Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko(Hitler agreed with of gen. lie)

[Jan-Hendrik]

In a KTBs it was entered far not all the document and/or the message, record of telephone conversations etc, in KTBs were entered short generalising record about this or that event.

In short words: you have never worked on a german Armee- or Heeresgruppen- KTB



Jan-Hendrik

[Yuri]

Dear, Jan-Hendrik, the monotonous food fatally affects on health, and in particular it affects brain activity. The documentary oil cake taken from the "german ARMEE - or HEERESGRUPPEN - KTB" is especially harmful in this sense.

Really to you it did not speak?!
I urgently recommend to You, dear, Jan-Hendrik, to dilute such "food" with considerable portion of battle reports and indications of captured german generals and officers, and as soldiers and corporals of different European nationalities from the Wehrmacht's units.
Exclusively out of respect for you, dear, Jan-Hendrik, on a separate branch on example KTB of 3rd Tank Army (it is stored in fund 500) I will show as well as with what it is necessary to read this sort of documents without harmful consequences for your knowledge of events of the Great Patriotic War which the Soviet people conducted against the European aggressors consolidated by nazi Germany of Adolf Hitler.
But it in the future, and now I urgently recommend to accept are offered here "pills" - official reports of officers of air-defence the Luftwaffe's units and indications of captured German officers, and as soldiers and corporals of different European nationalities from the Wehrmacht's units.
I hope it will help you to expand an outlook a little.

[Yuri]

Maps from German (Map 1) and Russian (Map 2) sources are more low given. On these maps situation development in region Kiev, Zhitomir and Korosten during the period since November, 3rd, 1943 when the Red Army has struck a blow from bridgehead at Lyutezh /Ljutesh - german/ to the north Kiev is shown.

These maps and as official reports of commanders listed before air-defence Luftwaffe's units will help us to understand how 213th Security Division has appeared in the middle of November, 1943 in region to the northeast from Zhitomir whereas by the moment of a start of an attack of Red Army it is formation held defence to the south of Kiev. Moreover, apparently from maps of 1 and 2 positions of this formation placed to the east of positions of 88th infantry division.

Having broken through defence of Wehrmacht, units of Red Army have promptly got far on the West, the southwest and the northwest. Russian have freed from the European invaders of the city of Fastov, Brusilov, Zhitomir, Korosten and, certainly, capital of Ukraine Kiev.

Pay attention, that at the moment of a start of an attack of Red Army 213th Security Division were to the south of Kiev and to the east of units of 88th Infantry Division.
By the moment of transition of Red Army in approach, that is on November, 3rd, 1943, listed before air-defence batallions Luftwaffe placed on a line which I have designated on a map corresponding signs on dark blue colour.
In particular, 2nd air-defence battery of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 77th air-defence regiment took anti-tank positions on a joint of 68th and 88th infantry divisions (to the north Kiev). Owing to fast flight of an infantry of these divisions the air-defence battery has been compelled to blow up all guns and to recede by order of the commander of 77th air-defence regiment to Zhitomir.
To similarly it have been compelled to throw or blow up the guns, a projector of plant and other arms, and as tractors, the lorry and another of property 125th and 650th air-defence Abteilungs. All of them by order of 77th air-defence regiment have receded to Zhitomir.
To the northeast from Zhitomir (to the north of highway Kiev-Zhitomir) I have shown region of gathering of air-defence units on a map a corresponding sign on a German map (a map 1).
77th air-defence regiment placed in the west from Zhitomir
Certainly, in reports of commanders of air-defence Abteilungs and batteries it is informed about everything, that occurred from November, 3rd and till the moment of arrival of units to Zhitomir.
However, in this unit of messages there is nothing about actions 213th Security Division, and on it these units of messages are not examined.

[Yuri]

Well. By November, 10th, 1943 in region to the northeast from the city of Zhitomir (to the north of highway Zhitomir-Kiev) to arrive following air-defence units:
- 125th mixed air-defence Abteilung;
- 620th projector/searchlight/air-defence Abteilung;
- 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung;
- 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung.

620th searchlight Abteilung has arrived to Zhitomir on November, 9th and 10 and till November, 11th executed orders of a headquarters of 77th air-defence regiment.
The personnel of this Abteilung was used as an infantry, and three escaped searchlight plants were used for illumination by night of district before infantry positions.

23.30 11rd November more to the left of positions of the headquarters battery 620th searchlight Abteilung the company convalescents SS has taken positions. To the right of the headquarters battery 620th searchlight Abteilung 4th battery of this Abteilung has taken positions.

I repeat once again, all units 620th searchlight Abteilung operated as an infantry as have lost on a way to the city of Zhitomir all of 60 sm searchlight plants and as all of 3.7 and 2.0 sm antiaircraft guns.

As an infantry operated as air-defence batteries 125th mixed air-defence Abteilung.
Together with it Abteilung operated (without air-defence units):
- One company of civil guardsmen (Landschutz - german);
- One company the sapper;
- One pontoon-roadway a company;
- One company of Cossacks;
- Alarm units from holiday-makers (soldier on leave) and the soldiers who have lagged behind units.

Air-defence batteries 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung and 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung carried out artillery functions. Thus headquarters batteries of these Abteilungs carried out infantry functions.
Till November, 11th 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung (group "Moser") carried out defence of southern airdrome of the city of Zhitomir.

982nd easy air-defence Abteilung was in a northeast unit of the city of Zhitomir.
On November, 10th 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung has received as the infantry cover one company from a regiment (schools) «A and C» 4th air fleet in figure of 200 man.

At the left positions of 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung were adjoined by positions sappers of SS-unit, and on the right a company of the convalescents.

As infantry cover of air-defence batteries of 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung the headquarters battery of this Abteilung was used.

On November, 11th 1st battery 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung (the commander lieutenant Fink) is given 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung. Late at night this day here it has been thrown also 3rd battery 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung.

373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung has been motorised. For this purpose confiscation of a motor vehicle of the Air Forces (Luftwaffe) has been made in the beginning, and then by order of the battle commandant of a town garrison Zhitomir motor vehicles of land forces have been confiscated also.

2nd battery 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung has been thrown to crossing of highway Zhitomir-Skvira and a railroad line Zhitomir-Berdichev. The battery has been strengthened by infantry group (2nd battery 620th searchlight Abteilung - the commander lieutenant Gebel).

In front of guns of 2nd battery of 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung have taken positions as infantry cover three SS-companies. It were recruits from military-training centre "Hegewald" /«Reserved wood»/

Positions 1st battery of 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung was to the south from positions of 2nd battery. Barracks of educational centre "Hegewald" was to the south of positions of 1st battery of 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung. Barracks «Hegewald» defended other units of this educational centre. The structure and number of SS-units defending barracks «Hegewald» are not specified, however from the report of the commander of 1st battery it is known, that one company has made the way to this battery.

Then in 19.50 November, 13th, 1943 1st battery 373rd and this company «Hegewald» at support of assault guns of 280th Abteilung of assault guns (has arrived from Berdichev) have made the way further on the south.
Thus, from reports of commanders of air-defence Abteilungs and batteries absolutely precisely it is known, that together with air-defence units operated not less than four companies of recruits from military-training centre "Hegewald".

And generally speaking, from the message of the commander of 2nd battery of 373rd heavy air-defence it is visible, that recruits from SS-school "Hegewald" was not less than a regiment. This is unit since November, 13th continuously attacked the Russian which have grasped barracks «Hegewald». 2nd battery of 373rd heavy air-defence has obtained the order of a headquarters XXII AK to support attacks SS-man by fire of the guns.

On November, 16th for the infantry cover of 1st batteries of 373rd heavy air-defence there have arrived some more companies from a regiment (school) «A» and from a regiment (school) «C». From the report follows, what to arrive on two companies from each of these regiments / of schools/. In total, so, there have arrived in addition four more companies from schools Luftwaffe. By the way, soldiers school "A" is young men of 16 and 17 years, and from school "C" it is young men of 17 and 18 years.

After panic flight from the city of Zhitomir, all this mixed group from SS - units, Luftwaffe-units, Landschutsz-units, holiday-makers (soldier on leave), convalescents, lagged behind the units, the sapper and builders of bridges, penal units, building batallions Luftwaffe, building batallions Heeres, building batallions Todt, drovers of large horned livestock, veterinary surgeons etc. has, etc. departed on the southeast from Zhitomir. Not later than November, 15th this «the infernal mix» (as it was expressed v. Kluge in conversation with Hitler on July, 26th, 1943) has been included in the battle group "Ehrig" formed on base 340th infantry division.

On 10.00 November, 17th command over this part battle group "Ehrig" was accepted by a headquarters of 213th Security division. Command over artillery of this part of battle group "Ehrig" was accepted by the chief of artillery of 213th security division. After the HQ XIII AK from the reserve has sent on it a site anti-tank batteries of Heeres, air-defence batteries Luftwaffe obtained the order to leave for an arrangement of 77th air-defence regiment.

Thus, from reports of air-defence units Luftwaffe it is clearly visible, that in the middle of November, 1943 from region to the south of Kiev to Zhitomir there has arrived only a headquarters of 213th security division and a headquarters of the chief of artillery of this division.

Live force /Manpower/ former structure of this formation region to the south Kiev anywhere did not leave. It is interesting, that units of former structure of 213th security division continued to rank themselves as 213th security division. That is there was a multiplexing of this formation (interesting in every respect) of ground forces (Heeres) of Wehrmacht.

Estimation /from the point of view of commanders of air-defence units Luftwaffe/ battle qualities (fighting spirit) of various units of various instances of Wehrmacht next time.

[Yuri]

The weakest from among the various units operating together with air-defence Abteilungs, were Landschutz units. Landschutz units have been strongly diluted not by Germans.
So, for example, from the report of the platoon commander of four barrel of antiaircraft guns of 5th battery of 125th mixed air-defence Abteilung follows, that in that to a the Landschutz's company that operated together with this platoon, only 40 % of staff were Germans. At occurrence of four tanks T-34 all not Germans, that is 60 % to a the Landschutz's company, have instantly run across to Russian.

It is a lot of not Germans was also in penal units. So, for example, the Pole who has surrendered voluntarily in a captivity from 8th penal group has given following data on unit:
-----------------
In German army (that is in Wehrmacht - Yuri) it is called in July, 1942 After wound and stay in a Zhitomir infirmary has not returned to the unit and within two months disappeared at guerrilla Dmitry Kirovika (or Dmitry Kirovicha­), living in Zhitomir on street Lubershtrasse, 3. Has been arrested, sentenced to two years of imprisonment for desertion, but then it is enlisted in 8th penal group. During conversation has declared: «I am a Pole and I wish to harm to Hitler there where I it can. Therefore I go back to lead to you group of soldiers-Poles».
--------------------
Apparently, in 8th penal group there were not few Poles.

[Yuri]

More low given the fragment of map OKH on which the situation as of November, 12th, 1943 is displayed. It is remarkable, that the autumn of 1943 in region Zhitomir specifies two structures OKH (VII AK and Armee-Abteilung Matlenklott), which after two and a half a month in January-February, 1944 will appear as figurants of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle.

[Yuri]

SS-companys "Hegewald', according to commanders of air-defence units, possessed high fighting spirit, but were not skilled and consequently sustained the big losses.
Soldiers alarm units were not inclined to display firmness even in defence and tried to slip away in back as soon as possible. Only in the presence of German tanks and assault guns these units remained on battle positions and entered battle.
To offensive battle alarm battalions were not suitable absolutely owing to casual character of formation of these units.
The company of Cossacks has received an appreciation at German anti-aircraft gunners.
However this company was on a front line only three days then without an explanation of the reasons has independently left positions and has left in back.
As to actions of units of the Air Forces then all as to Russian proverb - if itself do not praise who then it will make?
However, thus actions of companies from school (regiment) "A" and school (regiment) "C" are not commented in any way.

[Yuri]

First, who read to everyone actually «Study» is evident clumsy attempt of mister Critic to use in the purposes small discrepancies not essential character.

If what you quoted was all that Mr. Zetterling criticized then you'd be right, but his critique is much broader and full of more substantive issues.

Well. The statement of dear sir of the Critic that 213th Security Division operated, ostensibly, outside of region of carrying out with Red Army of operation on an encirclement and destructions the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky grouping of the opponent, is a following simultaneous recognition. Namely, that infantry divisions in Wehrmacht could be created for very short time interval (literally within three-four days) from the ill-matched elements (units) belonging besides ill-assorted to instances.
At the same time our dear Critic for some reason refuses in such right to Russian.

Well, for example, our dear sir the Critic refuses to Russian has the right to consider, that 332nd Infantry Division has got to the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket (boiler). But, after all, the headquarters of this division has accepted command over the same ill-matched public, as well as that, that in due time in region Zhitomir has received under one's own the command a headquarters of 213th Security Division.
Take into consideration and that at Russian, generally speaking, much more the rights to consider, that in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket 332nd Infantry division has got, than at our dear sir of the Critic of the rights to consider, that 213th Security division operated in other region.
Really, to a pocket have got together with a headquarters of 332nd Infantry Division as well the battle units of this formation, let even these units have been weakened in the previous combats.
On the other hand under Zhitomir there has arrived only a headquarters of 213th Security Division, and battle units of this formation remained on a former place.

At the moment of the beginning Red Army of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation a headquarters and units of 332nd Infantry division were not on a front line, and in a reserve of the commander XXXXII AK and placed to the southwest from Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. When the Red Army has broken through front and the encirclement began to be outlined, in units of 332nd Infantry division have been poured in the same grade of unit of other instances of Wehrmacht, as well as that which were received in due time near Zhitomir by a headquarters of 213th Security division.

[Yuri]

I have tried to find in the German or Anglo-American sources of data on those to ten divisions which troops of Red Army have encircled and have destroyed in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket in January-February, 1944. Me interested, first of all, that inform such sources on where those ten German formations have been for what purpose directed after mythical break from a pocket on February, 17th, 1944.
Among other this source has got to me and here.
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf
The author of this product criticises conclusions of German historian Overmans. As is known, German historian Overmans has come to conclusion, that channels of information of Wehrmacht and, first of all, channels OKH did not possess necessary reliability, in a consequence of that the information in documents of the higher headquarters of Wehrmacht on movement and the expense manpower is strongly distorted. From myself I can tell, that with conclusions about low reliability of data in documents of Wehrmacht I completely agree and have come to such conclusion irrespective of Overmans. Of correctness of this conclusion it was convinced repeatedly, verifying about what wrote to the KTB the German generals to that inform on the same events documents of units of troops of Red Army and documents of the bottom headquarters of the German units which have been grasped by Russian during operations.
For a refutation of the Overmans's conclusion , its critic gives the list of divisions arrived and the list decreased during the period from July, 1st, 1943 till June, 1st, 1944 in structure/from of structure of army groups of Wehrmacht which operated in the east, that is that which operated against troops of Red Army (except for the German divisions, that which operated in Northern Norway and Finland). Hence, in this list we should see and those divisions which as about it assured us the German generals, were pulled out on February, 17th, 1944 from the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket. These divisions should be present at this list as the German generals (in particular field marshal Manstein) have informed that they - these divisions - have been directed to Poland and, hence, these divisions of a decrease from structure of an army group "South".


I give quotes from this product. Numbers of footnotes are specified in square brackets, and the content of these footnotes in bottom to a text unit.

The author gives the list of the divisions which have arrived on the East in a footnote 15, and the list of divisions decreased of structure OstHeeres is given in a footnote 16.

….
This can be done for the period 1 July 1943 and 1 June 1944. On 1 July 1943 the Ostheer numbered (including Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground combat units) 3,138,000 men. [11]. Between 1 July 1943 and 1 June 1944 1,900,490 losses were suffered. [12]. In the same period the Ostheer received 1,205,030 replacements (including convalescents that had recovered from wounds). [13]. According to this it would be expected that the Ostheer numbered 2,442,540 on 1 June. However, it was slightly stronger, at 2,635,000. [14]. The missing piece of data is of course the transfer of combat units.
In the period 24 new divisions were sent to the eastern front. [15]. These numbered about 340,000 men, if assumed to be at full strength. During the same period 25 divisions were withdrawn from the eastern front. [16]. These numbered approximately 130,000 men when withdrawn. [17]. Thus the net increase was 210,000. This would suggest a strength on 1 June 1944 of 2,652,540, or less than 1 % of the reported strength. If the reported casualties were too small, then the number of replacements must have been higher than reported, a highly unlikely situation.
………


11. OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt. Nr. I/18941/44 g.Kdos, v. 7.9.44 (National Archives, Microfilm Publication T78, Roll 414,
Frame 6383114). The figure does not include forces in Finland.

12. BA-MA RH 2/1343.

13. Ibid.

14. FHO, Kräftegegenüberstellung, BA-MA RH 2/2649.

15. These were the following: 1. Pz.Div., 1. SS-Pz.Div., 2. Fallsch.Div., 9. SS-Pz.Div., 10. SS-Pz.Div., 11. SS-Pz.Gren.Div., 14. Pz.Div., 15. SS-Gren.Div., 16. Pz.Div., 19. SS-Gren.Div., 20. SS-Gren.Div., 24. Pz.Div., Feldherrnhalle, 76. Inf.Div., 100. Jäger-Div., 214. Inf.Div., 357. Inf.Div., 359. Inf.Div., 361. Inf.Div., 367. Inf.Div., 371. Inf.Div., 376. Inf.Div., 384. Inf.Div., 389. Inf.Div.

16. These were: 1. SS-Pz.Div. (twice), 2. Fallsch.Div., 2. SS-Pz.Div., 5. Geb.Div., 6. Pz.Div., 9. Pz.Div., 11. Pz.Div., 16. Pz.Gren., 19. Pz.Div., 34. Inf.Div., 38. Inf.Div., 39. Inf.Div., 86. Inf.Div., 113. Inf.Div., 137. Inf.Div., 151. Res.Div., 216. Inf.Div., 223. Inf.Div., 250. Inf.Div., 262. Inf.Div., 321. Inf.Div., 328. Inf.Div., 330. Inf.Div., 331. Inf.Div., 333. Inf.Div.,
Note that this only includes divisions physically withdrawn to other parts of Europe, not divisions disbanded on the eastern front and whose remnants were absorbed by other formations.

17. The 1. SS-Pz.Div. was withdrawn after Zitadelle, when it numbered at least 17,000. The 2. SS-Pz.Div. numbered around 9,000 when it was withdrawn, it seems that the 1. SS-Pz.Div. was of about the same strength when it was withdrawn in the spring 1944. Probably the 2. Fallsch.Div. had around 7,000 men when withdrawn. The 5. Geb.Jäg.Div. was immediately sent to the Italian front, hence it probably was reasonably strong, perhaps 9,000. The 6., 9., 11., and 19. Pz.Div. 16. Pz.Gren.Div. (according to data when they arrived in the west) seems to have had on average 7,000 men. However, both the 6. and 19. were sent late in May and are possibly still included in the 1 June strength figure for the eastern front. For this reason we only count them with half the indicated strength. The infantry divisions withdrawn were depleted and usually left elements (particularly infantry) to beef up units remaining on the eastern front. What was withdrawn were usually the staffs, rear services, signal units and some personnel from the artillery. Here we estimate these elements to have numbered, on average, 3,000 men. This would mean that around 48,000 men were withdrawn with these infantry divisions, or a total of approximately 130,000.

Unfortunately, I cannot see a name and a surname of the author of this product interesting in every respect. Clearly one, for a refutation of the Overmans's conclusions about low reliability of the data transferred on channels OKH this critic uses data from KTB. As consequence, and this critic has got into a mess just as Mr. Zetterling.
The matter is that just during that time when the above-stated source has got to me on eyes, I read the battle report of the commander of 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. This air-defence Abteilung operated in December, 1943 in region to southwest Kiev, and then on December, 20th has been attached 18th Artillery Division and besides on casual coincidence of circumstances in the end of December, 1943 the beginning of January, 1944 some batteries of this air-defence Abteilung operated together with units 25th Tank Division. As it will not difficult be convinced, in the lists resulted above is not present either 18th artillery division, or 25th Tank Division. On the other hand absolutely precisely it is known, that for example, 25th Tank Division has arrived on the East from France in the beginning of November, 1943, during a short time interval of unit of it formation have been routed and have decreased back in the beginning of January, 1944. Thus, this formation should be specified in both of them of two lists made by mr. Critic of the Overmans's conclusions.
I have decided to give the chance to you will get acquainted with the content of the battle report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. As can seem at first sight, the content of the report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment has no direct relation to the events occurring in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket. But it only at first sight.
Little bit later we will see in what this communication.
My English is extremely bad and consequently in advance I ask not to judge strictly for available errors.

Copy.
1st Abteilung of 231st /motorised / air-defence regiment
Operations section.
Command point
On January, 21st 1944.

The report on the battle activity of 1st Abteilung of 231st Air-Defence Regiment from January, 12th 1943 on January, 1st, 1944 /during the accounting period the Abteilung has been attach 18th Artillery Division/.

On December, 20th 1943 by order of 133rd air-defence regiment 1st Abteilung of 133rd regiment has replaced 1st Abteilung of 231st /motorised/ air-defence regiment from air-defence gun positions at airdrome in Belaya Tserkov' (White Church). After change of 1st Abteilung 231 air-defence shelves have been attach 18th artillery divisions. On December, 21st, 1943 at 04.00 the Abteilung was relocated in Grebenki /18 km to the north Belaya Tserkov ' (White Church) / in region of a disposition of 18th Artillery Division. An Abteilung task: air-defence defence of a concentration and expansion of artillery of 18th Artillery Division, against day and night attacks of aircraft of the opponent both from the big heights, and on low-level flight and simultaneously creation of an anti-tank covering force for cover of the left flank of a Division from tank attacks of the opponent from a northwest direction.

In Christmas on December, 24th, 1943 at 04 o'clock 30 min 18th Artillery Division has obtained by phone the preliminary order on redeployment in new region to the east Kocherovo about 40 km to northeast from Zhitomir. Big the reconnoitring group as a part of the commander of Abteilung and commanders of batteries /except for one battery commander who remained for the commander of a battalion / under command of colonel Shpeck /the commander of 18th Artillery Regiment/ has left forward for a reconnoitring of new positions. The division should act as a part of five mid-flight groups / mid-flight groups "A" - - «E»/. 1st Abteilung of 231st / motorised/ air-defence regiment has been included in mid-flight group "B". A route: Belaya Tserkov '-Skvira- Popelnja-Zhitomir-Kocherovo. Senior lieutenant Muller of the commander of 3rd battery has obtained the order to replace the Abteilung commander during a march as a part of 18th Artillery Division on new region of gun positions. The Abteilung has been concentrated 2 km to the north Belaya Tserkov ' in readiness to act on a march. Other subdivisions which were a part of mid-flight group "B" were late at some o'clock, therefore the Chief of mid-flight group major Lence has commanded to senior lieutenant Muller to act on a march independently, not waiting full formation of mid-flight group, and has arrived to region Kotlyarka about 15 km to northwest Popelnya where it was supposed to conduct spending the night.

Aide-de-camp lieutenant Velish who has been sent forward, has get to know in Kotlyarka from receding units of XXXXII Army Corps the following conditions: in the morning on December, 24th, 1943 large forces of an infantry and tanks of the opponent have broken in region Brusilov at the front in the width about 20 km and come in a southwest direction. Hudorkov /7km to the north Kotljarka/ it is evacuated by our units. The tank avant-guards of the opponent have already reached Hudorkov.

At 24.00 after Abteilung arrival in Kotlyarka senior lieutenant Muller has made a decision: to prevent the opponent to take possession highway to Zhitomir and to provide a march of units of 18th Artillery Division, to create an anti-tank covering force on both roads going from Chudorkov on highway Popelnja-Zhitomir. For this subdivision of Abteilung should hold following anti-tank the cut off positions (Riegelstellung - german - Yuri):

1st battery with 4th platoon of 4th battery of 231st air-defence regiment at a crossroads of highway of 4 km to northwest Kotlyarka. 4th and 5th batteries of a position to the east and to southeast Kotljarka for defence against attacks of an infantry of the opponent from a direction Lipki. 2nd both 3rd batteries northern and northeast exits from Kotlyarka.

All batteries till 06.00 December, 25th 1943 have held gun positions (take up a firing position) according to the order. From the north the battle's noise came nearer. At 12.15 positions of 1st battery at highway attacked from the north of 5-6 tanks of the opponent. In the battle, lasting the half an hour, four tanks of type «T-34» and «general Grant» have been destroyed. Other tanks have departed, attack has been beaten off. During this battle with tanks of the opponent of the battery and a columns of 18th Artillery Division a continuous stream moved by on highway to Zhitomir, passing directly behind battery positions. Operations of 1st battery have prevented tanks of the opponent to leave on highway on this site and to put in mid-flight columns and have allowed units of 18th Artillery Division to continue a march.

Some attempts of Abteilung to adjoin mid-flight group "B" had no success as the mid-flight group has not appeared in the deployment area specified in the order. Most likely the mid-flight group continued a march, not having advised about it Abteilung. To establish connection with XXXXII Army Corps also it was not possible, as the impaction the opponent has not allowed to define a corps disposition.

At night 1st battery could not operate, not having the infantry cover and to replace a position it was impossible in the afternoon, as the battery arrangement was looked through by the opponent. Therefore senior lieutenant Muller has given the order to 1st battery to replace positions with approach of twilight and to pass to east outskirt Kotryalka, thus to hold all-round defence as a part of all Abteilung.

With darkness approach at 15 o'clock 45 min to 1st battery the order has been allowed to begin change of positions. During this moment after sudden fire raid of 15-20 tanks of the opponent with an infantry landing on the big speeds attacked the battery, the unit of tanks circumvented the battery, on the right and at the left.

The tanks of the opponent painted in white colour, against darkness were allocated on distance of 400-500 m, it has allowed gunners to guide quickly guns at the purpose of 8.8 sm and 2.0 sm guns have immediately opened fire. One tank has been lined on distance of 100 m, the ricochet of a shell from a the tank turret on distance of 250 m was observed. A battery personnel has opened fire from machine guns, automatic machines and rifles on an infantry sitting on tanks.
However tanks on full to a course from different directions have rushed on a battery position. Guns and cars have been rammed or crushed by tanks. Soldiers of the battery who have survived, have made the way to Abteilung, differently they would be crushed by tanks.
As a result of operations of 1st battery of highway to Zhitomir it was kept opened for movement of units of 18th Artillery Division till 16.00 December, 25th, 1943

The highway to Zhitomir has been cut by the opponent, therefore the commander of 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment, after meeting with the chief of an operations section of a headquarters of 18th Artillery Division in Zhitomir, has commanded to explore the roads going from Kotlyarka on the south, and to reach Zhitomir through Chernoprudna Berdichev. Carrying out a commander's order, the Abteilung has acted on a march and has come across 25th Tank Division broken by the opponent which blocked up movement road, senior lieutenant Muller has found the division commander major general Treger and has get to know from it, that Popelnya is held by the opponent. The major general has declared to senior lieutenant Muller, that since this moment the Abteilung is subordinated 25th Tank Division and that batteries should take anti-tank positions between Voytovtsy and Popelnya. Such use mismatched antiaircraft artillery tasks, besides, roads to region Voytovtsy and Popelnya as a result of the rains going all the day long, have been covered by a layer of a dirt depth of half-metre. Therefore senior lieutenant Muller has reported, that the order the major general contradicts all key rules of tactics of an antiaircraft artillery, together with orders of higher command instances and the fieldmarshal. Batteries will fail before they will hold gun positions. Major general Treger has answered it literally the following: «I subordinate you to myself, execute my orders». Senior lieutenant Muller has immediately informed on an event by radio 133 air-defence regiment and to the Abteilung commander.133rd air-defence regiment by radio has commanded to Abteilung immediately has reported on the commander of 18th Artillery Division the content of the senior lieutenant Muller's radiogramm of and asked to achieve, that 4th Tank Army has commanded to 25th Tank Division to free the held back batteries of Abteilung. The division commander promised to the Abteilung commander to address to Tank Army.

On December, 26th, 1942 senior lieutenant Muller together with Abteilung has acted on a march and has arrived to Berdichev in the evening. To Berdichev profits from a the Abteilung's headquarters of 1st, 2nd and 4th battery.
3rd and 5th batteries of Abteilung in 03 o'clock 00 min have been again held back on December, 28 25th Tank Division in Markovaya Volitsa and are subordinated of division. The chief of an operations section of a division has refused to allow to execute the order of Abteilung on immediate performance of batteries on a march. Having received the report on this fact, the battalion commander again was to the commander of 18th Artillery Division in Zhitomir and asked to achieve definitive clearing of held back 3rd and 5th batteries. The division commander major general Foholte has declared to the Abteilung commander, that the division has achieved from 4th Tank Army liberation of batteries and that the HQ Army has already given the corresponding order of 25th Tank Division.

3rd battery on December, 26th in 06 o'clock 45 min should take anti-tank positions front on the south in Sokolshcha. After approach of the opponent from the north Sokolshcha it has been evacuated, however the order on evacuation has been transferred the battery not at once, but only after inquiry from batteries. From 12.15 the battery carried out of a problem anti-tank a covering force rear guard on northern outskirt Harleevka. From the report dumped from the plane, 3rd battery knew, that tanks of the opponent attack Harleevka along the railway from Kamenka. The battery has immediately taken anti-tank positions to the south of small river Kamenka and well-aimed fire has stopped tank attack of the opponent in flank of 146th tank regiment. One tank "T-34" has been destroyed, other two tanks are lined, the big losses in killed are put the opponent. Withdrawal of 146th tank regiment has been provided. Besides, operations of 3rd battery has allowed 3 Abteilung of 31st artillery regiment of a tank division to pull out all guns. Still, carrying out of a task anti-tank a covering force rear guard, the battery has made a march with 146th Tank Regiment through Andrushki in Pavloch. At 18.00 the battery has arrived in Pavloch and has accepted problems of anti-tank protection of a city Pavloch from the West.

On December, 27th, 1943 25th Tank Division has again obtained the order to free the battery and to send it to Berdichev. Soon after performance of the battery and on a march tanks of the opponent attacked Pavloch the battery has again held gun positions on the western outskirt of a city. Conditions development has forced 25th Tank Division almost with its full complement on December, 27th 1943г. At 01.30 to act on a march on Skvira. At this 3rd battery again it has not been transferred any order. In the meantime the battery has obtained the new order of Abteilung to act in Kazatin. The battery has immediately executed the order. To one captain from artillery have handed over a copy of the order with the request to transfer it in a headquarters of 25th Tank Division which has already acted on a march. 25th Tank Division at all did not provide 3rd battery with any supply, even has never allocated to it of fuel. 3rd battery has covered withdrawal of 25th Tank Division, especially withdrawal of 146th tank regiment and has beaten off attack of tanks to flank of 146th Tank Regiment. Thus the battery has not incurred losses neither in staff, nor in an equipment.

5th battery also has been held back on January, 26th, 1943 by 25th Tank Division. Contrary to all rules of use of an antiaircraft artillery positions have forced to take in settlement Great Lisovtsy equipped for all-round defence the battery, and have subordinated 146th Motorised Regiment. The highway, passing by Great Lisivtsy to northwest and to southeast settlement, has been already cut by the opponent. The field road which is going south was unique free road from the opponent, it has been washed away by rains and on all extent was looked through by the opponent. One platoon of 5th battery has taken positions at northern exit from village, and two platoons at the east. Battery use was absolutely irresponsible as infantry covers was insufficiently for all village which had considerable enough length. Besides, the battery had no armour-piercing ammunition. All instructions on inexpediency of such use of antiaircraft guns were disregarded. At a dawn the battery has sent on field road on the south all transport, searchlight plants and all cars which were not necessary for direct operations. Nearby 11.30 in a ravine arranged of 3-4 km to northeast of village, 14 tanks of the opponent have been noticed. Soon after 12.00 infantry of the opponent force to a regiment has begun approach to village with the north and the northeast. The gone in to the attack Soviet troops have been fired by effective fire of the platoon holding defence at northern exit from village, and of 600 m from village are stopped on distance. The commander of the battle group defending Great Lisovtsy has allowed the order to replace a position as to keep village there was no possibility.

The battery moved on the unique remained almost impassable road on the south under fire of artillery, anti-tank guns and mortars of the opponent. Thus it was necessary to undermine the car «81» /Krupp/ which went on a tow and six guns as the further towing on absolutely dim field road was impossible. At transition through a line of the railway about 14 tanks of the opponent have opened on the battery strong pulemetno-artillery fire from the western direction. Cars with an ammunition 2 (second), 3 (third) and 5 (fifth) guns were or are destroyed by direct hits of tank guns, or have got stuck on road, owing to damages of the motor and have been undermined.

5th battery has allowed battle group of 146th Motorised Regiment to come off an infantry of the opponent, has destroyed 5 machine-gun fire points and has put to the opponent of loss in quantity from above 130 persons the killed.

The reconnoitring group of 18th Artillery Division sent forward for a reconnoitring of new region of gun positions to the east Zhitomir on December, 24th, 1943, has not reached destination as this the region has already been held by the opponent. The reconnoitring group has stopped in Korostyshev 30 km to northeast Zhitomir. Within December, 25th of new orders from 18th Artillery Division did not arrive, therefore the battalion commander has returned to Zhitomir that in a division headquarters to receive the information on conditions. As a result of changed conditions of the opponent, the division commander has been appointed by the battle commandant of Zhitomir with a problem to use Abteilung for defence of Zhitomir. The Abteilung has received the following task: to use three heavy and one easy batteries for anti-tank defence, and for this purpose immediately to make a reconnoitring of positions directly to the east and to southeast Zhitomir. One easy battery to use for anti-aircraft defence of the highway bridge at southern departure from a city. The reconnoitring of positions has been conducted in second half of day on December, 25th and in first half on December, 26th. On December, 25th nearby 22.00 Abteilung commander has get know on command point of a division, that assumed use of 18th Artillery Division for defence of Zhitomir the division has disappeared also has obtained the order to be relocated in region Kazatin. The order immediately in the same night has been given the Abteilung commander to leave forward in Kazatin and there to make a reconnoitring of anti-tank positions. On absolutely hammered roads the battalion commander has arrived at 07.00 to Berdichev where Abteilung batteries have concentrated. Having transferred to batteries the order to act on December, 27th in Kazatin the Abteilung commander has followed further. After the arrival in Kazatin the Abteilung commander was to the commander of 18th Artillery Division and has received a problem at first to concentrate Abteilung batteries in Kazatin. Within night for December, 28th in Kazatin profits a headquarters, 2nd, 3rd and 4th batteries. 5th battery to concentrate in Vinnitsa.

On December, 28th 1943 at 08.00 six tanks of the opponent with an infantry have suddenly rushed in Kazatin from the northeast. All German subdivisions which were in Kazatin have immediately left a city, on the bad roads going from Kazatina on the south and the southwest, jams were formed of hundreds motor vehicles. Especially strong jams were formed at moving through a railway line. At first 2nd battery has held cut off a position (Riegelstellung – german) in a southwest unit Kazatin 3rd and 4th battery have taken defensive positions on the western outskirt Kazatin. The report has arrived, that in region Gluhovtsy and Nepedivka to northwest Kazatin there were new tank enemy forces, threat of break of these tanks of the opponent on extremely important highway Berdichev - Vinnitsa on which the considerable quantity of columns moved was created. Therefore in first half of day 3rd and 4th batteries have taken anti-tank positions directly to the east of a crossroads Highway in 1 km from Komsomol, and air-defence defence of the columns which have got stuck at a crossroads has simultaneously been charged 4th battery.

In the meantime 2nd battery together with the held back soldiers of other subdivisions has created a defensive boundary and well-aimed fire has stopped advancement of the opponent to northeast railway station. The subdivisions of the battery which did not have any support from an infantry, under courageous and vigorous command of the battery commander of senior lieutenant Velken about one 8.8 sm the gun and two 2.0 sm of guns attacked the opponent from the time defence line and have promoted to station. The same weak forces kept the held boundary. As a result in first half of day it was possible to pull out left in the morning calculations and drivers two guns of calibre of 17.0 sm both 10.5 sm and hundreds motor vehicles/nearby 400/, belonging 18th Artillery Divisions and to other formations. In the middle of day there has been begun approach to northern unit of a city held by the opponent, in this approach participated as well soldiers, in the morning stopped and again put in order. Approach developed successfully, nearby 14.00 coming have reached northwest outskirt and left in back to the opponent who has sat down at a northeast unit of a city. The infantry of the opponent accompanying tanks and armed civilians the big losses had. The opponent has departed in woody region to the north of a city. In the evening the city was again in our hands, the further evacuation from a city of motor vehicles, arms, technics and an ammunition has been provided. Courageous, self-denying actions of 2nd battery have created the precondition to giving to the opponent to grasp a significant amount of arms, motor vehicles, an ammunition, the foodstuffs and the different technics that had crucial importance for continuation of battles for Kazatin. Besides, as a result of these actions 18th artillery divisions could create a defensive boundary and prevent the further break of the opponent to the main highway highway Berdichev-Vinnitsa.

18th Artillery Division without an infantry could not keep a city Kazatin therefore the new boundary of defence in 2 kilometres behind a former boundary, approximately along highway to southwest on December, 29th has been created Kazatin. 2nd battery has been given the battle group of colonel Reinecke, the commander of 383rd Artillery Regiment. During the subsequent operations to the south Kazatin the battery battled under the strongest fire of the opponent at Titusovka at Rulyanka and at Vilkisten. The battery has put to the opponent the big losses in people and the technician, and for all time of battles only one soldier from battery structure has been easily wounded. The battery has given to subdivisions of land forces the most valuable support in reflexion of attacks of an infantry of the opponent, conducted at support of tanks, artillery, jet plants, mortars and anti-tank artillery.

18th Artillery Division continued to conduct defensive battles. On December, 31st, 1943 the left flank of a division has been taken away to Vuyna. 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment in structure: the headquarters, 3rd, 4th and 5th batteries, has received a problem - to defend Vuyna the important point at highway on Vinnitsa. As infantry cover to Abteilung 100 soldiers from Abteilung AIR of 18th Artillery Division have been subordinated. The commander of 1st Abteilung 231st air-defence regiment the order of 18th Artillery Division has been appointed by the commandant of strong point Vuyna with a task to cover the left flank of a division, keeping Vuyna in any conditions. Batteries together with the platoons of Abteilung AIR (Art. Instrument Rec.) given to it have held defence and equipped positions, 4th battery has held defence on east and northeast outskirts Vuyna, 3rd battery - on northern outskirt, 5th battery on northwest and western outskirts. Prospecting operations were regularly performed, has been established, that in Mozanets there are considerable reinforcements of the opponent. From Mozanets subdivisions of the opponent filter through highway on Markovtsy. The opponent has been beaten out by vigorous prospecting operation of 5th battery in which participated two 2.0 sm of the gun, from Markovtsy and rejected for highway. Thus machine-gun nests of the opponent have been destroyed some. The opponent has left a considerable quantity of the killed in the field of battle. 3rd battery repeatedly fired effective fire of movement of the opponent in a northeast direction. One armour vehicle, one artillery battery, one jet plant has been thus destroyed. Considerable losses in people and the technician are put the opponent.

On December, 31, 1943, on January, 4th and 5, 1944 the opponent number of 300 and 400 men attacked a strong point Vuyna. Attacks were preceded by artillery preparation in which participated artillery, mortars and anti-tank artillery. All three attacks have been beaten off by concentrated fire of 8.8 sm and 2.0 sm of the guns, all machine guns, automatic machines and rifles. In all three cases of the battery admitted the opponent on a distance of the most effective fire then all fire means of the battery suddenly opened squall of pernicious fire. To the opponent, attacking dense chains with shouts of "Ur", had been put the big losses. One heavy gun pushed forward for support of attack, has been destroyed by a direct hit of a shell of 8.8 sm. As a result of counter-attack over which lieutenant Schmidt /5th battery/ supervised infantry positions of the opponent have been grasped and new losses are put the opponent. It is grasped five Russian machine guns, anti-tank guns and many rifles are destroyed some, is taken seven captured.

We strongly kept a strong point Vuyna our losses made only a few wounded men. 2nd battery took anti-tank positions of 1 km to the south Gucha. By battery fire it is destroyed a little anti-tank and artillery pieces, mortars, machine-gun fire points, the opponent and some building, equipped with the opponent under strong points is set fire. The big losses in people and the technician are put the opponent.

By order of 133rd air-defence regiment the Abteilung has left from January, 7 till January, 10th, 1944 from a site of 18th Artillery Division for fulfilment of other tasks.

As a result results of operations of Abteilung are that:

1/ the Abteilung has prevented the broken tank enemy forces, to put in the mid-flight groups of a division moving to Zhitomir.

2/ Tanks and an infantry of the opponent, put in Kazatin have been thrown out from a city/. It had been provided evacuation of the most valuable arms, technics, an ammunition, motor vehicles and the foodstuffs that had crucial importance for the subsequent battles for Kazatin.

3/ the Abteilung kept a strong point Vuyna despite strong attacks of the opponent and to it has prevented blow of the opponent on open left flank of a division.
4/thus following losses are put the opponent:
----a/ The Equipment.
7 tanks "T-34" are destroyed
3 tanks "T-34" are lined.
It is destroyed:
1 armour vehicle
1 heavy artillery piece
2 infantry guns
3 mortars
1 jet plant
4 anti-tank guns
17 machine guns
2 anti-tank guns, 1 automatic machine and 10 rifles
14 cargo motor vehicles
9 sledge
13 horses
2 observation posts.
1 artillery battery is disseminated at employment of gun positions, a quantity of calculations of mortars, anti-tank guns and machine-gun nests are Besides, put out of action.
5 automatic machines, 10 rifles and entrenching tools are grasped.

--- b/ A personnel.
350 killed
7 captured.

5/ Losses of the troops
---a/ The Equipment
2 motorcycles
3 automobile motor vehicles
4г cargo motor vehicles
3 semifull-track tractors
8 motor vehicles «81»
5 guns of calibre of 8.8 sm with the special trailer.
9 guns of calibre of 2.0 sm
11 special trailers «202»
---b/ The Personnel
4 killed
23 wounded men/10 from them remain in a system /
18 missing persons.

The Abteilung commander
MAJOR HEINZEL

P.S. On a map from a German source I have added near Belaya Tserkov ' (White Church) near to a tactical sign on 18th Artillery Division a tactical sign on 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment.
With dark blue colour I have allocated as also numbers of those formations which units are mentioned in the battle of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky

[Yuri]

In a KTBs it was entered far not all the document and/or the message, record of telephone conversations etc, in KTBs were entered short generalising record about this or that event.

In short words: you have never worked on a german Armee- or Heeresgruppen- KTB



Jan-Hendrik

To put it briefly: you that, except an oil cake from KTB, have never worked. I urgently recommend for a change for "dessert" of the message of commanders of air-defence Abteilungs.
!!!!!!

[Yuri]

City Kazatin is arranged to the northwest from Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.
From the above-stated report of the commander of German air-defence Abteilung we learn, that on the eve of December, 28, 1943 this small city was flooded with a huge horde of Europeans. Only motor vehicles at them was not less than 1000 pieces.
Really, from the report of the german commander of air-defence Abteilung we know, that only in a city Europeans have thrown 400 units of vehicles, but also some more hundreds motor vehicles have formed traffic jams on roads of leaders from of Kazatin.
Except units making of the Kazatin's garrison here there have arrived units of 18th Artillery Division, 25th Tank Division and the battery of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 233rd air-defence regiment. Will not be exaggeration if to assume that on each motor vehicle it was necessary on five Europeans. Hence, in a city has concentrated not less than 5,000 Europeans from structure of the diversified formations belonging to the diversified instances: well-known, such as OKH, OKL, OT, SS, Polizei, Landschutz, SD, RAD, and as less known and absolutely exotic such as, for example, groups of collectors of copper, military veterinary surgeons, military agriculturists, agricultural scouts, the supplier of pork, drovers of large horned livestock and so on and so forth.

And so, in 8.00 December, 28, 1943 on outskirt of the small town Kazatin there are six Russian tanks T-34 with a mechanised infantry landing. And we observe what picture? And we see that all is a huge horde of Europeans directs away rashly from a city not rendering the slightest resistance, throwing the heavy guns, weapon and vehicles.

Photo, that I give more low, gives representation about from as attack to small town Kazatin of six Russian tanks T-34 with an infantry landing could look. Apparently on a photo, on each tank takes places no more than ten motor-infantrymen. Hence, in 8.00 December, 28, 1943 the small town Kazatin filled in several thousand of Europeans, six Russian tanks T-34 and no more than 60 Russian motor-infantrymen attacked.

[Yuri]

Earlier (see the post on pages 1 of this branch - Mon Oct 20, 2008 8:14 pm) I have given the report of the commander of other air-defence Abteilung - namely, 301st Flak Abteilung of the Reserve of the Main Command which operated in the winter 43/44 in rail station Apostolovo - arranged to the south from Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. Well consolidated point Apostolovo together with 301st Flak Abteilung units of 9th Tank Division and, as defended ill-matched groups, their same category that are listed in the previous post. Who read that post, will probably recollect, that there the result was same as well as in a case with Kazatin. That is, at occurrence of small group of Russian tanks and motor-infantries Europeans ran, not rendering resistance and have thrown a considerable quantity of vehicles and heavy guns.
Let's quote a corresponding place from the report of the commander 301st Flak Abteilung once again:

«Within day the battle commandant has collected all military subdivisions deployed in a city, holiday-makers etc. and has created the infantry cover of a Apostolovo. However hastily hammered together garrison not was able defend successfully a little long time even from attacks of the opponent who does not have a numerical superiority. Therefore Apostolovo defence was not high-grade in spite of the fact that in the garrison disposal there were the shore fortifications created round a city and, besides, to garrison could support self-propelled guns and tanks "Panthers" which have arrived to a Apostolovo.

Actually operations have begun that about 01.00 strengthened prospecting grouping of the enemy has approached at night to the site of front occupied by companies of holiday-makers, under unverified indications this group has addressed to defending and has ostensibly managed to provide to itself an unimpeded access in a city. Thus it was not distributed any shot. Then, after a while, this prospecting grouping of the enemy has fastened firing in position area of limbers of Abteilung. These are firing it has appeared enough that all subdivisions holding east front of defence of the city of Apostolovo, without a shot have left the battle posts.
Thus, in defence front created with such carefulness, with use of all funds available means wide gaps which already could not be closed were formed.

To approach of a dawn Russian have filtered through these gaps in such quantity, that at other fronts of defence already on remains any prospects on successful resistance.
.....

Events developed in fast sequence.

Under fog cover, not meeting resistance, Russian infantry with small arms, has filtered into different units of a city. Gun positions have been cut off or bypassed. The fog very slowly dispersed. The batteries, almost everywhere presented to themselves, shot all ammunition to last shot, using all possibilities. Fire with high points of rupture from near distances to the opponent had been put the big losses. The personnel has successfully beaten off some attacks of the opponent and then has undermined guns. Together with tanks "Panthers" and the self-propelled guns «Hummel» which were making the way from an environment of the opponent courageous anti-aircraft gunners with the weapon in hands have broken strong resistance of the opponent, and left to one's own».

Thrown by Europeans in Apostolovo and other rail station Razdelnaya vehicles and combat material it is possible to see on a photo more low.
As events in Kazatin and Apostolovo are actually identical, combining a photo where attack of Russian tanks and a mechanised infantry and a photo on which it is embodied thrown by Europeans in Apostolovo combat material is shown, it is possible to make a picture of a moral condition and level of fighting spirit at Europeans of those formations which operated in the winter 43/44 both to the north, and to the south from Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.

[GaryD]

... The matter is that just during that time when the above-stated source has got to me on eyes, I read the battle report of the commander of 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. This air-defence Abteilung operated in December, 1943 in region to southwest Kiev, and then on December, 20th has been attached 18th Artillery Division and besides on casual coincidence of circumstances in the end of December, 1943 the beginning of January, 1944 some batteries of this air-defence Abteilung operated together with units 25th Tank Division. As it will not difficult be convinced, in the lists resulted above is not present either 18th artillery division, or 25th Tank Division. On the other hand absolutely precisely it is known, that for example, 25th Tank Division has arrived on the East from France in the beginning of November, 1943, during a short time interval of unit of it formation have been routed and have decreased back in the beginning of January, 1944. Thus, this formation should be specified in both of them of two lists made by mr. Critic of the Overmans's conclusions.
I have decided to give the chance to you will get acquainted with the content of the battle report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. As can seem at first sight, the content of the report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment has no direct relation to the events occurring in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket. But it only at first sight.

Yuri,

Let me see if I understand you argument. Are you saying that the OKH reporting system is completely broken because the available records do not record the presence of a single flak battalion? Or are you saying that Zetterling, the author of the Overmans critique, missed one division (25th PzD) out of twenty-four transferred to the east, thus his entire argument is invalid?

[Yuri]

... The matter is that just during that time when the above-stated source has got to me on eyes, I read the battle report of the commander of 1st Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. This air-defence Abteilung operated in December, 1943 in region to southwest Kiev, and then on December, 20th has been attached 18th Artillery Division and besides on casual coincidence of circumstances in the end of December, 1943 the beginning of January, 1944 some batteries of this air-defence Abteilung operated together with units 25th Tank Division. As it will not difficult be convinced, in the lists resulted above is not present either 18th artillery division, or 25th Tank Division. On the other hand absolutely precisely it is known, that for example, 25th Tank Division has arrived on the East from France in the beginning of November, 1943, during a short time interval of unit of it formation have been routed and have decreased back in the beginning of January, 1944. Thus, this formation should be specified in both of them of two lists made by mr. Critic of the Overmans's conclusions.
I have decided to give the chance to you will get acquainted with the content of the battle report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment. As can seem at first sight, the content of the report of the commander of 1st air-defence Abteilung of 231st air-defence regiment has no direct relation to the events occurring in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket. But it only at first sight.

Yuri,

Let me see if I understand you argument. Are you saying that the OKH reporting system is completely broken because the available records do not record the presence of a single flak battalion? Or are you saying that Zetterling, the author of the Overmans critique, missed one division (25th PzD) out of twenty-four transferred to the east, thus his entire argument is invalid?

Gary,

In the beginning allow to ask you the question. From your post it is possible to understand, that the author of criticism of conclusions Overmans is mr. Zetterling. It is correct?

Now I answer your question.
As a whole you have misunderstood me. Generally speaking, I assumed to show errors of the author of criticism Overmans a little bit later. But as you have asked a question I will tell about them some words now.

Absence in lists of 25th PzDiv, 18th Art Div and those divisions that has been destroyed in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, have served only as an occasion to check of correctness of calculations of the author of criticism of conclusions Overmans.

That the critic has not considered in the calculations 25th Pz. Div, 18th Art. Div. and other divisions, say, the same 57th ID which anew generated has appeared in May 44 as a part of the "Center" army group under Orsha, it still half-troubles. Moreover not such the big trouble, that he does not wish to consider number of brigades, we will tell that SS-Langemark.

It would be possible not to notice and such error.
The critic believes, that at departure 1-SS Pz. Div from the East to Italy had figure 17,000. On the other hand at returning of this division from Italy back to Russia, its number, ostensibly, has decreased to 14,000. Meanwhile, 1-SS Pz. Div went to Italy not for operations, and to political reasons about what Hitler has clearly told to the commander of an army group "Center" to the field marshal v. Kluge on July, 26, 1943. Moreover, at returning from Italy in Russia 1-SS Pz. Div has received replenishment that follows from record of meeting of Hitler with generals Jodl and Zeitzler from December, 28, 1943.
Hence, figure manpower of this formation during absence in the East has not decreased, and has on the contrary increased. And generally speaking, SS-formations had considerably big number of soldiers, than divisions OKH. Thus it is necessary to remember, that SS-formations never informed the true number in an army headquarters in which they submitted.

But that eyes the gross blunder at once rushes to eyes at this critic such, for example.
At calculation of number of soldiers and officers directed on the East as a part of new divisions the critic does not consider a units of reserve GHQ, corresponding number and which nomenclature always went on the East together with new formations. Thus, on one division sent on the East it was necessary not 14,000 soldiers as it is considered by mr. Critic of Overmans, and more than 20,000 or on 40 % more than takes our mr. Critic.
It is not difficult to prove it, as in TsAMO there is in relative this corresponding package of trophy documents (so-called "the Kejtel's folder"). These documents are published for a long time, still in 50th and 60th years. In particular, documents with dates of the period examined by us December 1943 - February 1944.
The analysis of data available in these documents on losses and replenishments gives the basis to say that with the account of losses in Wehrmacht all was far not safely.

Further us mr. Critic correctly speaks to us that:
«… the many other possibilities are small. Probably true, but many small factors can taken together be kind significant, if they mainly pull in the same direction».
The thesis true, but in this case as it is not paradoxical sounds, this thesis works in favour of conclusions Overmans, instead of against them.
The matter is that the number men of various semimilitary and as formally not military formations which were pretty often used at the front as an infantry, but at the same time which number was not reflected in muster-rolls of units of Wehrmacht is very great and, as consequence, was not reflected in lists of their losses. A vivid example batallions OT.
Each such instance slightly distorts the account of losses, but all together they considerable underestimate the general military losses of Wehrmacht.
Principles of use of live force as an infantry in German Wehrmacht were rather and are rather original, not to accept it in calculations means obviously to receive the distorted result.

[Yuri]

The citation of one of documents from the Keitel’s folder is more low given. In it of the document data on losses and replenishment of land forces of Wehrmacht in the east from 1.7.1943 on 12.1943 contain. The document is published for the first time in the USSR in fifty years ago, in 1959 in «Military-historical magazine» and since then is duplicated in millions and millions copies of books and articles. The one who is not familiar with the content of it and documents similar to it and at the same time makes bold to criticise the Soviet military-historical science or works of the diligent western researchers (such as example Overmans and D. Glantz), that, as a rule, get down into the gutter
As confirmation of such conclusion just works of mr. Zetterling also serve.

========================================

Losses and replenishments of land forces in the East for December, 27th, 1943

The chief of an army staff at the chief of a headquarters of general headquarters of armed forces

HQ of the Fuhrer
On December, 27th, 1943

The inquiry
The content: Replenishment and losses of land forces in the East

A) Losses with 1.7 for 30.11.1943


[These data are grouped in the table, containing five columns. In these square brackets I give numbers and names of these columns - Yuri
1.Month
2.Victims
3.Missing persons
4.Evacuated, wounded and patients
5.In total ]

Month……………………………………………. July…………………………………………………………….
Victims…………………………………………… 34,800
Missing persons……………………………… 14,600
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 181,366
In total……………………………………………. 230,766

Month……………………………………………. August ……………………………………………………
Victims…………………………………………… 34,000
Missing persons……………………………… 20,200
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 252,567
In total……………………………………………. 306,767

Month….. ………………………………………. September…………………………………………………..
Victims…………………………………………… 20,200
Missing persons……………………………… 13,000
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 235,365
In total……………………………………………. 268,565

Month:……………………………………………. October…………………………………………………….….
Victims…………………………………………… 25,900
Missing persons……………………………… 15,470
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 185,687
In total……………………………………………. 227,057

Month……………………………………………. November………………………………………………….….
Victims…………………………………………… 18,600
Missing persons……………………………… 12,300
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 159,059
In total……………………………………………. 189,959

Grand Total……………………………………..……………………………………………………………………
Victims…………………………………………… 133,500
Missing persons……………………………… 75,570
Evacuated, wounded and patients…. 1,014,044
In total……………………………………………. 1,223,114

B)
I. Replenishments with 1.7 for 30.11.1943

[These data are grouped in the table, containing six columns. In these square brackets I give numbers and names of these columns - Yuri
1. Month
2. Reserve
3. Recovered
4. Personnel allocated from the West and the North
5. Personnel directed from sanitary subdivisions of army groups and military districts in troops
6. In total ]

July……………………………………………………………..
Reserve:- 47,000
Recovered:- 45,000
Personnel allocated from the West and the North:- -
Personnel directed from sanitary subdivisions of army groups and military districts in troops:- 25,316
In total:- 117,316

August………………………………………………………………..
Reserve:- 45,000
Recovered:- 34,000
… from West and North:- -
… from sanitary subdivisions:- 44,172
In total:- 123,172

September…………………………………………………………
Reserve:- 59,000
Recovered:- 35,000
… from West and North:- 34,000
… from sanitary subdivisions:- 36,719
In total:- 164,719

October……………………………………………………………….
Reserve: 64,000
Recovered: 31,000
… from West and North:- 25,000
… from sanitary subdivisions … : - 28,109
In total:- 148 109

November…………………………………………………………….
Reserve:- 56,000
Recovered:- 40,000
… from West and North:- 3,000
… from sanitary subdivisions … :- 22,584
In total:- 121,584

Grand Total:………………………………………………………………..
Reserve:- 271,000
Recovered:- 185,000
… from West and North:- 62,000
… from sanitary subdivisions … : - 156,900
In total:- 674,900


2. Replenishment from 1.12 for 31.12.1943

December……………………………………………………………………………
Reserve:- 75,000
Recovered:- 42,000
… from West and North:- -
… from sanitary subdivisions … : - -
In total:- 117,000

3. Except the replenishment specified in points 1 and 2 on the East have been sent from 1.7.1943 formations and separate subdivisions:


5 Infantry Divisions …..................................... approximately 65 thousand men

1 Airborne Division (without 4 batallions) …. approximately 10 thousand men

2 Motorised Divisions................................... approximately 26 thousand men

6 Tank Divisions ……………………………………….. approximately 78 thousand men

1 Motorised Brigade ……………………………….. approximately 8 thousand men

Other subdivisions ………………………………….. approximately 40 thousand men

Total: ………………………………………………………. approximately 227 thousand men

C) All replenishment from 1.7 for 31.121943 according to column B, points 1-3, make:

674,900 men
117,000 men
227,000 men

Total:- approximately 1,018,900 men

D) Comparison of losses and replenishments
Losses with 1.7 for 31.11 1943 have made 1,223,114 men
Approximate losses for December, 1943 about 190,000 men

Total:- 1,413,114 men

Aggregate number of replenishments with 1.7 for 31.12.1943 … … … … … … … … …. 1,018,900 men

Irreplaceable losses of 394,214 men

========================

Apparently Mr. Zetterling essentially underestimates data about number of soldiers and officers of Wehrmacht going on the East. Thus falsification goes as in a direction of understating of number of divisions directed on the East, and in a direction of concealment of the fact of sending on the East of the big number of separate units and brigades out of divisions.