No Bismarck or Tirpitz

[Andy H]

The Tirpitz tied down a LOT of resources, there were Fleet Air Arm attempts to torpedo it, RAF attempts - the famous Beaufighter footage - TWO attempts by 617 Sqn, and only the 2nd was successful. RN attempted TWO underwater sabotage attempts - one by chariot, one by the famous X-craft attack where Magennis won his VC - and it proccupied the Norwegian Resistance for years at SOE's request for constant information.

I think the Gneisenau took a hit in dock that just wasn't repaired.

The presence of the three and the Prinz Eugen also tied up constant photorecce resources

phylo

Why not denying that there continued existence caused the British/Allies to divert resources, it must be viewed in a relative context of what else the British/Allies had as a whole. With the gradual and relentless economic weight of the Allies gathered pace as the war progressed, the relative % of Allied resources specifically set asideto deal with there threat, diminished

[Andy H]

Also if the Germans stopped building there heavy ships, then there's a good chance that British production on the KGV's BB's etc may well have been slowed down or stopped and there resources diverted to the building of more convoy escort vessels etc.

[phylo_roadking]

Maybe in real allover terms not a lot, but when it comes to staff chiefs' infighting, the threat posed by the Tirpitz kept beards being pulled and hats knocked off in Whitehall offices and cinference rooms until the hour she was bombed. Small in real terms but big in threat and worry and sleepless nights.

phylo

[Paul Lakowski]

The German naval concept of warship/commerce raiding was suspect from the start. There were several key times in the late 1920s and in the 1930s where the very existance of those warships came into question. In truth the converted auxiliary raiders of WW-I were more cost effective solution, especially when combined with an enlarged Uboat fleet...since such a fleet could double as replenishment at sea ships to support an enlarged Uboat fleet. In WW-II the combination of seaplanes on auxiliary cruisers made them even more effective than the WW-I case. With a conversion cost of a mere 1/4 million RM, upto 400 such auxiliary raiders conversions could be funded for each pocket battleship built.

Infact in 1928 Defense minister Groener almost canceled the entire Pocket Battleship program if all it was going to achieve was some distant commerce raiding. It had to serve the primary interest of national defense to be funded , so it had to be built to allow sea control of the Baltic to prevent the French and Polish fleets from linking up.

There was considerable pull in many directions and the lack of a central vision crippled the Kreigsmarine. The ascension of Admiral Raeder might have made a difference had it not been for the fact that Hitlers grand racial strategy didn't realy conform to a military strategy. Consequently no serious effort could be made to battle the RN or UK... so instead of building up a naval fleet in the 1930s, Raeder spent the time slowing warming Hitler up to the realisation that naval priorities needed to be elevated. While in the 1920s naval spending accounted for upto 1/3 of the budget in the 1930s & 1940s it would rarely amount to more than 1/10th of the budget.

German industry was capable of building a large naval fleet and treaty arrangements with the UK etc allowed for an hugh fleet . According to the 1935 Naval Treaty the Germans could build 35% of the combined Commonwealth navy warships and 45% of their combined Sub fleet. On paper that total potential 1939 war fleet was ….

5 x Battleships/Battle cruisers [ + 3 building]
2 x Aircraft Carriers [ + 2 building]
22 x Heavy & Light Cruisers [ + 8 building]
64 x Destroyers & Torpedoboot [ + 11 building]
26 x U boats [ + 5 building]

The geman ship building industry was capable of building such a fleet. Historically in the 5 years prior to WW-I the german ship building industry laid down; built and commissioned....

13 x capital ships [average 25,000-31,000 ton Battleship/Battle cruisers]
6 x cruisers
67 x Torpedo boats [Destroyers/Destroyer escorts]
58 x U-boats [mostly small]

[In total between 1909-1914 ]

Due to treaty of Versailles, building priorties were scewed. In the 1920s the Reichmarine fleet composed of 6 ancient pre dreadnaught battleships , 6 ancient pre WW-I cruisers , a dozen newer torpedo boats [TB-1923/24] and 16 older WW-I Torpedo boats [TB-1911/1913] <some used as training warships> plus ~ 50 x WW-I era minesweepers [MB-16] . A program had begun to replace the old cruisers with the 'modern Koln’ cruisers in the late 1920s and the Pocket Battleships to replace the older dreadnaughts in the early 1930s. In the meantime, the older TB-1913 had their machinery overhauled to soldier on until replacement in the late 1930s , while the TB-1924 were also overhauled and experimentally up gunned from 4” to 5” guns.

However due to treaty weight restrictions, the Cruisers had to be made with welding instead of rivetes to keep them under restrictions, which comprimised hull strength forcing the cruisers to operate only in the local seas [not oceans]. Meanwhile the battleship replacements programes were really just super cruisers at best, since treaty limitations prevented larger warships. Real battleship building program could not begin until the some one ignored the weight restrictions and even later since the big guns needed for such a program [15" guns] would not be ready for production until the late 1930s.

It seems likely that any real RN building program of the 1930s would be more driven by Japanese; Italian; French and even American warship building programs.

[Andy H]

When war broke out the RN was at the start of its 1937 Naval Building Programme, and on the slipways were 1BB, 2AC's, 21 CA/CL's, 30 DD's and 20 DE's plus a myriad of smaller craft.

RN strength on 01/09/39 was:-
BB's 12
AC's 6
CA/CL's 58
DD's 100
DE/Sloops 101
Subs 38

[Paul Lakowski]

The 1935 Naval Treaty was between Commonwealth navies and Germany, not just the RN.

Differing sources have differing figures. Overy & Wheatcroft, put the figures at ...

1932
BB 15
CV 6
CC 46
DD 148
SS 55

1936
BB 15
CV 6
CC 48
DD 163
SS 52

1939
BB 15
CV 6
CC 54
DD 145
SS 54

James Levy reports the figures for UK & Dominions @

September/October 1939
BB 15 [+ 7]
CV 6 [+ 6]
CC 64 [+ 23]
DD 183 [+31]
SS 57 [+11]

[sid guttridge]

Hi Paul,

Your presumption is that there were 400 merchant ships suitable for conversion to raiders, let alone 1,200. I think in WWII the Germans actually converted only about 15. Raiders required a relatively high speed and great endurance. Could so many suitable merchant hulls be made available without damaging other merchant shipping requirements? I very much doubt it.

German industry was technically capable of building a much larger fleet. However, during the 1930s rearmament it was in competition for scarce materials with arms more vital to Germany - the Army and Luftwaffe. Therefore capacity and practicable possibility were not necessarily the same thing.

The number of dockyards available for warship construction was lower between the wars than before WWI. Danzig accounted for a significant share of Germany's warship construction up to 1918. For example, if memory serves me correctly, it had completed the last German battleship before Hitler laid down Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Between the wars Danzig and its yards were completely demilitarised.

As I understand it, and as you mention, the German fleet was primarily designed between the wars to combat the French. The deep sea raiding capital ships were intended to disrupt France's communications with its colonies, from where a significant proportion of its army had to be transported by sea in the event of a European war. Given the logistical problems the far larger British fleet had in finding raiders in WWII, it seems likely that this would have had considerable success against the French alone.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Paul Lakowski]

Hi Paul,

Your presumption is that there were 400 merchant ships suitable for conversion to raiders, let alone 1,200. I think in WWII the Germans actually converted only about 15. Raiders required a relatively high speed and great endurance. Could so many suitable merchant hulls be made available without damaging other merchant shipping requirements? I very much doubt it.

Cheers,

Sid.

Yes the 400 merchant conversions to aux cruisers was an exageration to illustrate the cost effectiveness difference... between one Pocket battleship....although where you'd get the crews or guns for such a fleet is beyond logic. That being said the german merchant fleet numbered 400-800 medium large merchant ships and another 400-600 smaller coastal steamers. Additionally many merchant ships were aquired during expansion years [10% of the Norwegian fleet ~ 1000 ships for example]. So there was a considerable pool of ships to exploite. In addition the need for tankers disappeared the more Hitler tried to establish his Autarchy based economy.

As a practical matter the guns and torpedo tubes for the auxiliary cruisers came from surplus WW-I guns and post war guns. There was a hugh stock of these 6" guns [Theoretically upwards of 400 may have been available and atleast 200 ended up along the Atlantic Wall].

In addition about 250 torpedo tubes would have been surplus when the calibre changed from 20-21" in the early 1930s. Finally Wehrmacht maintained a fleet of atleast 120 He-60 float planes in the early 1930s. By the war this would have double in numbers, with about 1/3 new Ar-196 , 1/3 the highly effective He-115 long range torpedo bomber and the rest older He-60 and a handfull of hugh flying boats. Most of these ended up being used from coastal ports and the odd catapult ships/Seaplane tenders.

If the flak guns are diverted from Luftwaffe stocks [~ 400 total] you could end up with enough weaponary to convert upto roughly 65 merchant ships , each with 3-4 torpedos, 1/2 dozen 6" guns a couple of He-60 float planes and 1/2 dozen light flak. Each such modification would cost about 1/4 million RM and take about 6 months in a ship yard, but may be done in place of some torpedo boot production.

In practice the Flottenboote and Torpedoboote 1935 were such poor designs, taking years to complete that the entire fleet of 65 Aux Cruiser conversions would consume the production of all 10 Flottenboote and 6-7 Torpedoboote 1935 in the mid to late 1930s. Given the choice I would go for a fleet of Auxiliary cruisers and use them as raiders and Uboat tenders. These certainly would fit into Donitz Uboat strategy. I understand that Raeder didn't really want to embrace the Tir[pitz fleet 'Zplan', until they had an interme plan. He saw a combination of Admiral Heyes Pocket battleship fleet with auxiliary cruisers in support , combined and working in tandem with Donitz enlarged Uboat fleet , as a possible solution to neutralise the UK.

[Srgt Rock]

Responce to Florin's idea to help Bismarck's jammed rudder: I have thought that a better solution just might have been to mount several of the AR196 engines as far forward as possible and use them as a bow thrusters