Pioneer weapons.

[JohnWilliam88]

Hi,

Thanks for that info, Roger.

Does anyone know how many men were in the companies (13,14,15) compared with the panzer grenadier companies (is this right or was every man in a pz.gren.rgt considered a panzer grenadier) also how many men would have been in the heavy companies (4,8,12).

Do these numbers depend on the number of weapons in the company?

for example 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 5.3.45.

Ist: 57/431/2304

4th and 8th companies have 3 Pak and 3 lmg's,
12th company has 2 pak, do these companies only include the guns and their crews or other infantry as well?

1st company has 11 stg and 4 lmg, 2nd company has 11 stg, 8 lmg and 3 panzerschrecks.
Would the 2nd company have had more men because it had more weapons or would they have roughly similar numbers?

My question is basically how were the 2792 men organised in the 15 companies.

Did the companies have different numbers of platoons depending on the number of men?

Thanks,

any help is always appreciated.

John.

[weasel_fierce]

some sources indicate that engineers were issued larger numbers of submachine guns than regular units, particularly those intended for assault roles.

Is this realistic or ?

[JohnWilliam88]

Hi,

I'm not sure about the machine pistols as far as I know they were only issued to Officers, NCO's or assistant leaders. but probably to other troops if there were enough to go around. I can't really comment about the engineers, (I have not seen any late war kstns for pioneer troops) hopefully someone else can...

There is an order to the 2.SS Panzergrenadier Regiment about the organisation of weapons and personel within the companies prior to Wacht am Rhein, basically it says that they should be distributed by proportion and that any remaining should be made avaliable to fill gaps in other units...

Does anyone know if this would have happened on other dates or just have been a "one-off" ?

Thanks,

John.

[V. Andries]

There is an order to the 2.SS Panzergrenadier Regiment about the organisation of weapons and personel within the companies prior to Wacht am Rhein, basically it says that they should be distributed by proportion and that any remaining should be made avaliable to fill gaps in other units...

Hi John,

Could you tell us a little more about this order? Did it apply to personal weapons too?

I'm eager to find out whether during Wacht am Rhein, armoured units like 1.SS had enough StG44 around to bring the 'Sturmzug concept' (see late war KStN's) into practice.
Did you by any chance come across the number of StG44 available to 1.SS during Wacht am Rhein?
If 1.SS would have had a relatively low number of StG44, an order such as this would probably have meant that the Sturmzug concept was not brought into practise, as an equal proportion would have deprived any possible existing Sturmzug of its necessary amount of StG44.

Thanks,

Andries

[JohnWilliam88]

Hi,

A couple of lines from the order:

"Gaps in pesonnel, armament and outfit of vehicles will be remedied within the units from their own resources through equilization of distribution."

"The assignment of personnel is in every respect to accord with the outfit of weapons."

It goes on to say that all superfluous personnel are to report to regiment and that all superfluous weapons and equipent are to be haded over to regiment.

The idea of the order is to make the regiment as battle ready as possible.

Does anyone know what "LSSAH"/Ia/Tgb. Nr. 558/44 geh.Kdos. is?

I do know how many Sturmgewehr "LSSAH" had before Wacht am Rhein or at least on the 3.12.44 according to Ia Nr 548/44 g

They are listed as Masch. Karab. (Maschine Karbiner). The number of Sturmgewehr is 418.

Since Wacht am Rhein was launched on the 16th it is possible they aquired more?

According to the above mentioned order replenishment of equipent should have been completed on the 9th.

As for sturmzuge I don't know, what I can tell you is that each Panzergrenadier kompanie had around 14 Sturmgewehre each. (A couple had 13 while a couple had 15)

It is possible that they were organised into Sturmzuge of 14 men but I don't know, believe me I would like to know...

Hope that I have answered the question as best I can.

Thanks,

John.

[V. Andries]

Hello John,

Thanks a lot, your reply is of great help.

The number of StG44 with 1.SS is low when one compares it to the amount of StG44 available to 26.VG-Div. prior to its engagement in the Ardennes. According to its Waffenmeldung on Dec. 1st (parts of which were posted in this forum quite some time ago) this division had no less than 1.395 StG44.

Off course, Panzer-Divisionen were to have less Sturm-Züge than the Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen, which partly explains the lower number.

Like you said, between early December and the start of the offensive new equipment was still arriving; this is confirmed by several authors. But considering the difficult supply situation, I don't think the number of StG44 with 1.SS would have gotten much higher in that short period.

Do you have an idea about 1.SS's Soll-Stärke in StG44 prior to Wacht-am-Rhein? Is there information on the amount of Machine-Pistole in the document you have at your disposal?
When there weren't enough StG44 available, gaps in the Sturmzüge might have been filled up with MP's.

But like you said, with only 13 to 15 Sturmgewehre per Kompanie (through the order of proportianal distribution?), there can't have been more than a single Sturm-Gruppe in each Kompanie (providing MP's were not used to fill the gaps). Then again, seperated Sturm-Gruppen would have nullified any possible tactical benefit of the 'Sturm-Zug concept'.

So an equal assignment of the weapon among the Kompanies' officers and NCO's seems most plausible.

Off course, all this is 'educated guess-work'. Any historical proof would be welcome...

Greetings,

Andries

[Roger Griffiths]

Sorry Andries, you're way off track. StG44 would have eventually replaced most rifles, as in post WWII armies. They were supposed to be issued mainly to VGD's which, whilst numerically inferior in personal weapons to earlier ID's, had superior firepower, due to StG44's. VGD grenadier coys. were supposed to have 2 out of 3 platoons mainly equipped with these weapons. However, VGD's still would have more Kar98k's than StG44's.

However, StG44 was issued to all types of divisions. The panzer and panzer grenadier divisions had them but in relatively small numbers. 1SSPD had establ 177 on 1Nov44 and 1Dec44 and none on 1Feb45. Actuals were 425, 418 and 158 respectively. I don't think there was any question of StG platoons, but I may be corrected. It was not a matter of officers and NCO's either. Those gents had a thinking and leadership roll. Officers might aquire an MP and NCO's might be allocated an MP but this was for personal protection whilst fulfilling their functions. Function is all that matters, not rank. I have seen pics. of officers with StG44's but it proves nothing.

Roger

[V. Andries]

Hi Roger,

Sorry Andries, you're way off track. StG44 would have eventually replaced most rifles, as in post WWII armies. They were supposed to be issued mainly to VGD's which, whilst numerically inferior in personal weapons to earlier ID's, had superior firepower, due to StG44's. VGD grenadier coys. were supposed to have 2 out of 3 platoons mainly equipped with these weapons. However, VGD's still would have more Kar98k's than StG44's.

I do know all that. If you think I'm stating something different, than I must have expressed myself in the wrong way.

1SSPD had establ 177 on 1Nov44 and 1Dec44 and none on 1Feb45. Actuals were 425, 418 and 158 respectively.

Thanks for posting those figures.

It was not a matter of officers and NCO's either. Those gents had a thinking and leadership roll. Officers might aquire an MP and NCO's might be allocated an MP but this was for personal protection whilst fulfilling their functions. Function is all that matters, not rank. I have seen pics. of officers with StG44's but it proves nothing.

Yes, I admit that it was wrong of me to think that, if there were no Sturm-Züge, StG44 would be mainly issued to officers and NCO's. Sure soldiers would have gotten them too.
But in fact, the guess was not that far off, as the early designation of the StG44 was MP-43 (albeit to mislead Hitler, I know), and the distinction between MP and Stg was not always made very sharply, as the Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen were to be equipped originally with MP-Züge, which was changed only later into to Sturm-Züge.
If no other MP was available, an officer or NCO could 'commandeer' a Stg44 for personal protection, no? In fact, we'd need to have a look at the number of MP's for 1SS to properly assess this issue.

I don't think there was any question of StG platoons, but I may be corrected.

If this is correct, then it means that the Sturm-Zug wasn't brought into practice, and that K.St.N. like 1114a & b (1.11.1944), were not adhered to, which is exactly the kind of information I'm after.

greetings,

Andries

[Roger Griffiths]

SS PD's were quoting use of KStN's dated 1Apr44 at end of 1944, and could not fill them out due to shortages. MP's were not used as Russians used PPSH's in some assault units or British Commandos used Stens. MP's were only effective to 100 yards. The whole point of assault rifles (500 yards range) was to replace rifles both by increasing firepower and dispensing with unnecessary range and waste of propellant.

MP establishment in 1SSPD 1Dec44 and 1Feb45 was 2,250 and actuals 841 and 491.

I used to know a Royal Marines officer who was at Anzio. Both RM Commandos and US Rangers had to be put in the line. They had hardly anything to fire back with as Hermann Goering panzer grenadiers attacked, until the enemy came within 100 yards. Then the Germans were met with a hail of fire from stens and paid dearly. Nevertheless, 44 or 45 RM Commando had 50% losses, was withdrawn to Egypt and took no further part in WWII.

Roger

[Hans Weber]

Hello,

To end speculation: The detailed Gliederung of the Panzer Grenadier Btl (mot) of LAH prior Wacht am Rhein is among the records that survived the war.

To understand the peculiar situation this unit was in, one has to see two facts: Regarding manpower, LAH was overstrength. Reagarding weapons, it was understrength. One can look at the whole division as one and also on the subunits, what emerges is that roughly only 2 thirds can be counted into the combat power.

Regarding the Panzergrenadiere this translates into the following:

Ia, Tg.B.Nr. 1351/44 geh. dated 23.10.44 "Ausrüstung der Pz. Gren. Kp und des Pz.Gren. Btl mot" (note: I only give the important passages)

Grendadierkompanie (mot):

Gruppe Führer wie bisher (as before)

- 3 Züge zu je 2 Gruppen, dazu s.MG-Zug

- 1. Zug = 2 Gruppen zu je 2 le MG
- 2. Zug = wie 1. Zug
- 3. Zug = 2 Gruppen mit je 7 M.Karab 44

Die schwere Kp Pz.Gren.Btl (mot):

-Gruppe Führer wie bisher
- 1. Zug = s.Pz.Jg.Zug zu 3 s.Pak (mot.Z)
- 2. Zug = s.Gr.W.Zug zu 4 12cm GrW
- 3. Zug = m.Gr.W.Zug zu 6 m.GrW
- 4. Zug = Pz.Zerstörer-Zug mit 12 Pz Schreck (German Bazooka)

This illustrates two things: the reduction in the main combat element from three to two units (66%) per platoon and the tendency to concentrate the heavy weapons into the schwere Kp as illustrated with the m.GrW and also with the Panzerschrecks. There are two explanations for the latter: First the concentration helped the training and supply situation and would be done naturally in any refitting phase, secondly it reflects the fact that capable subunit leaders were no longer available which lead to the regrouping on Btl level, thus saving Officers and NCO. This could have been reversed in combat situations, but in the case of LAH in BoB, American G-2 reports noticed the fact that in at least one case, a schwere Kp fought as a unit and was not parcelled out to the combat Co, which seemed remarkable for men trained in military thinking.

The standard Schützen Grp in LAH in autumn looked like this:

1 Gruppenführer
1 Scharfschütze (sniper)
2 MG Trupps zu je 3 Mann
2 Gewehrschützen

It is not exactly like the "official" Soll 1114a (fG) dated 01.11.44, main difference beeing that it has only one sniper. As to the Sturmzug, as explained above it only had two Gruppen with a total of 14 and one additional M.Karab 44 (assault rifle) for the Zugführer (actually, also this level was not reached in some Kp, having 13 to 15 assault rifles per Co according to the Gliederung dated 03.12.44). It could be split in two Halbgruppen or Trupps each with 4 men (one of the Gewehrschützen beeing with one MG Trupp, the other beeing the Melder (runner), the sniper acting on his own. POW reports give another variant with 7 M.Karab 44 men and one MG Trupp of 3 men plus a sniper (11 men). So this would be a mixture of the Sturmzug with the Schützenzug. Just to show that everything is possible and to warn dogmatic minds.

The situation remained unchanged for another month. There exists a list by the divisional Ib, dated 27.11.44 giving the exact equipment for a typical LAH Pz Gren Btl. down to the watches and fieldcookers. It adds to the above that in schwere Kp, 6 Flammenwerfer were (again) concentrated (two beeing the SS-standard in the Schützen Kp). Situation is reflected in a further list giving the exact number for distribution of Panzerfausts (4 per Grp, 24 per Kp (i.e. 6 x 4 NOT 9 x 4 plus 4 in the s.MG Zug plus 6 in the Kp Trp giving 34 per Kp). The Panzerfausts were issued just prior to action, so no last minute reorganisation took place. It gives the explanation why Sandig in his order dated 8.12.44 (mentioned in this thread) was well and explicitly concerned that any surplus men not fitting because of lack of weapons and transport were to be first handed over to fill holes in other units or on second priority back to the Feldersatz unit. This Feldersatz unit, FEB 1, was by far not the outfit with 5 Kp depicted on the December Gliederung, if you read the Soll and Ist in manpower, you will see that it was actually a regimental sized waterhead. Some members refered to it as the Feldersatz-Regiment. Its multi-Kp structure can be glimpsed by a list of FP Nrn that also survived the war. Together with the FEB 12 of HJ it formed what was called the Feldersatz Brigade 501 (former Feldersatz-Brigade 101 for those who have the Bender publications vol 5 on the Waffen SS), of which not much info survived the war at least in official documents. Further proof can be gained by the POW interrogations by the GI done during the BoB. They confirm the 2 Gruppen per Zug structure in the PzGren mot units. The Pz.Gren gp (the armored Btl) retained the 3 Gruppen per Zug unit BUT in at least two cases (10. and 11. Co) one whole platoon was left behind in Germany because of lack of transport. So they were not really better off, again lacking 33% of main combat power. The bottom line: Many men, not enough machines and weapons to make to deliver fighting power to the enemy. To this third lacking you can add another third not reaching the frontline in time to do combat when it was needed. This was due to bad roads, worn out machines and gigantic road jams. Whole platoons were missing when LAH tried to reopen the crucial route at Stavelot. When going into action, the SS fighting spirit coupled with inexperience of the young recruits (although their training was exquiste, what can be gleaned from the orders on the November 44 exercises will leave many of todays professionals with an open mouth, belive me) made for huge losses. KG Hansen lost more than 100 men dead at Recht alone BEFORE trying to reach Peiper. This amounts to the strenght of a whole Kp. in dead soldiers alone and you just can wonder at the number of wounded, MIA and POW this must imply. No surprise that there is still a field called "Friedhof Hansen" (they speak German in this part of Belgium). I assume that at a focal point, roughtly one third of Soll strength could be engaged, not more.

Many things have been said and written of the SS always been given the best and plenty of it. Of the vaunted KG Peiper beeing lavishly equipped with plenty of armour and the best weapons, explaining the reason why they were able to pierce the American lines like lightning. Looking at the actual situation, it is indeed astonishing that they got that far.

Cheers
Hans Weber

[JohnWilliam88]

Hi,

Thanks for the replies Roger and Hans,

Hans,

Ia, Tg.B.Nr. 1351/44 geh. dated 23.10.44 "Ausrüstung der Pz. Gren. Kp und des Pz.Gren. Btl mot"

What exactly is this document?

Thanks for the wealth of information exactly the sort of info i'm looking for.

There exists a list by the divisional Ib, dated 27.11.44 giving the exact equipment for a typical LAH Pz Gren Btl. down to the watches and fieldcookers

What exactly is this document?

Where did you get these documents, are there any others like them?

Thanks,

John.

[V. Andries]

Hello,

Hans and Roger, thanks a lot indeed for the exhaustive information! No need for me anymore to make far-fetched 'educated guesses', when people like you with access to first-hand historical documents are willing to share info.

Now, what I'm looking for is information on 1.SS's engagement in the Bastogne sector, after the debacle in the Amblève valley. Due to the over-information on the 'Peiper-venture', 1.SS's second engagement in the Ardennes, its attack against the East of the Bastogne corridor, remains largely uncovered by literature.
Any information on which divisional units took part in this attack, on how depleted these units were or whether they received reinforcements during the transfer across the Bulge, would be greatly appreciated, as would be any reference to detailed literature on this suject.

Thanks a lot,

Andries

[Roger Griffiths]

All credit is due to Hans. I did'nt know that 1SSPD was applying that KStN. The docs. I have quoting KStN's quote earlier dates and they did'nt look anything like in actuality.

Roger

[Hans Weber]

Hello
The Abt Ia is the Operationsabteilung of the division, head is the Ia the erste Generalstabsoffizier of the Division, which was the man who helped the Div Kdr to wage war and stood in for him if he was absent. The abreviations mean the entry in the Tagebuch of the Abteilung (short for Tagebuchnummer), these entries were numbered consecutivly, the second numbers /44 meaning that it was this number in the year 44. geh means geheim or secret.

These documents can be found in the BA-MA in Freiburg or on microfilms from the NARA (which are also available at Freiburg). Certainly also in the IWM, but I'm not used to their system, I only begin to understand the one in Freiburg in the parts that interest me (it is huge, but you can access the archvies on the internet for the main finding aids and general directions). The hard work is to find out what is stored under which file number.

Cheers
Hans

[JohnWilliam88]

Hi,

Thanks for the replies,

Hans,

Is there anyway to find what is stored under which file number without actually going to Freiburg?

I would be very interested in getting copies of any documents relating to the organisation of LSSAH in late '44 and in '45, like the ones you have mentioned.

There is however no chance of me getting to Germany.

I would appreciate it if you could let me know how to go about finding out whats what and how to get it. (I have no idea how to find out what the BA-MA has nor how to order copies, in addition I can't speak German.)

Thanks again,

John.