Combat actions North of Kiev from November 3 to 6.

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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castro323
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Combat actions North of Kiev from November 3 to 6.

Post by castro323 » Fri May 26, 2017 10:44 am

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From the book Battle of Dnepr 1943 by V. Goncharov
В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г

Combat actions in north of Kiev

Fights on 3 November.
At 8 hours on 3 November the troops of the 60th and 38th Armies began artillery preparation.
At 8:40 the infantry and tanks of direct support went over to the attack.
Despite the fierce fire resistance of the enemy and his furious counterattacks,
the troops of both armies broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced 5-12 km.

On the sites of the 17th and 18th Guards Rifle Corps,
the 60th Army conducted private battles to improve its positions.
The 77th Rifle Corps of the Army broke through the enemy's defense at the front of 3 km,
occupied the settlement of Sychevka and advanced westward by 4 km.
The 24th and 30th Rifle Corps, which dealt the main blow,
broke through the enemy's defenses on the front 18 km,
occupied the settlements of Fedorovka, Rovy, Rostesno, Glebovka and
by the end of the day they engaged in battles near the northern outskirts of Dymer.
The 30th Rifle Corps in the second half of the day brought into battle its second echelon -
the 141st Rifle Division.

The 38th Army broke through the enemy's defense in the sector of the 50th Rifle Corps and
on the right flank of the 51st Rifle Corps at the front 10 km.
After moving for 7 km, the army units seized the village of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
In the center and on the left flank of the 51st Rifle Corps, and especially in the Vyshgorod area,
the enemy resisted stubbornly and held back the advance of our units.
Thus, the army's connections on the narrow front broke through only the first position of the
enemy's defense and started battles for the second position in the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa area.

The artillery preparation of the attack in both armies (and especially in the 38th)
on the main attack directions was exceptionally powerful and effective.
In the first hours after the artillery preparation from the enemy's side,
only individual guns and mortars fired.
The first 2 km of the attacking infantry passed, without encountering any special resistance.
The organized artillery fire of the Germans began only in the afternoon.

Due to the large forest cover of the area,
during the whole day in the zone of both armies they were mostly forest battles.
This greatly complicated the offensive.
So, for example, in the forest near Fedorovka and Rostesno the enemy planted "kukushek"
with automatic weapons on the trees, delaying the advance of our infantry.
For combing the forest, small-caliber antiaircraft artillery batteries, anti-tank guns and
anti-aircraft machine guns were used.

A change of fire positions was made simultaneously by one-third of the entire artillery.
In the 60th Army, part of the artillery began to change the OP immediately
after the artillery preparation and moved to the artillery NP areas.
These batteries have greatly helped in solving the firing problems,
which appeared with the beginning of the attack of the infantry.

The 7th Artillery Corps accompanied the infantry with wheels
by only two combined brigades (one per rifle corps).
Consolidated brigades were composed of divisions and regiments,
which were armed with various calibers.
One composite brigade consisted of
two divisions of 152-mm howitzers, two divisions of 122-mm howitzers,
a division of 203-mm howitzers and a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The other brigade consisted of two divisions of 152-mm howitzers,
a regiment of 122-mm howitzers, a regiment of 76-mm guns and
a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The allocation of such improvised brigades was caused by
the need to have various calibers of artillery and
a lack of thrust in the artillery corps to accompany the infantry and tanks.
The bulk of the artillery supported the offensive of infantry from the main firing positions.
As a characteristic combat episode,
it is necessary to note the concentration of the fire of the entire artillery corps in one area.
This concentration of fire was twice carried out by the enemy's resistance units during
the battle of our infantry in the depth of defense.
In the first case, the fire was concentrated on the southern outskirts of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa,
and in the second - at an altitude 153.8 southeast of the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa (map 50 000).
As a result of powerful fire strikes, enemy resistance in these areas was quickly broken.

On the first day of the offensive, the 60th and 38th armies repelled five counterattacks of
infantry and enemy tanks in different sectors,
which he undertook with the help of his tactical reserves.
As a result of the day, the enemy suffered great losses,
a significant amount of military equipment was seized,
550 people were taken prisoner, among them several officers.
Interrogation of the prisoners and the study of captured documents confirmed
the former enemy grouping in the area.

On the first day of the offensive north of Kiev, the enemy began to hastily pull up reserves and
parts removed from other areas to the breakout area.
The aerial reconnaissance of the front detected the movement of columns of tanks and
motor vehicles (altogether 215 tanks and assault guns and up to 400 motor vehicles)
from the south to the north from the districts of the Beloy Tserkvi, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.
On the first day of the offensive in the band of the 38th Army,
the enemy put in the fight part of the 20th Motorized Division and
drew the 8th Tank Division to the area of Dymer.

The 2nd Air Army conducted intense combat activity on the first day of the operation.
Before the attack on the Lyutezh bridgehead on the night of 3 November,
light night bombers fired 207 sorties to destroy the enemy's manpower in the districts of
Goryanka and Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
Because of the dense morning mist covering the territory east of the Dnieper,
where our airfields were located, the front aviation did not lead up to 10 hours of combat work.
The first sorties of fighters to cover the troops began at 10:20,
and the actions of the Sturmovik at 10:40.
Later on, during the whole day, the actions of the front aviation were very intensive.
The day was produced 938 sorties, including ground attack planes and
bombers produced 545 sorties, fighters - 174 sorties to cover the troops and
212 sorties to accompany attack planes and bombers,
the remaining sorties were carried out for reconnaissance purposes.

The Sturmovik operated in groups of 6-22 aircraft, and bombers - in groups of 14-24 aircraft.
Departures of groups were made with 5-10 minute intervals.
In total, there were 26 groups of attack planes and 5 groups of bombers.
The first echelon of aviation was struck during the period from 11:00 to 12:30,
the second from 13:50 to 14:40 and the third from 15:50 to 17:00.
In the first echelon, 171 ground-attack planes operated under the cover of 66 fighters,
in the second - 151 attack aircraft, 58 bombers and 59 fighters, and
in the third - 133 attack aircraft, 32 bombers and 48 fighters.
The blows were inflicted on the enemy infantry, as acting in battle formations,
and on a campaign, on artillery on firing positions and on tanks in areas of settlements
Goryanka, Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa and Priorka.

After the appearance of the first echelon of Sturmovik and fighters over the battlefield,
the enemy sharply increased the number of his fighters in the breakout zone.
The fighters accompanying our attack planes and bombers
repeatedly had to engage in fierce air battles.

The Bombing aviation of the enemy during the day in groups of 3 to 37 aircraft
bombed our troops on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
During the day, 286 sorties were flown by airplanes of all types of enemy aviation.
The fighters of the 2nd Air Army on this day covered the ground troops
on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
In the patrol area, there were simultaneously 2-3 groups of 8-10 planes each.
The patrol was continuous from 10:20 to 17:45.

During the day, fighters shielded the troops and escorted the Sturmovik and
bombers conducted 36 air battles,
In which 31 enemy planes were shot down -
13 bombers, 16 fighters and, 2 reconnaissance aircraft.

Their tasks the 60th and 38th armies were not fully implemented.
This created a threat of delaying the operation.
The presence of the 7th, 8th Tank and 20th Motorized Divisions in the nearest reserve
meant that battles on the approaches to Kiev on 4 November could take exceptionally
fierce character and that infantry of the 38th Army,
weakly saturated with infantry support tanks, would experience great difficulties.
The front commander insistently demanded the 60th Army
to increase the pace of the offensive and, at all costs, to fulfill the task of the day.
The success of the 38th Army in the Kiev direction also
largely depended on the success of this army.

The control of the battle in the corps-division on the first day of the operation
was not clear enough - primarily because of the unstable operation of the connection.
So, for example, with the beginning of the offensive after the first change of command and
observation posts, wire communication from the regiment to the corps
was not restored within twenty hours.

The Stavka Supreme High Command gave great importance
to the operation in the region of Kiev.
On the very first day of its beginning,
a telegram was sent to the commander of the front (cipher telegram No. 125485),
in which Stavka ordered
the operation begun on the right wing of the front not to be delayed,
since every extra day gives an advantage only to the enemy,
allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads,
whereas the roads destroyed by the Germans in our location make it difficult and
restrict the maneuver.
Stavka demanded not later than 5 November to cut the Kiev-Korosten railway
east or west of the Irpin' river, depending on the situation and
not later than 5-6 November to seize Kiev.
Stavka indicated that the Kiev bridgehead is the most important and
most advantageous of the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper River,
which is of the utmost importance for the expulsion of Germans from the right-bank Ukraine.

В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г

castro323
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Combat actions in north of Kiev from November 3 to 6.

Post by castro323 » Fri May 26, 2017 11:28 am

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castro323
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Posts: 89
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Combat actions in north of Kiev from November 3 to 6.

Post by castro323 » Fri May 26, 2017 11:33 am

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At dawn on 4 November.
The commander of the front specified the tasks of the armies of the shock group.

The 60th Army was tasked with:
From the morning of 4 November to continue the impetuous offensive,
the 3rd Guards Airborne Division was put into battle
and by the end of the day to the front of Manuil'sk, Osikovo, Vladimirovka,
Rudnya Dymerskaya, Katyuzhanka, Nikol'sky, Tarasovshchina, Sinyak;
By the end of 5 November, the army units had to go to the front
Katyuzhanka, Filippovichi, Novaya Greblya, Dachi Klavdiyevo, Dachi Kicheyev, Irpen'.

The 38th Army was ordered:
to take operationally the 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army,
to enter into battle the 23rd Rifle Corps with 39th Tank Regiment and 6th Guards Tank Corps,
using the latter to support infantry of the 50th Rifle Corps.
By the end of 4 November, the formations of the 50th Rifle Corps were to leave for the front
Mostishche, Shevchenko, Bobritsa, Malyutyanka, Yankovichi.
At the same time, the formations of the 51st Rifle Corps, by the end of 5 November,
were to liberate Kiev and go to the front of
Yankovichi, Khodosovka (island), the island of Kazachy.

The 3rd Guards Tank Army was ordered to leave the Boyarka-Budayevka area,
Veta Pochtovaya, Khotov, Zhulyany by the end of 4 November, and by the end of 5 November - to the Plesetskoye, Vasil'kov, and Glevakha areas.
On 5 November, the 6th Guards Tank Corps should be returned to the army.
On 4 November, the front commander directly addressed to the corps commanders of
the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Corps
sent a telegram with an assessment of the general situation in the Kiev area on 4 November.
In addition, the following instructions were given in the telegram:
"The successful fulfillment of the task depends primarily on the swiftness, courage and
determination of your actions. Your task is to accomplish the tasks assigned to you in the
shortest possible time, for which, without fear of breaking away from the infantry,
boldly destroy individual enemy pockets, to cause panic among the enemy troops.
Rapidly pursue them so that by the morning of 5.11.43 we will be occupied by Kiev. Commanders of all degrees should be with their own units and personally lead them to
accomplish the task."


Fights on 4 November.
On this day, the 60th and 38th Armies resumed their offensive.
The 60th Army began combat with the left-flank units of the 77th Rifle Corps and
on the entire front of the 24th and 30th Rifle Corps.
By the end of the day, the army advanced 2-6 km, seized the villages of
Manuil'sk, Alekseyevka, Dymer, Kozarovichi.
The enemy, pulling up new forces, often counterattacked.
In the second half of the day, the 60th Army repulsed the enemy's repeated attempts
to restore the situation in the Dymer area.
In counterattacks in this direction participated 8th Tank Division of the Germans with
five battalions of infantry.

The 38th Army resumed the offensive at 10 hours on 4 November.
On its site there were units of the 7th Tank Division of the Germans.
During the day, the army's combined forces, having repelled four counterattacks of the enemy,
advanced 5 km, seized the settlements of Berkovets, Vyshgorod and
reached the outskirts of Priorki (a suburb of Kiev).
The success of the 60th Army in the area of Dymer and Kozarovichi
allowed the commander of the 38th Army to remove the 340th Division
from the right flank of the army and send it to the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa area
to strengthen the strike group.
In the division's strip there was only a cover.

The enemy was the strongest counter-attack in the band of the 38th Army
on that day in the southern part of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
Here, he even managed to first take possession of the district Detsky sanatorium,
where in the conditions of semi-encirclement
the 20th Guards Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards Tank Corps and
one regiment of the 136th Rifle Division fought.

In connection with the strong resistance of the enemy,
the commander of the 38th Army on that day led the whole composition
of the 5th Guards Tank Corps into battle.

The 3rd Guards Tank Army at 10:30 began to advance to the starting position
to enter the breakthrough.
The fighting order of the army was constructed as follows.
In the first echelon of the army, the 9th Mechanized Corps came forward with the task,
overtaking the infantry, by the end of the day to seize the area of
Shevchenko, Korytishchi, Dal'ny Yar.
The 6th Guards Tank Corps, having attached the 52nd and 53rd Guards Tank Brigades
to the commanders of the 167th and 136th Rife Divisions for operations with infantry
as direct support tanks,
the remaining forces also advanced in the first echelon of the army with the task of
overtaking the infantry and by the end of the day to seize the area
Zabor'ye, Malyutyanka, Boyarka-Budayevka.
Behind him came the 7th Guards Tank Corps,
which by the end of the day was to take possession of the villages of
Glevakha, Markhalevka, Veta Pochtovaya.
The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps received the task by the end of 5 November to seize
the Yurov area on the Zhitomir Highway (8 km to the south-west from Makarov),
which radically changed its original task -
to advance along the right bank of the Irpen' River to Fastov.
The task set by the tank army was not fulfilled.
The 6th and 7th Guards Tank Corps were drawn into the battle and
interrupted the enemy's defense together with the infantry.

Initially, only the 6th Guards Tank Corps took part in the battle,
the tanks of which operated in the combat formations of the infantry of the
167th and 136th Rifle Divisions.
The 7th Guards Tank Corps overtook its combat formations and at 13:30 seized Berkovtsom.
By 23 hours on 4 November, separate units of the 7th Guards Tank Corps reached
the northern outskirts of Svyatoshino and on the Kiev-Zhitomir highway,
where they fought the whole night all night with the enemy.
The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps in the afternoon of 4 November ended the crossing of the Dnieper and concentrated in the forest east of Rakovka.
Aviation of the front due to bad weather produced flights only by single aircraft.

The incoming fighters and officers of the front saw the glow of fires in Kiev.
Encouraged by the aspiration to snatch the capital of Soviet Ukraine
from the hands of the fascist invaders as soon as possible and
to prevent the enemy from destroying the city,
the front forces conducted offensive battles continuously on 5 November,
throughout the day of 5 November and at night on 6 November.

The enemy retreated to the west and south-west, clinging stubbornly to each advantageous line.
Air reconnaissance of the front reported on the flow of vehicles from Kiev
in the western and south-western directions.
In some areas,
the enemy counterattacked force to the infantry regiment with several dozen tanks.

The plan for the operation was to force the Dnieper to be moved south of Kiev
by a single combined division.
The representative of the Stavka Marshal G.K. Zhukov at 20:46 on 2 November
telegraphed the commander of the front in connection with the failure of
the 40th and 27th armies and the success of the 38th Army to take from
the 40th and 27th armies two divisions,
to transport to the right bank of the Dnieper south of Kiev not one, but three divisions,
than to render assistance to the 38th Army in the quickest mastery of Kiev.

As a result of the second day of the operation,
the troops of the 60th, 38th, and 3rd Guards Tank Armies did not fulfill their tasks.
As a result of the introduction of reserves by the enemy,
the battles took exceptionally fierce character.
One of the main reasons for the slow progress of the 38th Army was the circumstance that the
army commander, encountering strong resistance from the enemy, slightly increased the strike,
although he had in his second echelon two rifle corps.
The commander of the front on 4 November demanded the introduction of the 23rd Rifle Corps.
However, the corps moved out of the second echelon,
deployed very slowly and did not actually take part in the battle that day.

В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г

castro323
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Posts: 89
Joined: Fri Dec 18, 2009 7:34 pm
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Re: Combat actions North of Kiev from November 3 to 6.

Post by castro323 » Sat Jun 10, 2017 12:40 pm

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Kiev Offensive Operation
November 3 situation.

Image


38th Army

13th Artillery Breakthrough Division : (fire support for the 50th Rifle Corps)
----101st High Power Howitzer Artillery Brigade (203-mm)
----24th Guards Cannon Artillery Brigade (152-mm)
----88th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade (122-mm)
----47th Howitzer Artillery Brigade (122-mm)
----42nd Light Artillery Brigade (76-mm)
----17th Mortar Brigade (120-mm)
total guns =
23 x 203-mm , 62 x 152-mm , 78 x 122-mm , 70 x 76-mm , 99 x 120-mm

17th Artillery Breakthrough Division : (fire support for the 51st Rifle Corps)
----108th High Power Howitzer Artillery Brigade (203-mm)
----39th Cannon Artillery Brigade (152-mm)
----92nd Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade (122-mm)
----50th Howitzer Artillery Brigade (122-mm)
----37th Light Artillery Brigade (76-mm)
----22nd Mortar Brigade (120-mm)
total guns =
24 x 203-mm , 61 x 152-mm , 73 x 122-mm , 62 x 76-mm , 90 x 120-mm

50th Rifle Corps :
----163rd Rifle Division (west flank of 50 RC)
----232nd Rifle Division (middle)
----167th Rifle Division (east flank of 50 RC)
----39th Separate Tank Regiment (approx. 15 x T-34)
----21st Guards Tank Brigade (approx. 20 x T-34)
----48th Guards Tank Breakthrough Regiment (approx. 10 x Mk.III Churchill)
----6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade
The 50th RC planned route for 3.11. :
Moshchun - Goryanka - Dachi Pushcha Voditsa - Berkovets - Svytoshino

51st Rifle Corps :
----136th Rifle Division (west flank of 51 RC)
----240th Rifle Division (middle)
----180th Rifle Division (east flank of 51 RC)
----20th Guards Tank Brigade (approx. 20 x T-34)
----22nd Guards Tank Brigade (approx. 20 x T-34)
----1st Czechoslovakian Brigade (approx. 20 x T-34)
The 51st RC planned route for 3.11. :
Vyshgorod - Priorka - Syrets

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