Peiper's competence to command a Panzerregiment

[mellenthin]

It has been sometimes alleged that Peiper got his nominations as an infantry and SPW-battalion commander because he deserved them but as a Panzer leader and Kampfgruppe commander only because he was one of Himmler's pet soldiers. It was for example stated that he got his oakleaves after he was released from command in december 1943 because he burned up his regiment in senseless actions. It has been stated that various capable LSSAH Panzer officers wondered in November 1943 why Peiper got the job, and still wondered in December 1944 because Peiper had messed up the Panzer-Regiment on several times in the Ukraine and in Normandy.

The truth is that Peiper got the command of the Panzerregiment in november 1943 because as commander of the APC batallion he had shown to have the aptitude for commanding armoured units.
Peiper was never relieved as commander of the Panzerregiment in the winter of 1943-1944The stellungsbesetzungsliste in Lehmann's book clearly shows that Peiper always remained in command of the panzerregiment.Kuhlman never formally commanded the regiment.When the strength of the batallions or Abteilungen in a regiment drops so much that they have temporarily to be amalgamated,the regimental commander ceases to effectively command the regiment but the regimental commander stays in formal command.In the action on the 14th january Peiper commanded the armored battlegroup which consists of the Panzerregiment,an Abteilung of self propelled artillery and the SPW batallion. He is also mentioned in command of the armored battlegroup the day before.There is also a mention of him with the panzerregiment on the 7th of january.As first general staff officer of the division Lehmann knew best where Peiper was. Peiper was certainly always still in command of the armored battlegroup until he left on his leave.
The strength reports in Lehmann's book clearly show that the panzerregiment was never destroyed.Its operational strength dropped as is normal in intensive operations
The operational strength of the tankregiment on the 23rd november(on p.368 in part III)was
as follows:23 Panzer IV ,15 Panzer V and 4 Panzer VI. The total strength on 4.12 was 183(66 operational,93 shortterm repair,25 longterm repair).
The total strength on the 09.12 was 172(20 operational,110 shorterm repair,42 in longterm repair)
The 21.1.44 82 tanks were present in the assembly area (50+14+18).From a battlegroup sent tot the 7th Pz div.,no operational tanks had returned.
When Peiper took over the operational strength was already only a small part of the total strength. There are no disasters visible in there. Just that a lot of tanks are always in shortterm repair(probably from mechanical failures).
Heavy fighting takes a heavy toll on any panzer regiment.That is the only thing that shows.It would not be possible otherwise.
In the detail of the actions there is no evidence of any underperformance of the panzerregiment,on the contrary.
Two commanders got the Knights cross and Peiper himself eventually was proposed for the Oak leaves.
When one looks at the chapter in Schneiders book on the tiger company of the Leibstandarte one sees no sign of any disasters or underperformance either.One simply sees that most total losses of Tigers were due to having to blow them up when they had to be left behind and you also see that because of mechanical failures the operational strength of the tiger company was always low.
In the divisional history of the first panzer division (by R.Stoves) which was also involved in the fighting in november-december 1943 one sees the same story of mounting losses in vehicles and experienced officers because of the heavy fighting.
There was no underperformance of the LAH panzerregiment which suffered no more losses than any other unit suffered in the same heavy fighting.
There was also nothing abnormal in a Panzergrenadiercommander being in charge of tanks.During the fighting in november-december 1943 near Kiev during which Peiper took over command of Panzerregiment,the armored battlegroup of the 1.Pz Div. was commanded by Oblt Bradel,the commander of PzGren Rgt 113.Just shows that tanks being under the tactical command of an infantry commander was not abnormal.When each of the Abteilungen of the panzerregiment was paired with a PzGren Rgt,the commander of the PzGren commanded the battlegroup.This was common practice.If Wisch would for some reason have lost confidence in Peiper he could have easily put each of the Abteilungen of the panzerregiment in a battlegroup with a Pz Gen Rgt and tactically Peiper would not have had not much to do.But he did not.Peiper mostly commanded a battlegroup consisting of at least his regiment and the APC batallion.Good policy because only APC borne infantry can really follow the tanks.Interesting to note that Oblt Bradel got the Knights cross for the operations in december 1943(Stoves p.465).Was a very daring and brave commander who also made a deep panzerraid on 06.12.1943.So Peiper was not the only commander of an armored battlegroup who got a medal for that operation.

[krichter33]

Having read the Leibstandarte unit histories as well as Schneider's book and Agte's and Westemeier's books, I have to say that I agree with your assessment. Peiper was at times quite reckless, yet he was a very effective Panzer commander. Most of the "allegations" about Peiper's incompetence as a Panzer commander in the winter of 43-44 come from Westemeier's book. Though well researched, it has a tendency towards certain polemics that can be interpreted as biased. And as you will see in the future postings on this board, there are many who subscribe to that school of thought. However, I know of one historian whose future works will produce a more fair and accurate picture of Peiper as an armored commander that tends to agree with the notion that he was effective. I will let the rest of you battle this out, just like before.