander-in-chief that half of his divisions were already engaged in combat; the note ended: “hence, I have went ahead of my pledge to begin an offensive with gros of my forces involved on the 15th day following the mobilisation. I could have not done more.” Orders issued to the 3. and 4. French army in the next two days focused on maintaining their positions and did not discuss further advance.

On Sep 12 Gamelin ordered his troops to stop; the document contained also speculations that given the developments in Poland, further advance was pointless. This decision was than discussed at the Supreme War Council sitting in Abbeville the same day. Basing their discussion on reports from own military missions received on Sep 10-11 (which described the situation of Sep 8-9); the allies unanimously decided to adopt Gamelin’s decision as their common strategy. One of the arguments quoted was that any French offensive might pose the danger of the Germans moving some of their troops from Poland towards the Rhine. The Poles were not informed about the course adopted.

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

First rate post that introduces many hard facts that were missing from the earlier discussion.

I am printing it off to read at leisure.

Many thanks,

Sid.

[4444]

many hard facts

look out, I am afraid there are very few hard and undisputable facts in the list I gave. Most of the controversial bits and pieces come from different memoirs, usually written post factum.

[Zalewski]

Hello
I have every information about Polish Army (Wojsko Polskie) 1939 from Army to companies. From Baltic to the Mountains
Structure, battles, man and map,
http://www.taktykaistrategia.pl
[email protected]
wojtek

[BullsEye]

Dear Pirx,

Who said "I will wage war, but I will not declare war."?

Regards,

Oscar

Maybe Adolph H? If i'm right, Adolph was honest politician. He said before war that he will not declare war. Real pacifist. Adolph never declare war against the Netherlands, and Denmark. As he promised.

No. It was the distinguished leader of the US of America, Franklyn D. Roosevelt. He used this policy against Germany to provoke a reaction which would cause the majority of the elected members of Congress - who were Isolationist - to declare war. For all intent and purpose the US was fighting an undeclared war against Germany for most of 1941. It was not until a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that Hitler finally obliged and declared war on the USA, to the relief of a very grateful Winston Churchill. There were also other instances were Allied nations disregarded diplomatic niceties and international agreements in order to gain strategic advantage. One that comes to mind was the Allied takeover of a neutral Persia, another was the Royal Navy attacking French ships at Oran and Dakar, another was the Allied invasion of Syria, Madagascar and French North Africa, another was the mining of the Leeds, and the occupation of Greenland and Iceland without the consent of the Danish Crown. The Allies were also very lucky that Finland signed an armistice with Soviet Russia before their plan of occupying Narvik was carried out. The plan also called for an advance into neutral Sweden to occupy the iron ore mines plus the capture of a Swedish sea port.

So, the moral of this story is that military necessity is above international conventions and the rule of law. Of course, when the other guys do violate the rules then they're liable for the infraction if they loose.

Regards,

Oscar

[Joe Cleere]

When the Germans invaded Poland, what was the disposition of Polish forces? Also, what was the combat potential of Polish forces, could they have held off the Germans? Could there have been a more substantial intervention by the Franco-British forces?

The Poles had positioned their infantry divisions and cavalry brigades in such a way as to defend the entire country, except the east, where they left minimal forces. They were overextended. The Germans planned a classic battle of annihilation enhanced tremendously by mechanized forces and air power. In my opinion, they could not have held off the German attack. The Germans planned their attack so that they could finish off the Poles and transfer forces west to meet any Anglo-French attack. The Poles could have concentrated their forces by leaving the Corridor undefended and positioning the Pomorze and Poznan Armies further to the east, but that was not considered possible for political reasons.
At the time, the British could only commit two divisions to the continent.
The French were not well prepared for offensive operations. They could have launched an offensive into the Saar, but the Germans would have hammered them once their first wave infantry, motorized infantry, and Panzer divisions completed their transfer to the west.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Joe,

I think the corridor itself was virtually undefended except for about three national guard battalions that quickly fell back into Gdynia.

The Poles were probably going to be defeated anyway. The question was how long would it take?

By positioning themselves so far west they probably ensured that defeat was more rapid than absolutely necessary. On the other hand, to pull back out of the clasp of German pincers in Slovakia and East Prussia and onto a shorter, more defensible river line would have meant abandoning most of the mainly Polish-populated regions of the country. It was a lose/lose situation for the Poles.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ANBO VIII]

Hi to all,
Does any one of you gentlemen know if there were german air raids on Vilna in 1939 september? I think its highly unlikely.
Thanks in advance.

[4444]

Hi to all,
Does any one of you gentlemen know if there were german air raids on Vilna in 1939 september? I think its highly unlikely.
Thanks in advance.

Odd as it may seem, Luftwaffe did fly sorties over Vilnius.

I vaguely recollect in some memoirs notes being made about single air raids; their key effect was damage done to the Polish morale rather than to any military installations.

A military atlas dedicated to the Polish campaign I happen to have also indicates there were some German raids against Vilnius (and other neighbouring military airbases, like Lida) between Sep 11-18.

The most specific account I found was that of a certain major, who certifies some damage done by the German aircraft in the Naujoi Vilnia suburb on Sep 14 and Sep 16.

I guess these must have been raids flown by few aircraft, incomparable to the massive bombardments carried out by Luftwaffe in central Poland.

[ANBO VIII]

Odd as it may seem, Luftwaffe did fly sorties over Vilnius.

Thank you very much, 4444. I do appreciate your help.