What histories there are all say that "French Forces were sent in piecemeal and uncoordinated" So yes what might have looked like several French counter-attacks were probably...all meant to be the same attack! lol lol Whats a few days here and there for the French Army? Probably better performance than normal!
The BEF counter-attack....elsewhere in threads youve contributed too, Sid, especially the one about elite British tank units, we've talked about how tank losses are actually damaged-repairables, and that tank crews so often survive. So though Rommels forces were driven back, this happened with few actual human casulties.
Phylo
German Losses against France, May-June 1940.
Moderator: sniper1shot
-
Panzermeyer
- Supporter
- Posts: 53
- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
Hello AK74,
• At the beginning of the 1940 western campaign, there are 83 French divisions in the north-east area (3 DLMs, 3 DCRs, 5 DLCs, 72 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades). The 6 DCR/DLM armored divisions were never the equivalent in power and combined arms than a Panzerdivision. They had only about 160 tanks against about 250-320 for each Panzerdivisionen. There are also 10 British divisions (BEF), 22 Belgian divisions (but their real men strength corresponds only to 12 divisions) and 8 Dutch divisions. The allied had therefore a strength of 123 divisions (113 with the real strength of the Belgian divisions) to face a total of 136 German divisions. There are the equivalent of 13 French divisions on the Maginot line and 6 French divisions initially left to face the Italians. 13 French, 13 Belgian and 9 British divisions are lost in the north = 35 divisions, including numerous and precious equipments. To defend the 500 km of the so-called "Weygand Line", from the North Sea to the Rhine, there remains only 63 divisions (59 French, 2 Polish depending from the French army and 2 British divisions) to stop 136 German ones, including 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. With such means only a frontline on the Somme and Aisne Rivers can be defended. Mathematically the campaign is lost, but the French troops will offer a fierce resistance during June 1940, inflicting heavy losses to the Germans and later to the Italians who declared war to an already beaten opponent.
• The French air force had some 1,900 aircrafts, of which only about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation). It was conceived as a defensive arm, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore much dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops. At the time of the German attack the French air force was just modernizing and reorganizing.
There were only 36 Dewoitine D520 fighters in May 1940, the others were Morane-Saulnier 406, Curtiss H75, Bloch 151, Bloch 152 and Potez 631 fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10th May 1940.
Only 120 of the bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational.
From the 490 reconnaissance aircrafts only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones : Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use.
Great Britain sent 416 aircrafts in France and kept about 800 aircrafts in Great Britain but all the allied planes available (1340 French + 416 British + about 190 for Belgium and the Netherlands = 1946) was still inferior to the about 3,500 German aircrafts effectively used during the 1940 western campaign. Nevertheless the RAF was also active from Great Britain, especially during the battle of Dunkirk. At the beginning of the German attack a large part of the Dutch and Belgian aviation are destroyed on the ground as well as 232 French aircrafts.
• About 10,000 field artillery pieces for the French troops
• Concerning the AFVs :
ALLIES :
1) Number of tanks, tank destroyers and self-propelled guns
• France : 2307 (2777*)
• United Kingdom : 308
• Belgium : 278
• Netherlands : -
• Luxembourg : -
--> TOTAL 1 : 2893 (3363*)
2) Number of armored cars
• France : 575
• United Kingdom : 56
• Belgium : -
• Netherlands : 34
• Luxembourg : -
--> TOTAL 2 : 665
--> TOTAL 1+2 : 3558 (4028*)
* counting the French FT17 and FCM-2C old tanks in combat units.
Listed among the 575 French armored cars there are 279 tracked vehicles that can also be counted as light tanks instead.
GERMANY :
Number of tanks and SP guns : 2821 (tanks, Panzerkjäger I and StuGs)
Number of armored cars : more than 900
--> TOTAL : 3721
-----------------
• There are comparable numbers of allied and German tanks with about 2900 tanks. If all the AFVs are counted there are 4028 allied vs 3718 German AFVs, with the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks being counted. Without the obsolete AFVs there are 3558 allied vs 3718 German AFVs. This apparent equality in the number of tanks is purely mathematical but in the facts it is completely false. All the about 3000 German tanks are concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen unlike only about 960 French tanks in the DCR/DLM. Each DCR/DLM has less tanks than a Panzerdivision : there are roughly 10x300 German tanks against 6x160 French tanks and many dispersed battalions. That was the reality on the battlefield. The allied armored divisions were used as a delaying or shock element, working for the infantry units, never as a decisive and independent arm. The British 1st AD concentrated the cruiser tanks but did not really change the balance and was quickly neutralized. All the Belgian tanks were dispersed in small numbers in their infantry divisions, the higher number of Belgian tanks could be found in the 1e division de chasseurs ardennais with about 50 AFVs.
• All the French tanks have a power/weight ratio of 7-10 hp/ton ; the German tanks have a power/weight ratio of 15-20 hp/ton, they have a better mobility. French tanks were generally more adapted to heavy and brutal charges against slow or immobile targets but were not really conceived for a war in which speed and mobility rules. And this speed and mobility was created by the revolutionary Panzerdivisionen. Only the Somua S35 cavalry tank could really compete with the German tanks in terms of speed, mobility and autonomy.
• All the French tanks have a better armor then the German tanks (13-30mm for the German tanks and 40-60mm for the French tanks). The 23 British Matillda II tanks are also far better armored than the German ones. French tanks are able to sustain many German hits.
• The Germans tanks have often a better AT capacity, except the French 47mm SA35 gun and 75mm SA35 gun. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun is able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800-1000m but generally the French rate of fire is slower because of the 1-man turret where the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner.The 2636 German tanks include 965 ones (37%) armed with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun. Not counting here the additional 117 Panzerjäger I and 24 StuG A. Which leads to 2777 AFVs and 1106 ones (40%) armed with a 3.7cm, 4.7cm or 7.5cm gun. From the 3056 French tanks (if the AMR33/35s are counted as tanks), there are only about 480 French tanks armed with a 47mm SA35 (including the B1bis tanks with their 75mm hull gun) and about 300-350 which have a 37mm SA38 gun. From the 279 AMR33/35s, 259 are only armed with a single 7.5mm or 13.2mm MG and 20 AMR35 have a 25mm SA35 gun, which is also better than the German 3.7cm gun. That makes 800-850 tanks (26-28%) with an excellent to good anti-tank capacity. The huge majority of the French tanks are light tanks armed with the 37mm SA18 gun which can be used at 300-400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models are less armored and easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D, they have to get as close as < 25-100m, whereas the enemy can destroy them at about 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK). On 10th May, there are also 23 British + 236 Belgian tanks with a rather good AT capacity for a total of 1039-1089 allied tanks with a good AT capacity.
------------------------------
Concerning other German losses :
The area of the Mont Dieu woods was held by the French troops facing German assault from 14th to 25th May. During this time there were important battles in Stonne, Les Grandes Armoises, Tannay and Le Chesne.During these battles the French lost about 3,000 men including about 1,000 KIA. The German losses were even higher, serious studies estimate them up to 3 times higher. There are 915 German graves around the town of Stonne alone. During 23rd and 24th May, the German 24.ID had 1,490 losses (347 KIA, 1,086 WIA and 57 MIA). From 17th to 25th May the 1st battalion of the German 79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIA, 144 WIA and 6 MIA) near the Mont Damion. Most of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment losses of the 1940 Western campaign were around Stonne with 570 losses (KIA, WIA, MIA).
During the battles of Hannut / Gembloux in Belgium 12-15th May 1940, the Germans suffered very heavy losses among their tanks. In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and in Gembloux the French artillery alone destroyed about 50 German tanks, including 32 in the Pz.Rgt.35.
On 15th May, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from its 331 tanks. So there were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux. Only 41 % operational tanks.
On 16th May :
• the 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks than on 15th May. But 149 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repair workshops.
• the 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the battles.
On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats the next day. The Germans repaired probably some more of their tanks during the later days or weeks while the French could not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.
On 5th June, the German XIV.Panzerkorps (9.PzD, 10.PzD, 13.ID (mot), 9.ID and "Grossdeutschland" regiment) assaults the French positions south of Amiens on the Somme River. The 14-20 km front (including the plateau of Dury) is hold by the 16e DI supported by 2 companies (30 Renault R35 tanks) of the 12e BCC. More than 400 German tanks and about 64,000 men are launched against about 18,000 French troops and 30 tanks. The French troops are organized in strongpoints in the towns and woods on a depth of about 10 km sometimes. These hedgehogs include infantry, HMGs, 25mm and 47mm AT guns, 75mm field guns used in AT role, AT mines etc. for a 360° defense. The advancing German tanks are rapidly cut from their supporting infantry and confronted on the rears to French 75mm, 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries engaging them in direct fire. On 8th and 9th June the 16e DI rears are reinforced by the 24e DI. After 5 days the German operation is stopped in that area, it failed and the Germans sustained heavy losses. The XIV.Panzerkorps is then moved and engaged behind the XVI.Panzerkorps in Péronne. The German troops lost 196 destroyed or damaged tanks (136 against the 16e DI and 60 against the 24e DI), including many definitively destroyed ones especially against French artillery batteries firing directly on the enemy tanks. The 2 French divisions have lost 60-70% of their strength but they stopped a Panzerkorps. Unlike in Gembloux the French troops had no strong artillery support since the artillery was mainly engaged in direct fire missions. After this battle the number of operational tanks of the XIV.Panzerkorps dropped to 45%.
We have already talked about operation Tiger against the Maginot line in the Sarre area on 14th June, on a 30 km front between Saint-Avold and Sarralbe in Moselle. The Germans engage 6 infantry divisions and 3 divisions in reserve, a total of 9 divisions. The German troops involved are the XXX.Korps (258.ID and 93.ID), XII.Korps (268.ID and 75.ID) and XXIV. Korps (60.ID and 252.ID). That makes 155,000 men supported by 1,052 field guns and 8.8cm FlaK. It is the strongest artillery concentration of the campaign in France. The 79.ID, 198.ID and 168.ID are in reserve. About 300 German bombers are supporting the attack. On the French side there are only 4 fortress infantry regiments, 2 colonial MG regiments (about 17,000 men) and 114 field guns.
On 15th June 1940, the Germans launch operation Kleiner Bär against the Maginot line in Alsace, on the Rhine. The Germans engage 8 divisions : 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID, 239.ID, 554.ID, 556.ID, 557.ID and the 6.Gebirgsdivision. These troops are supported by more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support (including 150 Stukas). The French have to fight 1 vs 10 and there are less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) to support them. The French 104e DIF (42e RIF, 28e RIF and 242e RIF) is alone to face the German assault on the Rhine between Rhinau and Neuf-Brisach on a 30 km front. There are also 5 companies in the fortifications and the 5e DBCPy (5th Chasseurs Pyrénéens half-brigade) with the 9th and 10th battalions. Less than 10,000 French troops to face more than 100,000 German troops. The French fortifications on the Rhine were only smaller bunker and due to the ground water they have no underground levels at all, these were surface fortifications with simplified armament. Due to the small size there for example no 47mm AT guns and except a few 37mm AT guns, only 13.2mm HMGs as AT weapons. The German assault are at first repulsed or reduced to very small bridgeheads. Several counter-attacks are led by French "groupes francs", which for example manage to take again the town of Vogelgrun. Nonehteless, on the north, in what was initially a diversion attack, the 557.ID, manages to establish a bridgehead in Rhinau. The German advance is not easy, they loose 766 KIA, 2,567 WIA and 117 MIA. On 16th May the Germans manage to break through the German lines in several areas and the encircled French troops in their bunkers continue to fight or withdraw in the woods where they continue t resist. On 17th June the remaining French troops are ordered to retreat to the Vosges heights and valleys where they will fight until 25th June.
During operations Tiger and Kleiner Bär, the Germans grouped heavy AA guns (8.8cm FlaK) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while 3.7cm FlaK and 3.7cm PaK had to blind/destroy the weapons crenels and observation means of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 AA/AT guns.
Armistice came in application on 25th June 1940. At that date, from the Maginot Line in the North-East some 45 defense works out of 53 and 130 casemates/blockhouses were still fighting and many defense works surrendered only on 7th July.
Regards,
David
• At the beginning of the 1940 western campaign, there are 83 French divisions in the north-east area (3 DLMs, 3 DCRs, 5 DLCs, 72 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades). The 6 DCR/DLM armored divisions were never the equivalent in power and combined arms than a Panzerdivision. They had only about 160 tanks against about 250-320 for each Panzerdivisionen. There are also 10 British divisions (BEF), 22 Belgian divisions (but their real men strength corresponds only to 12 divisions) and 8 Dutch divisions. The allied had therefore a strength of 123 divisions (113 with the real strength of the Belgian divisions) to face a total of 136 German divisions. There are the equivalent of 13 French divisions on the Maginot line and 6 French divisions initially left to face the Italians. 13 French, 13 Belgian and 9 British divisions are lost in the north = 35 divisions, including numerous and precious equipments. To defend the 500 km of the so-called "Weygand Line", from the North Sea to the Rhine, there remains only 63 divisions (59 French, 2 Polish depending from the French army and 2 British divisions) to stop 136 German ones, including 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. With such means only a frontline on the Somme and Aisne Rivers can be defended. Mathematically the campaign is lost, but the French troops will offer a fierce resistance during June 1940, inflicting heavy losses to the Germans and later to the Italians who declared war to an already beaten opponent.
• The French air force had some 1,900 aircrafts, of which only about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation). It was conceived as a defensive arm, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore much dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops. At the time of the German attack the French air force was just modernizing and reorganizing.
There were only 36 Dewoitine D520 fighters in May 1940, the others were Morane-Saulnier 406, Curtiss H75, Bloch 151, Bloch 152 and Potez 631 fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10th May 1940.
Only 120 of the bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational.
From the 490 reconnaissance aircrafts only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones : Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use.
Great Britain sent 416 aircrafts in France and kept about 800 aircrafts in Great Britain but all the allied planes available (1340 French + 416 British + about 190 for Belgium and the Netherlands = 1946) was still inferior to the about 3,500 German aircrafts effectively used during the 1940 western campaign. Nevertheless the RAF was also active from Great Britain, especially during the battle of Dunkirk. At the beginning of the German attack a large part of the Dutch and Belgian aviation are destroyed on the ground as well as 232 French aircrafts.
• About 10,000 field artillery pieces for the French troops
• Concerning the AFVs :
ALLIES :
1) Number of tanks, tank destroyers and self-propelled guns
• France : 2307 (2777*)
• United Kingdom : 308
• Belgium : 278
• Netherlands : -
• Luxembourg : -
--> TOTAL 1 : 2893 (3363*)
2) Number of armored cars
• France : 575
• United Kingdom : 56
• Belgium : -
• Netherlands : 34
• Luxembourg : -
--> TOTAL 2 : 665
--> TOTAL 1+2 : 3558 (4028*)
* counting the French FT17 and FCM-2C old tanks in combat units.
Listed among the 575 French armored cars there are 279 tracked vehicles that can also be counted as light tanks instead.
GERMANY :
Number of tanks and SP guns : 2821 (tanks, Panzerkjäger I and StuGs)
Number of armored cars : more than 900
--> TOTAL : 3721
-----------------
• There are comparable numbers of allied and German tanks with about 2900 tanks. If all the AFVs are counted there are 4028 allied vs 3718 German AFVs, with the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks being counted. Without the obsolete AFVs there are 3558 allied vs 3718 German AFVs. This apparent equality in the number of tanks is purely mathematical but in the facts it is completely false. All the about 3000 German tanks are concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen unlike only about 960 French tanks in the DCR/DLM. Each DCR/DLM has less tanks than a Panzerdivision : there are roughly 10x300 German tanks against 6x160 French tanks and many dispersed battalions. That was the reality on the battlefield. The allied armored divisions were used as a delaying or shock element, working for the infantry units, never as a decisive and independent arm. The British 1st AD concentrated the cruiser tanks but did not really change the balance and was quickly neutralized. All the Belgian tanks were dispersed in small numbers in their infantry divisions, the higher number of Belgian tanks could be found in the 1e division de chasseurs ardennais with about 50 AFVs.
• All the French tanks have a power/weight ratio of 7-10 hp/ton ; the German tanks have a power/weight ratio of 15-20 hp/ton, they have a better mobility. French tanks were generally more adapted to heavy and brutal charges against slow or immobile targets but were not really conceived for a war in which speed and mobility rules. And this speed and mobility was created by the revolutionary Panzerdivisionen. Only the Somua S35 cavalry tank could really compete with the German tanks in terms of speed, mobility and autonomy.
• All the French tanks have a better armor then the German tanks (13-30mm for the German tanks and 40-60mm for the French tanks). The 23 British Matillda II tanks are also far better armored than the German ones. French tanks are able to sustain many German hits.
• The Germans tanks have often a better AT capacity, except the French 47mm SA35 gun and 75mm SA35 gun. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun is able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800-1000m but generally the French rate of fire is slower because of the 1-man turret where the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner.The 2636 German tanks include 965 ones (37%) armed with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun. Not counting here the additional 117 Panzerjäger I and 24 StuG A. Which leads to 2777 AFVs and 1106 ones (40%) armed with a 3.7cm, 4.7cm or 7.5cm gun. From the 3056 French tanks (if the AMR33/35s are counted as tanks), there are only about 480 French tanks armed with a 47mm SA35 (including the B1bis tanks with their 75mm hull gun) and about 300-350 which have a 37mm SA38 gun. From the 279 AMR33/35s, 259 are only armed with a single 7.5mm or 13.2mm MG and 20 AMR35 have a 25mm SA35 gun, which is also better than the German 3.7cm gun. That makes 800-850 tanks (26-28%) with an excellent to good anti-tank capacity. The huge majority of the French tanks are light tanks armed with the 37mm SA18 gun which can be used at 300-400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models are less armored and easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D, they have to get as close as < 25-100m, whereas the enemy can destroy them at about 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK). On 10th May, there are also 23 British + 236 Belgian tanks with a rather good AT capacity for a total of 1039-1089 allied tanks with a good AT capacity.
------------------------------
Concerning other German losses :
The area of the Mont Dieu woods was held by the French troops facing German assault from 14th to 25th May. During this time there were important battles in Stonne, Les Grandes Armoises, Tannay and Le Chesne.During these battles the French lost about 3,000 men including about 1,000 KIA. The German losses were even higher, serious studies estimate them up to 3 times higher. There are 915 German graves around the town of Stonne alone. During 23rd and 24th May, the German 24.ID had 1,490 losses (347 KIA, 1,086 WIA and 57 MIA). From 17th to 25th May the 1st battalion of the German 79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIA, 144 WIA and 6 MIA) near the Mont Damion. Most of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment losses of the 1940 Western campaign were around Stonne with 570 losses (KIA, WIA, MIA).
During the battles of Hannut / Gembloux in Belgium 12-15th May 1940, the Germans suffered very heavy losses among their tanks. In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and in Gembloux the French artillery alone destroyed about 50 German tanks, including 32 in the Pz.Rgt.35.
On 15th May, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from its 331 tanks. So there were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux. Only 41 % operational tanks.
On 16th May :
• the 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks than on 15th May. But 149 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repair workshops.
• the 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the battles.
On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats the next day. The Germans repaired probably some more of their tanks during the later days or weeks while the French could not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.
On 5th June, the German XIV.Panzerkorps (9.PzD, 10.PzD, 13.ID (mot), 9.ID and "Grossdeutschland" regiment) assaults the French positions south of Amiens on the Somme River. The 14-20 km front (including the plateau of Dury) is hold by the 16e DI supported by 2 companies (30 Renault R35 tanks) of the 12e BCC. More than 400 German tanks and about 64,000 men are launched against about 18,000 French troops and 30 tanks. The French troops are organized in strongpoints in the towns and woods on a depth of about 10 km sometimes. These hedgehogs include infantry, HMGs, 25mm and 47mm AT guns, 75mm field guns used in AT role, AT mines etc. for a 360° defense. The advancing German tanks are rapidly cut from their supporting infantry and confronted on the rears to French 75mm, 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries engaging them in direct fire. On 8th and 9th June the 16e DI rears are reinforced by the 24e DI. After 5 days the German operation is stopped in that area, it failed and the Germans sustained heavy losses. The XIV.Panzerkorps is then moved and engaged behind the XVI.Panzerkorps in Péronne. The German troops lost 196 destroyed or damaged tanks (136 against the 16e DI and 60 against the 24e DI), including many definitively destroyed ones especially against French artillery batteries firing directly on the enemy tanks. The 2 French divisions have lost 60-70% of their strength but they stopped a Panzerkorps. Unlike in Gembloux the French troops had no strong artillery support since the artillery was mainly engaged in direct fire missions. After this battle the number of operational tanks of the XIV.Panzerkorps dropped to 45%.
We have already talked about operation Tiger against the Maginot line in the Sarre area on 14th June, on a 30 km front between Saint-Avold and Sarralbe in Moselle. The Germans engage 6 infantry divisions and 3 divisions in reserve, a total of 9 divisions. The German troops involved are the XXX.Korps (258.ID and 93.ID), XII.Korps (268.ID and 75.ID) and XXIV. Korps (60.ID and 252.ID). That makes 155,000 men supported by 1,052 field guns and 8.8cm FlaK. It is the strongest artillery concentration of the campaign in France. The 79.ID, 198.ID and 168.ID are in reserve. About 300 German bombers are supporting the attack. On the French side there are only 4 fortress infantry regiments, 2 colonial MG regiments (about 17,000 men) and 114 field guns.
On 15th June 1940, the Germans launch operation Kleiner Bär against the Maginot line in Alsace, on the Rhine. The Germans engage 8 divisions : 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID, 239.ID, 554.ID, 556.ID, 557.ID and the 6.Gebirgsdivision. These troops are supported by more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support (including 150 Stukas). The French have to fight 1 vs 10 and there are less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) to support them. The French 104e DIF (42e RIF, 28e RIF and 242e RIF) is alone to face the German assault on the Rhine between Rhinau and Neuf-Brisach on a 30 km front. There are also 5 companies in the fortifications and the 5e DBCPy (5th Chasseurs Pyrénéens half-brigade) with the 9th and 10th battalions. Less than 10,000 French troops to face more than 100,000 German troops. The French fortifications on the Rhine were only smaller bunker and due to the ground water they have no underground levels at all, these were surface fortifications with simplified armament. Due to the small size there for example no 47mm AT guns and except a few 37mm AT guns, only 13.2mm HMGs as AT weapons. The German assault are at first repulsed or reduced to very small bridgeheads. Several counter-attacks are led by French "groupes francs", which for example manage to take again the town of Vogelgrun. Nonehteless, on the north, in what was initially a diversion attack, the 557.ID, manages to establish a bridgehead in Rhinau. The German advance is not easy, they loose 766 KIA, 2,567 WIA and 117 MIA. On 16th May the Germans manage to break through the German lines in several areas and the encircled French troops in their bunkers continue to fight or withdraw in the woods where they continue t resist. On 17th June the remaining French troops are ordered to retreat to the Vosges heights and valleys where they will fight until 25th June.
During operations Tiger and Kleiner Bär, the Germans grouped heavy AA guns (8.8cm FlaK) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while 3.7cm FlaK and 3.7cm PaK had to blind/destroy the weapons crenels and observation means of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 AA/AT guns.
Armistice came in application on 25th June 1940. At that date, from the Maginot Line in the North-East some 45 defense works out of 53 and 130 casemates/blockhouses were still fighting and many defense works surrendered only on 7th July.
Regards,
David
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi Panzermeyer,
I think it should be pointed out that the German troops used in Kleine Bar were of low quality. All the divisions had been created since the outbreak of war, many were manned by older WWI veterans and their artillery was largely from captured Polish and Czech stocks. They were also very short of specialist equipment and manpower.
They could only attack across the Rhine at all because the French had already withdrawn all their field formations and interval troops from the Rhine front, leaving only two very strung out fortress divisions in the Maginot fortifications along the river. In addition to the reasons you gave, these fortifications were also weaker than those further north because the river was an additional defensive barrier.
The Germans didn't have any insurmountable difficulties crossing the Rhine, despite the low quality of their own forces and the resistance put up by the French.
Cheers,
Sid.
I think it should be pointed out that the German troops used in Kleine Bar were of low quality. All the divisions had been created since the outbreak of war, many were manned by older WWI veterans and their artillery was largely from captured Polish and Czech stocks. They were also very short of specialist equipment and manpower.
They could only attack across the Rhine at all because the French had already withdrawn all their field formations and interval troops from the Rhine front, leaving only two very strung out fortress divisions in the Maginot fortifications along the river. In addition to the reasons you gave, these fortifications were also weaker than those further north because the river was an additional defensive barrier.
The Germans didn't have any insurmountable difficulties crossing the Rhine, despite the low quality of their own forces and the resistance put up by the French.
Cheers,
Sid.
-
Panzermeyer
- Supporter
- Posts: 53
- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
Hello Sid,
The 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID and 239.ID are 3. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen (3rd wave - the 126 infantry divisions included 9 waves), created in August 1939. There were rather decent but the infantry regiments had generally cavalry platoons instead of bicycle platoons. One artillery battalion is often missing and the AT Abteilung is often in incomplete. Like most of the first and second waves divisions, the 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID and 239.ID had an armored car platoon : 1 SdKfz 14 Funk-Kraftwagen (unarmed, open-topped radio vehicle) and 2 SdKfz 13 MG-Kraftwagen (thinly-armoured, open-topped, with minimal off-road capacity but armed with a single MG34 behind a little armoured shield). They were supported by not endivisioned artillery and strong air support.
For the 554.ID, 556.ID and 557.ID indeed these ones were static divisions created in February 1940, and equipped with many Polish and Czech field guns, by the way roughly often the same types of guns than on the French side concerning the Polish ones.
I mentioned a Gerbirgsdivision ... when I red Bruge I kept in mind that there were also mountain troops there ... of course it could not be the 6th division ... I may be wrong in that but I am too far from these books to check immediately.
The cities of Colmar, Mulhouse and Strasbourg in Alsace are occupied on 19th June.
Regards,
David
The 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID and 239.ID are 3. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen (3rd wave - the 126 infantry divisions included 9 waves), created in August 1939. There were rather decent but the infantry regiments had generally cavalry platoons instead of bicycle platoons. One artillery battalion is often missing and the AT Abteilung is often in incomplete. Like most of the first and second waves divisions, the 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID and 239.ID had an armored car platoon : 1 SdKfz 14 Funk-Kraftwagen (unarmed, open-topped radio vehicle) and 2 SdKfz 13 MG-Kraftwagen (thinly-armoured, open-topped, with minimal off-road capacity but armed with a single MG34 behind a little armoured shield). They were supported by not endivisioned artillery and strong air support.
For the 554.ID, 556.ID and 557.ID indeed these ones were static divisions created in February 1940, and equipped with many Polish and Czech field guns, by the way roughly often the same types of guns than on the French side concerning the Polish ones.
I mentioned a Gerbirgsdivision ... when I red Bruge I kept in mind that there were also mountain troops there ... of course it could not be the 6th division ... I may be wrong in that but I am too far from these books to check immediately.
The cities of Colmar, Mulhouse and Strasbourg in Alsace are occupied on 19th June.
Regards,
David
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
-
Panzermeyer
- Supporter
- Posts: 53
- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
The 6th started to form on June 1st 1940, from units culled from other Divisions.
Tessin states that the Division was under XVIII Korps/12th Army/AG'C' based at Lothruingen in July, before moving Korps in August and under 9th Army control in France. Where it stayed till November before moving to Poland
Tessin states that the Division was under XVIII Korps/12th Army/AG'C' based at Lothruingen in July, before moving Korps in August and under 9th Army control in France. Where it stayed till November before moving to Poland
You have enemies? Good. That means you've stood up for something, sometime in your life.
And so as I patrol in the valley of the shadow of the tricolour I must fear evil, For I am but mortal and mortals can only die
And so as I patrol in the valley of the shadow of the tricolour I must fear evil, For I am but mortal and mortals can only die
-
Richard Hargreaves
- Author
- Posts: 2073
- Joined: Sun Jun 01, 2003 11:30 pm
- Location: Gosport, England
-
Panzermeyer
- Supporter
- Posts: 53
- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
Hi,
Ok then for "kleiner Bär" we have 8 German divisions : 6. Gebirgsdivision, 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID, 239.ID, 554.ID, 556.ID and 557.ID. The first five divisions are good ones and the 3 last ones are second line troops. They are strongly supported by the Luftwaffe and by the artillery. The French 104e DIF (42e RIF, 28e RIF and 242e RIF) is alone to face this German assault on the Rhine between Rhinau and Neuf-Brisach on a 30 km front. There are also 5 companies in the fortifications and the 5e DBCPy (5th Chasseurs Pyrénéens half-brigade) with the 9th and 10th battalions. South of the 104e DIF there is the 105e DIF. North of the 104e DIF there is the 103e DIF but the are that is attacked is the one hold by the 104e DIF. After the 104e DIF fighting on the canal behind the Rhine and pulling back on 17th June, a 9th German division crosses the Rhine on 18th June on the hinge between the 104e DIF and the 103e DIF.
Regards,
David
Ok then for "kleiner Bär" we have 8 German divisions : 6. Gebirgsdivision, 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID, 239.ID, 554.ID, 556.ID and 557.ID. The first five divisions are good ones and the 3 last ones are second line troops. They are strongly supported by the Luftwaffe and by the artillery. The French 104e DIF (42e RIF, 28e RIF and 242e RIF) is alone to face this German assault on the Rhine between Rhinau and Neuf-Brisach on a 30 km front. There are also 5 companies in the fortifications and the 5e DBCPy (5th Chasseurs Pyrénéens half-brigade) with the 9th and 10th battalions. South of the 104e DIF there is the 105e DIF. North of the 104e DIF there is the 103e DIF but the are that is attacked is the one hold by the 104e DIF. After the 104e DIF fighting on the canal behind the Rhine and pulling back on 17th June, a 9th German division crosses the Rhine on 18th June on the hinge between the 104e DIF and the 103e DIF.
Regards,
David
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi David,
Nope. None of the German divisions you mentioned were "good ones".
Welle 1 divisions contained all the active peacetime formations. They were generally "good". None were on the Rhine front.
Welle 2 divisions consisted largely of recent reservists trained since conscription was reintroduced in the mid 1930s. None were on the Rhine front.
Welle 3 and 4 consisted largely of the younger WWI veterans, none younger than about 40. In France most of them would have been in Serie B divisions. They were mixed with younger men with limited training. Welle 3 and 4 included the 200-series divisions on the Rhine front, all of which had been assembled since the outbreak of war. 6th Mountain Division was under three weeks old!
The four 55? series divisions fell below the 200-series in efficiency. They were originally only meant to screen the Rhine and were barely intended to be mobile at all, let alone cross the Rhine.
Although there were individual good performances by French units, (and it is often forgotten that French fortress troops were considered elite units), the basic fact is that French defences were by then so thinned that even this limited German force was able to force passage of a major obstacle like the Rhine.
Cheers,
Sid.
P.S. I think the ninth German division was probably the 555th.
Nope. None of the German divisions you mentioned were "good ones".
Welle 1 divisions contained all the active peacetime formations. They were generally "good". None were on the Rhine front.
Welle 2 divisions consisted largely of recent reservists trained since conscription was reintroduced in the mid 1930s. None were on the Rhine front.
Welle 3 and 4 consisted largely of the younger WWI veterans, none younger than about 40. In France most of them would have been in Serie B divisions. They were mixed with younger men with limited training. Welle 3 and 4 included the 200-series divisions on the Rhine front, all of which had been assembled since the outbreak of war. 6th Mountain Division was under three weeks old!
The four 55? series divisions fell below the 200-series in efficiency. They were originally only meant to screen the Rhine and were barely intended to be mobile at all, let alone cross the Rhine.
Although there were individual good performances by French units, (and it is often forgotten that French fortress troops were considered elite units), the basic fact is that French defences were by then so thinned that even this limited German force was able to force passage of a major obstacle like the Rhine.
Cheers,
Sid.
P.S. I think the ninth German division was probably the 555th.
-
Panzermeyer
- Supporter
- Posts: 53
- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
Hello Sid,
I meant good ones because the 200 series is a 3rd wave divisions with rather complete equipment by the way. Remember that there are 6 other waves behind which are worse than these.
The 6th Gebirgsdivision was constituted late indeed but with good pre-existing elements.
The 9th division was indeed the 555. ID.
In the Sarre there is the highest artillery concentration of 1940 and in both the Tiger and Kleiner Bär operation 100,000 to 150,000 Germans soldiers are concentrated on a 30 km front and largely supported by the Luftwaffe. Even if the objectives are here secondary ones, considering the campaign, I would not call that a limited attack. Generally the French troops in front of them cannot be called "elite" ... and I don't agree that the creation date of a unit tells everything. But if you look at that the French troops here are not better then.
The fortress infantry divisions were the result of the reorganization of fortress troops during the spring of 1940. In all 5 were formed and were conversions of existing secteurs fortifiés and secteurs défensifs.
They were based on the infantry and artillery units already present, supplemented by engineer, signal and transport elements. They were intended to be "static" divisions with no offensive capability. Most had no service units relying on district or army level assets for medical and quartermaster services. The formed divisions were :
• 101e DIF in the Secteur Fortifié (SF) of Maubeuge
• 102e DIF is the SF of the Ardennes
• 103e DIF in the SF of the Bas-Rhin
• 104e DIF in the SF of Colmar
• 105e DIF in the SF of Mulhouse
The fortress infantry division had the following organic units :
• a HQ staff
• 1 to 4 fortress infantry, infantry, MG regiments (RIF)
• a fortress infantry training battalion (not the 102e and 105e DIF)
• a fortress divisional training center (not the 102e and 105e DIF)
• a static artillery regiment (régiment d'artillerie de position) (only one group – 12 guns – in the 104e anf 105e DIF and 2 groups – 24 guns – in the 101e DIF)
• a fortress divisional artillery park (103e DIF only)
• a fortress engineer company (2 in the 103e DIF)
• a fortress telegraph company (103e DIF only)
• a fortress radio company (103e DIF only)
• a mixed signal company (104e and 105e DIF only)
• a HQ motor transport detachment (102e DIF only)
• a divisional quartermaster group (102e and 103e DIF only)
• a divisional medical group (102e and 103e DIF only)
The RIF is often composed of :
• HQ staff
• Headquarters company
• 3 MG battalions, each with :
--o a battalion staff and command company
--o a headquarter company
--o 3 MG companies
--o 1 weapons and rifle company
But a RIF can also be organized as following :
• HQ staff
• Headquarters company
• 3 classical infantry battalions each comprising :
--o Battalion staff and command platoon
--o 3 rifle companies
--o Support company
The kind of RIF including 3 MG battalions (e.g. in the Metz fortified area) had 3474 soldiers :
• 96x officers
• 345x NCOs
• 3033x corporals and men
The total number of weapons in each regiment is in that case :
• 105x FM 24/29 LMGs
• 108x Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs
• 27x 25mm AT guns
• 18x 81mm mortars
This kind of RIF with 3 MG battalions had therefore a higher number of automatic weapons, AT guns and medium mortars than a classical RI but it had less logistics/transport capacities. The logistics equipments issued to a RIF are :
• 130x horses
• 67x wagons
• 7x liaison vehicles
• 27x trucks
• 20x Renault UE
• 67x motorcycles
• 250x bicycles
The 104e DIF was only created on 16th March 1940 and its RIF do not correspond to the strong RIF with 3 MG battalions described above.
- The 28e RIF has only 2 infantry battalions
- The 42e RIF has only 2 battalions but later an attachment of a 21st battalion
- The 242e RI is not a fortress infantry division but a classical regiment mobilized only in September 1939 - 3 battalions.
The 104e DIF has only 8 battalions. The whole division has only 12 field guns but on 1st June their is the reinforcement of 4 150mm T Fabry trench mortars from WW1. Well 16 guns on a 30 km front.
----
The Pyrenean Chasseur half-brigade (Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs Pyrénéens – DBCPyr) was a relatively new unit in the French army. In fact they did not exist as a peacetime unit but were to be mobilized in South Western France from a local regular cadre and reservists of the first reserve (30-35 years old) of the region. They were an idea of general Gamelin in response to concerns of the security of the frontier with Spain after Franco's victory, especially the possibility of foreign troops remainin g on Spanish soil. They formation was authorized in February 1939 with 5 two-battalion half-brigades to be mobilized under the command of the Détachement d'Armées de Pyrénées and were to be deployed along the frontier blocking the likely avenues of attack across the Pyrenees. However, the initial good relation between Spain and France and the departure of Italian and German troops meant these deployments were never realized. The half-brigades were progressively withdrawn from the Pyrenees, being sent to the Alp sector, replacing units that had been transferred to the North Eastern front. On 20th November 1939, the 3rd half-brigade was dissolved and its 5th anf 6th battalions were assigned to the 4th and 1st half-brigades respectively. The bataillon de chasseurs pyrénéens (BCPyr) was identical in composition to the bataillon de chasseurs alpins (BCA) except they lacked the ski scout platoon of the latter. This difference ended for the battalions of the 4th half-brigade when it was assigned to the Army of the Alps and a platoon was formed in each battalion from the SES left behind by the alpine infantry regiment that had moved north.
The initial composition of the Pyrenean Chasseur half-brigade was :
• a half-brigade HQ staff and command platoon
• 2 mountain infantry battalions each with :
--o battalion staff and command platoon
--o a headquarters company
--o 3 rifle companies
--o a support company
The choice of a command platoon for the half-brigade instead of a company like for the alpine troops was a mistake, especially for the half-brigades which had later 3 infantry battalions. The lack of signals, logistics and medical elements produced numerous problems. The lack of a weapons company produced complaints for the commanders of these units.
A pyrenean half-brigade with 3 battalions included 76 officers, 328 NCOs and 3100 corporals and men = 3414 soldier. There were also 492 horses/mules, 6 liaison vehicles, 69 trucks, 35 motorcycles and 31 bicycles.
But on the Rhine only 2 battalions are present ... and as you see they are not elite units.
-----
Concerning the groupes francs who led several counter-attacks :
the corps franc is a special infiltration and deep reconnaissance unit. It is the equivalent of the German Stosstruppen. Concerning WW2, these corps francs were created in September 1939 with specially selected volunteers at the battalion, regimental and/or divisional level. These elite troops had the mission to infiltrate behind the enemy lines, to collect information, to organize ambushes or raids and to take prisoners.
The smallest element of a corps franc is a team of 6 men called “l’équipe” (= the team) or “sizaine”. All these members of the team had a combat knife, a handgun (revolver or pistol) and many grenades for close combat. These men were usually armed with the Mousqueton (carbine) Berthier Mle1892 M16 and in each team there were usually 1-2 SMGs (typically Erma Vollmer but also MAS38 SMGs, Suomi M31 from which 150 had been sent north-east and even German captured SMGs) and 1 FM 24/29 LMG to increase the firepower (some captured MG34s were also used). Some shotguns were also used during the patrols. They carried also satchel charges if the mission required explosives. Several teams could be grouped together, for example a squad of 12 men will include 2 FM 24/29 LMGs and 2-4 SMGs and has therefore more automatic weapons than a regular infantry squad. The bigger unit including several teams is called the “groupe franc” (or “trentaine”) with 5 teams (30 men), it corresponds roughly to a platoon. The “groupe franc” is generaly commanded by a lieutenant and is completely autonomous. Several “groupes francs” can be grouped for a specific mission into a “groupement franc”. Such a “groupement franc” includes usually a maximum of 6 “groupes francs” (180 men), roughly a company.
Regards,
David
I meant good ones because the 200 series is a 3rd wave divisions with rather complete equipment by the way. Remember that there are 6 other waves behind which are worse than these.
The 6th Gebirgsdivision was constituted late indeed but with good pre-existing elements.
The 9th division was indeed the 555. ID.
In the Sarre there is the highest artillery concentration of 1940 and in both the Tiger and Kleiner Bär operation 100,000 to 150,000 Germans soldiers are concentrated on a 30 km front and largely supported by the Luftwaffe. Even if the objectives are here secondary ones, considering the campaign, I would not call that a limited attack. Generally the French troops in front of them cannot be called "elite" ... and I don't agree that the creation date of a unit tells everything. But if you look at that the French troops here are not better then.
The fortress infantry divisions were the result of the reorganization of fortress troops during the spring of 1940. In all 5 were formed and were conversions of existing secteurs fortifiés and secteurs défensifs.
They were based on the infantry and artillery units already present, supplemented by engineer, signal and transport elements. They were intended to be "static" divisions with no offensive capability. Most had no service units relying on district or army level assets for medical and quartermaster services. The formed divisions were :
• 101e DIF in the Secteur Fortifié (SF) of Maubeuge
• 102e DIF is the SF of the Ardennes
• 103e DIF in the SF of the Bas-Rhin
• 104e DIF in the SF of Colmar
• 105e DIF in the SF of Mulhouse
The fortress infantry division had the following organic units :
• a HQ staff
• 1 to 4 fortress infantry, infantry, MG regiments (RIF)
• a fortress infantry training battalion (not the 102e and 105e DIF)
• a fortress divisional training center (not the 102e and 105e DIF)
• a static artillery regiment (régiment d'artillerie de position) (only one group – 12 guns – in the 104e anf 105e DIF and 2 groups – 24 guns – in the 101e DIF)
• a fortress divisional artillery park (103e DIF only)
• a fortress engineer company (2 in the 103e DIF)
• a fortress telegraph company (103e DIF only)
• a fortress radio company (103e DIF only)
• a mixed signal company (104e and 105e DIF only)
• a HQ motor transport detachment (102e DIF only)
• a divisional quartermaster group (102e and 103e DIF only)
• a divisional medical group (102e and 103e DIF only)
The RIF is often composed of :
• HQ staff
• Headquarters company
• 3 MG battalions, each with :
--o a battalion staff and command company
--o a headquarter company
--o 3 MG companies
--o 1 weapons and rifle company
But a RIF can also be organized as following :
• HQ staff
• Headquarters company
• 3 classical infantry battalions each comprising :
--o Battalion staff and command platoon
--o 3 rifle companies
--o Support company
The kind of RIF including 3 MG battalions (e.g. in the Metz fortified area) had 3474 soldiers :
• 96x officers
• 345x NCOs
• 3033x corporals and men
The total number of weapons in each regiment is in that case :
• 105x FM 24/29 LMGs
• 108x Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs
• 27x 25mm AT guns
• 18x 81mm mortars
This kind of RIF with 3 MG battalions had therefore a higher number of automatic weapons, AT guns and medium mortars than a classical RI but it had less logistics/transport capacities. The logistics equipments issued to a RIF are :
• 130x horses
• 67x wagons
• 7x liaison vehicles
• 27x trucks
• 20x Renault UE
• 67x motorcycles
• 250x bicycles
The 104e DIF was only created on 16th March 1940 and its RIF do not correspond to the strong RIF with 3 MG battalions described above.
- The 28e RIF has only 2 infantry battalions
- The 42e RIF has only 2 battalions but later an attachment of a 21st battalion
- The 242e RI is not a fortress infantry division but a classical regiment mobilized only in September 1939 - 3 battalions.
The 104e DIF has only 8 battalions. The whole division has only 12 field guns but on 1st June their is the reinforcement of 4 150mm T Fabry trench mortars from WW1. Well 16 guns on a 30 km front.
----
The Pyrenean Chasseur half-brigade (Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs Pyrénéens – DBCPyr) was a relatively new unit in the French army. In fact they did not exist as a peacetime unit but were to be mobilized in South Western France from a local regular cadre and reservists of the first reserve (30-35 years old) of the region. They were an idea of general Gamelin in response to concerns of the security of the frontier with Spain after Franco's victory, especially the possibility of foreign troops remainin g on Spanish soil. They formation was authorized in February 1939 with 5 two-battalion half-brigades to be mobilized under the command of the Détachement d'Armées de Pyrénées and were to be deployed along the frontier blocking the likely avenues of attack across the Pyrenees. However, the initial good relation between Spain and France and the departure of Italian and German troops meant these deployments were never realized. The half-brigades were progressively withdrawn from the Pyrenees, being sent to the Alp sector, replacing units that had been transferred to the North Eastern front. On 20th November 1939, the 3rd half-brigade was dissolved and its 5th anf 6th battalions were assigned to the 4th and 1st half-brigades respectively. The bataillon de chasseurs pyrénéens (BCPyr) was identical in composition to the bataillon de chasseurs alpins (BCA) except they lacked the ski scout platoon of the latter. This difference ended for the battalions of the 4th half-brigade when it was assigned to the Army of the Alps and a platoon was formed in each battalion from the SES left behind by the alpine infantry regiment that had moved north.
The initial composition of the Pyrenean Chasseur half-brigade was :
• a half-brigade HQ staff and command platoon
• 2 mountain infantry battalions each with :
--o battalion staff and command platoon
--o a headquarters company
--o 3 rifle companies
--o a support company
The choice of a command platoon for the half-brigade instead of a company like for the alpine troops was a mistake, especially for the half-brigades which had later 3 infantry battalions. The lack of signals, logistics and medical elements produced numerous problems. The lack of a weapons company produced complaints for the commanders of these units.
A pyrenean half-brigade with 3 battalions included 76 officers, 328 NCOs and 3100 corporals and men = 3414 soldier. There were also 492 horses/mules, 6 liaison vehicles, 69 trucks, 35 motorcycles and 31 bicycles.
But on the Rhine only 2 battalions are present ... and as you see they are not elite units.
-----
Concerning the groupes francs who led several counter-attacks :
the corps franc is a special infiltration and deep reconnaissance unit. It is the equivalent of the German Stosstruppen. Concerning WW2, these corps francs were created in September 1939 with specially selected volunteers at the battalion, regimental and/or divisional level. These elite troops had the mission to infiltrate behind the enemy lines, to collect information, to organize ambushes or raids and to take prisoners.
The smallest element of a corps franc is a team of 6 men called “l’équipe” (= the team) or “sizaine”. All these members of the team had a combat knife, a handgun (revolver or pistol) and many grenades for close combat. These men were usually armed with the Mousqueton (carbine) Berthier Mle1892 M16 and in each team there were usually 1-2 SMGs (typically Erma Vollmer but also MAS38 SMGs, Suomi M31 from which 150 had been sent north-east and even German captured SMGs) and 1 FM 24/29 LMG to increase the firepower (some captured MG34s were also used). Some shotguns were also used during the patrols. They carried also satchel charges if the mission required explosives. Several teams could be grouped together, for example a squad of 12 men will include 2 FM 24/29 LMGs and 2-4 SMGs and has therefore more automatic weapons than a regular infantry squad. The bigger unit including several teams is called the “groupe franc” (or “trentaine”) with 5 teams (30 men), it corresponds roughly to a platoon. The “groupe franc” is generaly commanded by a lieutenant and is completely autonomous. Several “groupes francs” can be grouped for a specific mission into a “groupement franc”. Such a “groupement franc” includes usually a maximum of 6 “groupes francs” (180 men), roughly a company.
Regards,
David
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi David,
Fascinating stuff! I shall print off all your extremely informative last post.
Regarding the "eliteness" or otherwise of the French fortress troops. It is my understanding that they were regarded as high grade technical units and got the pick of many of the best conscripts in the 1930s, in much the same way as the Germans gave the panzerwaffe better class conscripts.
The actual creation of the fortress divisions was essentially administrative. They were combinations of longstanding, pre-existing Fortified Sectors. This is rather different from new German divisions such as 6th Mountain Division, which was a very recent creation in its entirety.
The real problem for the French was that all the major field formations allocated to the Rhine front, which were meant to act as interval troops and counter-attack forces between the fortifications, had been withdrawn to face the Germans to their rear. As a result the fortifications were extremely isolated and only minor local counter-attack forces were available. As I mentioned before, a good number of French units seem to have fought well on the Rhine, but they were little more than a heavily outnumbered screen and were not really capable of repulsing even the second rate attack force the Germans used in Kleine Bar.
Cheers,
Sid.
Fascinating stuff! I shall print off all your extremely informative last post.
Regarding the "eliteness" or otherwise of the French fortress troops. It is my understanding that they were regarded as high grade technical units and got the pick of many of the best conscripts in the 1930s, in much the same way as the Germans gave the panzerwaffe better class conscripts.
The actual creation of the fortress divisions was essentially administrative. They were combinations of longstanding, pre-existing Fortified Sectors. This is rather different from new German divisions such as 6th Mountain Division, which was a very recent creation in its entirety.
The real problem for the French was that all the major field formations allocated to the Rhine front, which were meant to act as interval troops and counter-attack forces between the fortifications, had been withdrawn to face the Germans to their rear. As a result the fortifications were extremely isolated and only minor local counter-attack forces were available. As I mentioned before, a good number of French units seem to have fought well on the Rhine, but they were little more than a heavily outnumbered screen and were not really capable of repulsing even the second rate attack force the Germans used in Kleine Bar.
Cheers,
Sid.
-
Laurent Daniel
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 546
- Joined: Sun Apr 03, 2005 7:29 am
- Location: Bangkok, Thailand
Why the French lost in such a short time?
Hi everybody,
I have a strong belief: The German invasion of France was successful in a short period of time because the French Army was lead by high level officers who were incapable to adapt it to modern warfare, themselves placed at those key posts by politicians unable to foresee the tactical changes.
Let's have a look at the history of Charles de Gaulle before his flight to England and the creation of the Free French Forces:
Charles de Gaulle fought in World War One and was wounded and taken prisoner at Verdun in 1916. During the Polish-Soviet war in 1919-1920, he volunteered to be a member of the French Military Mission to Poland and was an infantry instructor with the Polish army. He fought and distinguished himself in fighting near the river Zbrucz and received the highest Polish military award, Virtuti Militari. He was promoted to major and offered possibility of a further career in Poland, but chose instead to return to France. He was heavily influenced by that war, namely by the use of tanks, fast manoeuvres and lack of trenches.
De Gaulle published several books before WW2, the main one being “Vers l'Armée de Métier”, published in English as "The Army of the Future" while in fact the French title means “towards a professional army”. There, he supported the new ideas of mechanized troops and specialized armored divisions in preference to the static theories exemplified by the Maginot Line, as well as professional volunteers army in preference to conscripts.
Ironically, Heinz Guderian is usually credited with creating what was to be known as Blitzkrieg in World War Two. However, the ideas of men such as Charles de Gaulle and Britain’s Captain Liddell-Hart tend to be overlooked when looking at the background to Blitzkrieg. Whereas Guderian was given Hitler’s full support once he got to power in 1933, de Gaulle found that his ideas were not seized on by the French High Command – a similar experience to Liddell-Hart.
While Heinz Guderian and the German Army General Staff were influenced by de Gaulle, Pétain, French Army Chief of Staff at that time, rejected most of de Gaulle's theories, and the relationship between them became strained. French politicians also dismissed de Gaulle's theories with the notable exception of Paul Reynaud who would later play a major role in de Gaulle's career.
At the outbreak of World War II he was only Colonel of an armored regiment, having encountered hostility from the leaders of the military all through the 1920's and 1930's due to his bold views. All his men were calling him “Colonel Motor”.
After the German breakthrough at Sedan on May 10, 1940, he was finally given command of the 4th Armored Division, the 4eme DCR, created from an assembly of armored regiments and units, that went to combat with few days of training.
Except De Gaulle, none of the officers had a clear idea about an armored division tactical management.
On May 17, 1940 de Gaulle attacked the German 10th Panzer Division (Guderian Panzer army group) at Montcornet. They first overcame German anti-tank positions. But with only 200 French tanks and no air support, the offensive had little impact on stopping the German advance and the 4eme DCR had to retreat under severe air attacks from Ju-87 bombers.
There was more success on May 28, when de Gaulle's tanks forced the German Panzers to retreat at Caumont. He became the first and only French commanding officer to force the German Panzers to retreat during the invasion of France. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud promoted him provisional brigadier general (thus his title Général de Gaulle) and on June 6 appointed him as War Secretary of State.
Too little, too late.
It remind me of a French joke, coming from those stories:
The President: Will you win that war, General?
The General: Up to you, Mr. President...
The conventional anglo-saxon joke about French soldiers raising arms while brand new never used riffles are falling on the ground should be replaced by the joke about French politicians raising arms while brand new never used tactical plans are falling on the Ministries floor
I have a strong belief: The German invasion of France was successful in a short period of time because the French Army was lead by high level officers who were incapable to adapt it to modern warfare, themselves placed at those key posts by politicians unable to foresee the tactical changes.
Let's have a look at the history of Charles de Gaulle before his flight to England and the creation of the Free French Forces:
Charles de Gaulle fought in World War One and was wounded and taken prisoner at Verdun in 1916. During the Polish-Soviet war in 1919-1920, he volunteered to be a member of the French Military Mission to Poland and was an infantry instructor with the Polish army. He fought and distinguished himself in fighting near the river Zbrucz and received the highest Polish military award, Virtuti Militari. He was promoted to major and offered possibility of a further career in Poland, but chose instead to return to France. He was heavily influenced by that war, namely by the use of tanks, fast manoeuvres and lack of trenches.
De Gaulle published several books before WW2, the main one being “Vers l'Armée de Métier”, published in English as "The Army of the Future" while in fact the French title means “towards a professional army”. There, he supported the new ideas of mechanized troops and specialized armored divisions in preference to the static theories exemplified by the Maginot Line, as well as professional volunteers army in preference to conscripts.
Ironically, Heinz Guderian is usually credited with creating what was to be known as Blitzkrieg in World War Two. However, the ideas of men such as Charles de Gaulle and Britain’s Captain Liddell-Hart tend to be overlooked when looking at the background to Blitzkrieg. Whereas Guderian was given Hitler’s full support once he got to power in 1933, de Gaulle found that his ideas were not seized on by the French High Command – a similar experience to Liddell-Hart.
While Heinz Guderian and the German Army General Staff were influenced by de Gaulle, Pétain, French Army Chief of Staff at that time, rejected most of de Gaulle's theories, and the relationship between them became strained. French politicians also dismissed de Gaulle's theories with the notable exception of Paul Reynaud who would later play a major role in de Gaulle's career.
At the outbreak of World War II he was only Colonel of an armored regiment, having encountered hostility from the leaders of the military all through the 1920's and 1930's due to his bold views. All his men were calling him “Colonel Motor”.
After the German breakthrough at Sedan on May 10, 1940, he was finally given command of the 4th Armored Division, the 4eme DCR, created from an assembly of armored regiments and units, that went to combat with few days of training.
Except De Gaulle, none of the officers had a clear idea about an armored division tactical management.
On May 17, 1940 de Gaulle attacked the German 10th Panzer Division (Guderian Panzer army group) at Montcornet. They first overcame German anti-tank positions. But with only 200 French tanks and no air support, the offensive had little impact on stopping the German advance and the 4eme DCR had to retreat under severe air attacks from Ju-87 bombers.
There was more success on May 28, when de Gaulle's tanks forced the German Panzers to retreat at Caumont. He became the first and only French commanding officer to force the German Panzers to retreat during the invasion of France. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud promoted him provisional brigadier general (thus his title Général de Gaulle) and on June 6 appointed him as War Secretary of State.
Too little, too late.
It remind me of a French joke, coming from those stories:
The President: Will you win that war, General?
The General: Up to you, Mr. President...
The conventional anglo-saxon joke about French soldiers raising arms while brand new never used riffles are falling on the ground should be replaced by the joke about French politicians raising arms while brand new never used tactical plans are falling on the Ministries floor
Regards
Daniel Laurent
Daniel Laurent