No Bismarck or Tirpitz

German Kriegsmarine 1935-1945.
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behblc
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Steel for Kgm.

Post by behblc »

I think Tiornu makes the same point as I do.
The only major construction going on for the Kgm. was that of Submarines , and if Germany was going to contest a war at sea this was completely necessary.
The capital ships already completed would have made little draw on steel resources , support ships would have been those already at hand. (By 1939).
There was no major build plan for support vessels for the likes of Bismarck . ( Not that I am aware of ).
The steel you refer to must be that which went to Donitz , the use of steel in U-Boat construction would have been as necessary as that in tank production.
I would not agree with you in that diversion of all production to the army would have given a fair chance of beating Russia , Russian tank production just ran away from anything Germany could hope to produce.
footnote...the tanks and aircraft sent by America and Gt. Britain to Russia were largley inferior to that which Russia produced herself , transport by way odf trucks , jeeps were more valuable to the Russians.
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
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Re: Steel for Kgm.

Post by Paul Lakowski »

behblc wrote:I think Tiornu makes the same point as I do.
The only major construction going on for the Kgm. was that of Submarines , and if Germany was going to contest a war at sea this was completely necessary.
The capital ships already completed would have made little draw on steel resources , support ships would have been those already at hand. (By 1939).
There was no major build plan for support vessels for the likes of Bismarck . ( Not that I am aware of ).
The steel you refer to must be that which went to Donitz , the use of steel in U-Boat construction would have been as necessary as that in tank production.
I would not agree with you in that diversion of all production to the army would have given a fair chance of beating Russia , Russian tank production just ran away from anything Germany could hope to produce.
footnote...the tanks and aircraft sent by America and Gt. Britain to Russia were largley inferior to that which Russia produced herself , transport by way odf trucks , jeeps were more valuable to the Russians.

In addition to building over 1000 subs during the war they built 750 surface ships as well...mean while the Soviets built 50????
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Post by Sam H. »

By "during the war" do you mean 9/1/39 to the 5/45?

Of those 750 surface ships, how many had a displacement of over 1,000 tons? I bet not more than 50, probaly less than 2 dozen.

I believe the investment in U-Boats, at least until May 1943, was a judicious investment. A lot of allied supplies ended at the bottom of the sea in 1942.

Even after May 1943, the allies invested heavily in ASW technology and ships, not to mention the thousands of new merchant ships (Liberty and Victory) that were launched.
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Re: Steel for Kgm.

Post by Tiornu »

"In addition to building over 1000 subs during the war they built 750 surface ships as well...mean while the Soviets built 50?"
The only German fleet units completed after Tirpitz were fourteen destroyers. Only two others progressed even to the point of launching. There were a couple dozen torpedo boats. A number of captured units were commissioned. I found a U-boat tender completed in 1943, plus two more built from captured Polish vessels.
During the same period, the Soviets commissioned 23 of their own destroyers, with about four others being launched. The number of torpedo boats was small, but three full-sized cruisers were completed and three others launched.
I can't see the German expenditures as being especially prodigal. What do you mean by 750 "surface ships." Does this include coastal transports, minecraft, motor boats...?
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750

Post by behblc »

Sounds like a lot , but how much was left when Germany surrendered ?
Germany did not have a massive naval fleet at any time.
Could you give a break down of that 750 ships , as Sam says you will find very few of any size.
Germany had to make coverage for more naval work than the russians.
Norway , Baltic , Black , North Seas , Atlantic and the Med.
Russia was only really active in the Black Sea and later in the Baltic. Her support to Allied PQ shipping was very minimal.

The U-boats had to be built and the new generation boats developed , had they come into service in 1944 with faults ironed out the Convoy system would have been tested for a second time.
Quick look over some of Jak Showells figures does not show on paper a 750 ship navy , very much less.
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Post by Paul Lakowski »

OK its time to try to some more teeth into this discussion.




To get an idea of the size of the Kriegsmarine here is a list of the ships that were listed as lost or scuttled during the war.
4 BB/BC
5 HC
4 CCL
37 DD
68 PT
27 escorts
238 mine detectors & auxiliary Md
188 minesweepers & auxiliary MS
152 patrol boats
525 Landing ships & Arty Pontoons
968 subs
9 auxiliary cruisers
35 minelayers
66 bulldozer ships
137 sub chasers
189 reconnaissance ships
278 coast guard cutters
86 picket ships
21 other escorts and 200 auxiliary small craft.
[Source : THe Historyical Encyclopedia of WW-II]


Interms of steel allocation its more like 1/2 the Wehrmacht allocation than 2/3...here are some figures from Millwards :"THe German Economy at War"

1939 4th quarter
Heer 306,000 tons
Navy 125,000 tons

1st Quarter 1940
Heer 342,000 tons
Navy 140,000 tons

2nd Quarter 1940
Heer 348,000 tons
Navy 122,000 tons

3rd Quarter 1940
Heer 305,000 tons
Navy 140,000 tons

4th Quarter 1940
Heer 351,000 tons
Navy 155,000 tons

Thats 557,000 tons naval steel construction , including subs...if it all went to tank production thats ~23,000 Pz-III/IVs.

roughly 1/4 million workers where involved in ship building program and another 1/4 million would have served in sailor or support roles. Over the course of the war the shortage of workers in key industries were

35,000 oil
200,000 coal
70,000 auto workers


so no surface ship program also solves the manpower shortage in the war economy.[Source the USSBS]
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numbers

Post by Tiornu »

I'm afraid these numbers raise more questions than answers. How much tonnage went into non-naval shipbuilding?
If we accept a hypothetical dissolution of German shipbuilding, how many tanks do the Soviets gain from the scaling back of their own shipbuilding? Given the uncontested Soviet command of Baltic, what happens to the seaward flanks of Barbarossa? How much more aid do the Soviets get from the West? How badly do German logistics suffer from the absence of freighters etc? When does the Normandy invasion take place?
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Kgm Tonage.

Post by behblc »

Paul,
This is only quick ...have to get to work.
The great number of ships mentioned are samll in size , when you get below the destroyer size many are as Sam said less than 1,000 ton displacement.
The build of 14 destroyers post Tirpitz as mentioned by Tiornu illustrates that U-boats apart most constructed during war years were small.
A great number of the types mentioned would be ships taken up from trade , trawlers , coasters etc taken over by the navy , converted and used , we did much the same these may well be included in your number.
A fair number of craft came from the Reichsmarine old ship some dating from alst war or built in late 20's -early 30's.
Found the following figures in "Oxford Companion to WW2"
Steel production for 1939 23.7 (m.t)
" " " 1940 21.5 (m.t).

The extent to which German was prepared for gearing her industrial out put for war even if Kgm tonage were given to Heer purposes the where with all to build the tanks would be a problem , Germany was not really geared for war in 1939 from point of view of either army or navy.
Of all forces in 39 the navy was the least prepared for war.

To say no navy as a matter of policy would have made things much more easy for the Allies and allowed them complete freedom of movement by sea and would have restricted Germany completely .
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
A.E. Housman.

" The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. " Wilfred Owen (M.C.).
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Re: numbers

Post by Paul Lakowski »

Tiornu wrote:I'm afraid these numbers raise more questions than answers. How much tonnage went into non-naval shipbuilding?
If we accept a hypothetical dissolution of German shipbuilding, how many tanks do the Soviets gain from the scaling back of their own shipbuilding? Given the uncontested Soviet command of Baltic, what happens to the seaward flanks of Barbarossa? How much more aid do the Soviets get from the West? How badly do German logistics suffer from the absence of freighters etc? When does the Normandy invasion take place?
Theres another stat that shows for every million tons of steel produced they manufactured tanks
German 453 tanks per million
USA 306 tanks per million
UK 666 tanks per million
USSR 3,083 tanks per million
The explaination given is that western countries had large navies to support , but this also suggest that had the Germans ignored surface fleets they had could have had similar production to the USSR. Consider the following production.

USSR
Coal 441 million tons
Iron 31 million tons
Steel 45 million tons
Oil 91 million tons

GERMANY
Coal 2,151 million tons
Iron 98 million tons
Steel 134 million tons
Oil 62 million tons

[Source: Walter Dunn Jr "Soviet economy at war and the Red Army 1930-1945"]
But the Russians may have made much more of their production , for example in 1942 only 8 million tons of german steel production went to military production from a total of 30 million tons....in the USSR the total steel production figure was 12.5 million tons of which 40% went to military production.
Germany in 1943 , 9 million of steel production went to military [29 million tons total steel production]. By comparison 16 million USSR steel production of which about 10 million went to military production.

Note that from 1942 to 1943 German allocation of steel to military production went up by only 1 million tons or 11% increase when the tank & SP production nearly doubled. [~ 10,000 compared to ~6,000]...during this same period the USSR produced 15,000 to 24,000 tanks and SP guns
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Resources wasted .

Post by behblc »

Germany when she went to war and even after Barbarossa was not fully geared for waging a war on the scale which Hitler comitted the Nation to.
The "wherewithall" to produce the tamnks did not exist nor I suspect did the workforce.
Russia and the U.S. either or both , Germany just could not live with or hope to match the industrial out put , even if they had , where would the fuel come to run these machines of war and were would the trained troops come to crew them ?
The increase in Panzer divisons for Brabarossa only same from what was effectively a watering down of the existing divisons.
This was to continue as the war went on 12th SS was created by using a chunk of the experienced NCO's / Officers from the Leibstandarte , I think I am correct in this and will no doubt be corrected if I am wron( which I don't mind !) .

Even with an expanded army Germany's first linbe of defence was always going to be attacking the British and later the Allied supply routes.
No Navy would have meant surrendering everything up to the shores of France and a difficult job of supplying Rommel in Africa would have proved to be impossible.

Whilst I can see that if germany could have had more by way of troops , equipment and the ability to supply and keep them mobile would have helped in Russia and North Africa there was always going to be a need to have a navy , which as time proved capital ships had only a small part to play. This was thankfully not forseen by those making decisions in 1930's , and unfortunately the same lesons learnt in 14-18 had largely been ignored by the British and American Navy.
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
A.E. Housman.

" The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. " Wilfred Owen (M.C.).
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Re: Resources wasted .

Post by Paul Lakowski »

behblc wrote:Germany when she went to war and even after Barbarossa was not fully geared for waging a war on the scale which Hitler comitted the Nation to.
The "wherewithall" to produce the tamnks did not exist nor I suspect did the workforce.
Russia and the U.S. either or both , Germany just could not live with or hope to match the industrial out put , even if they had , where would the fuel come to run these machines of war and were would the trained troops come to crew them ?
The increase in Panzer divisons for Brabarossa only same from what was effectively a watering down of the existing divisons.
This was to continue as the war went on 12th SS was created by using a chunk of the experienced NCO's / Officers from the Leibstandarte , I think I am correct in this and will no doubt be corrected if I am wron( which I don't mind !) .

Even with an expanded army Germany's first linbe of defence was always going to be attacking the British and later the Allied supply routes.
No Navy would have meant surrendering everything up to the shores of France and a difficult job of supplying Rommel in Africa would have proved to be impossible.

Whilst I can see that if germany could have had more by way of troops , equipment and the ability to supply and keep them mobile would have helped in Russia and North Africa there was always going to be a need to have a navy , which as time proved capital ships had only a small part to play. This was thankfully not forseen by those making decisions in 1930's , and unfortunately the same lesons learnt in 14-18 had largely been ignored by the British and American Navy.
I doubt this is true.It took Speer 2 years to convert the german economy to total war from 1942 to 1944. This was done by centralizing production on fewer plants, fewer model plus a worker force that became much more productive. This last part was cause by halting the hemoraging of skilled workers to the Wehrmacht and better allocation of raw resources to these factories and ofcourse eliminating the absurd duplication that was going on. All these were changes that were doable in 1940 as much as in 1942. The difference is that when Reich Minister Toddt tried to pull the same manuever off in the fall of 1940, Hitler didn't think it was necessary to burden the Gaulitiers too much ...since from his POV the war was almost over anyway!All of this is a question of human decisions or politics not industry.

AS far as fuel goes elimination of the production of bunker fuel oil for the KReigsmarine [ don't touch marine diesel for subs and patrol craft]...allows the progressive conversion of 1 million tons a year to gasoline production for the HEER[nearly doubling there monthly supply]. Stockpiling this over 1940 and 1941 effectively tripples the gasoline stocks going into Barbarossa in mid to late 1941. This allows for atleast a 70% increase in gasoline consumption for the trucks & tanks of the HEER right through to the end of 1942.

Where are all these extra vehicles to come from??? Well as it was the german econmy produced something like 1 million vehicles in 1939-41...but less than 1/3 went to the HEER...so you buy the bulk of this production and it allows you to motorize atleast half of the HEER by 1941.

Where is the money supposed to come from?? THe annual budget for ship building and opps, ran at something like 1/2 billion Rm per year so each year can easly fund purchase of the needed vehicles plus upgrade a hole host of existing assets and increase ammo production by 1/3 to cover the increased demand.

What AFV can be upgrades at short notice?? Well the offical german inventory counted 3500 tanks and Assault guns by mid 1941...but in practial terms they also had 3600 obsolete tanks in the inventory [Pz-I /II and french tanks]. These may have been useless as tanks but if the turrets were removed and the fighting compartments opened up...a simplified PzJag could be improvised? Historically this was done through out the war as a stop gap when production proved too slow.They could probably convert 7-8 existing AFVs for the price of one new tank.

The guns for such a whole sale conversion would come from the 7000 captured french 75mm guns...1/2 of which were histroically converted to Pak-97/38 in the mid war period.In addition all the 50L60 gun production should have been channeled into refitting the entire Pz-III force by mid 1941 and with new spaced armor mantles /superstructure front added by 1942] .

Were are the crews for these SPATs coming from?? Since the PzJag fr75s are a delivered to the existing infantry division ATBattalion, there is little conversion need in training since the are still essentially mobile ATgun unit...just now with armor.

What about the lack of ATGuns for the HEER with no 50mm PAK they have nothing to deal with T-34 etc?? Well aside from the 3500 PzJager fr-75s that would be added to the infantry divisions, they would recieve 3500 Pak 97/38 as well.

The 37mm ATGuns made redundant with this move could inturn be mounted on the thousands of captured french UE-630 tankettes to equipp the recon Bn of each infantry division.
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No Kgm. ?

Post by behblc »

Paul would Germany have had the industrial base and manpower (troop wise) to do all this betwen fall of France and Start of Barbarossa ?
If the heer were only being allocated a fraction of truck production were was the rest going ?
To be able to do all this would Germany be able to do it all ?
Its unlikely that even if the resources to do this were to hand , the will to accomplish it was lacking. Hitler was discounting Red Army strengths , totally underestimating what he was taking on and against the background of these decisions its most unlikely that any mass production would have been given the go ahead.
"Why do I need this massive effort when the Red Army is a push over " ..."Kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down".
The resources you suggest being a possible would be made impossible and unecessary via the Fuhrer's assessment of the Russians , something he was never willing to view in reality.

For Germany to enter a war which took on such a Global aspect , a war against Britain , so dependent on imported materials , and a war which was to involve the United States of America and Russia. If there had been no U-Boat arm and only limited Coastal Forces the build up of materials in the Uk would have been virtually unopposed and unhindered save the very limited intervention of the Luftwaffe and german Coastal traffic would have been totally comprimised , nothing would be save coming from Norway , indeed the invasion of Norway would never have been possible.
Axis intervention in the Med. / North Africa would have been a much shorter affair. The advantages given to the Allies would have been posibley fatal for Germany. End outcome still defeat.
Without Britain either totally isolated or forced to surrender germany was always going to be faced with an invasion of Europe, without the Kgm , in particular the U-Boat arm and the resources which had to be given to it the invasion would have come sooner and the Allied build up would have been all but trouble free.
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
A.E. Housman.

" The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. " Wilfred Owen (M.C.).
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Sorry.

Post by behblc »

For the bloody awful spelling and keyboard skills...can't get an "edit" option. My eldest girl just can't undersatnd how god awful I am with a keyboard ! :oops:
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
A.E. Housman.

" The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. " Wilfred Owen (M.C.).
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Post by CaptSquid »

We'll forgive your bloody awful spelling skills, behblc. After all, yer from "up there." :D

But I do understand what you're trying to get across. Germany was woefully unprepared to conduct war on the magnitude that happened.

Had Onkel Adolf stopped after walking over Poland, then he would've had the chance to build bigger and better. Perhaps if war had actually happened 10 year later?

@ Paul Lakowski - Minesweepers are not made out of large quantities of steel. They are made of wood. Wood is a non-magnetic entity. Steel hulled vessels have a tendency to make magnetic mines go "boom."
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Long Term.

Post by behblc »

The whole idea does become irrelevant ( and I mean no offense Paul) in that even if Germany had the resources ( which I doubt) , Hitler would have killed it.
To get to this point of being geared to convert so much booty you would first have to be sure of having it , there is no way to be sure of this.
That said Germany made good use of captured Czech. materials.
To convert on the scale you suggest would not be possible in the June 40 -June 41 time scale , and in June 41 it was already a late start to Barbarossa owing to the Balkans / Greece.
The fuel situation would need to have been based on a decision to have no navy taken years before , this would be like crossing the rubecorn ( spelt wrong!) and one given the turn of events which would have left Germany with lots of catching up to do ( even if Capital ships are discounted ) , certainly in no position of ever being able to blockade Britain as effectively as occurred and tied to mainland Europe.
The need to expand the navy would have been felt very accutely.
To embark on the tank building / conversion process you mention needs a decision made at high level .....Hitler as i mentioned before was looking at what he thoguht was a weak , over rated , right for dismemberment Soviet Bear.
He was not going to order the massive industrial work you suggest , this was a man who saw no need for winter supplies in mid-41 as the war would be over and the Russian had all but been defeated.
Hitler's realm of reality and over confidence would ensure no long term planning could be made , on land sea or in the air.
The world war into which he blindly led Germany left her ill prepared on all fronts , too few U-boats many of the wrong kind , no long term planning for new boats , an airforce which lacked the ability to defend by day and by night , an air force which had no long range bomber , an army which was about to be hurled at Russia and the three armed services were so casually asked to take on America 6 months later.
Look at the initial operations of the American Coast 6 U-boats...the boats Donitz wanted to send ...off to the Med. and Norway. The boats he would later need were but ink on a drawing board , time and resources not to be had.
It has been said that Germany suffered because she switched her priorities so often , she had to it was crisis management , she was out of her depth.
I would have to disagree with your view that Germany could have done with a much smaller navy or indeed only coastal forces , te long term plan you suggest was not possible in Hitlers Germany and is to some extent dependent on the captured materials which no-one knew would come , or indeed if France and Britain would be defeated in 1940.
As capt. Squid says ...war was not expected until 1944......4 years early....Hitlers realm of reality.
" Life , to be sure is nothing much to loose ; But young men think it is , and we were young . "
A.E. Housman.

" The old lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori. " Wilfred Owen (M.C.).
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