Feldersatz-Bataillonen

[John W. Howard]

Hello Folks:
Was there a specific date when the Feldersatz-Bataillons started to disappear from Infanterie Divisions? I imagine it was some time in 1943 and probably after a Heer reorganization, but have no specifics. Thank you.

[John W. Howard]

I think I should rephrase this. Did the Heer stop maintaining Infanterie Feldersatz-Batallions during the war? If so, was there a specific time when this happened, or did they just slowly disappear due to attrition over time at a rate unique to each division? Surely at some point during the war, due to the lack of man-power, these units were no longer maintained? Thanks.

[Kamen Nevenkin]

FEB was an integral part of each German division, be it Panzer-, PzGrenadier-, Infantry, Jaeger, Geb., etc, They were very important for the functioning of the replacement system and therefore they could not disappear from the divisional OOB. The records of HGr Sued, for instance, show that on 4 Nov 1944 all types of divisions (ID, VGD, PzD, PzGrD, GebD, JgD, KavD) subordinated to this army group had their own organic FEB. The text below (slightly modified) is taken from a book project of mine, which will be published by J.J.Fedorowicz till the end of this year.

The purpose of Feldersatz-Bataillon was to give additional training to the new replacements that had been sent to the division in personnel transfer companies (Marsch-Kompanien), batteries (Marsch-Batterien) or battalions (Marsch-Bataillone) before sending them to the divisional combat units.
The battalion usually consisted of two parts – constant (the cadre personnel) and variable (the replacements). The constant group consisted of staff with training section (Ausbildungsstaffel) and a supply company (since the spring of 1944). On 1 November 1943 the authorized strength of the staff was 4 men and 1 PKW, the training section – 96 men while the supply company – 73 men, 8 unarmored motor vehicles and 36 horse-drawn wagons. Part of the maintenance services of the supply company was to be provided by respective specialized services of the divisional units.
The training section usually was designated as divisional combat school (Divisions-Kampfschule) because it particularly conducted the battle training. The weapons section (Waffenstaffel) of the supply company provided the weapons for the training process. On 1 November 1943 the authorized strength of the latter was 50 le.MG, 12 s.MG, 6 8-cm GrWf, 2 12-cm GrWf (or 7.5-cm le.IG), 1 sPak (mot Z), 1 2-cm Flak, 2 flamethrowers and 1 leFH (mot Z).
The divisional combat school was used not only to train the replacements, but also to undertake training courses (Lehrgänge) for the selected personnel of the divisional combat units. For example, the transformation of the tank-less crews into infantrymen was carried out in the divisional combat school.
The variable part of the group consisted of replacement companies (Feldersatz-Kompanien) entirely composed of replacements (the authorized establishment of such company was 200 men). The replacements arrived in the battalion organized into personnel transfer units and armed with personal weapons. The personnel transfer companies consisted only of enlisted men and NCO and due to this the company-, platoon- and detachment commanders of the replacement companies were provided by the training section of the staff.
Almost all of the combat branches were represented in the replacement companies. Usually the main combat arms as (panzer-) grenadiers and artillery had own dedicated companies while the support combat arms (engineers, signals, etc) – own platoons within the companies. On the contrary, the replacements intended for the panzer regiment, as a rule, were attached to the regimental tank maintenance company (Panzerwerkstatt-Kompanie).
The number of the replacement companies depended on the number of the recruits provided by the Ersatzheer. The field replacement battalions of the panzer divisions of the Heer were authorized to have four companies while those of the SS-panzer divisions – five. In reality, however, some of the divisions occasionally had six or even seven companies. On the contrary, sometimes only the cadre personnel were available.

Hope this helps

[John W. Howard]

Hello Kamen:
You told me everything I wanted to know and then some!!! I was confused by the progression of the gliederung of the 36ID, 36ID(mot.), 36ID, 36GD, 36VGD. A Feldersatz-Bataillon is listed on the gliederung for the 36ID, 36ID(mot.), and 36ID again, but not on the gliederung for the 36 Grenadier Division, and 36 Volksgrenadier Division. From that I assumed the late war Grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions did not have Feldersatz units, and wanted to know why. From what you have told me, they must have had them, even if they are not listed on the Gliederung. Am I correct? Thanks again for your help!!

[Doug Nash]

Originally, the KstN for VGDs did not authorize a FEB. However, this seems to have been widely ignored and many units created them anyway out of existing assets, an indicator of just how important this unit was to the orderly functioning of a division in combat. Many of the older divisions that converted from the Kriegsetat '44 KstN, such as the 272nd Infantry Division, retainted their existing FEB and I haven't found much evidence to show that the Ersatzheer made much of a fuss about it. The 272nd VGD's FEB was temporarily disbanded in the first week of Jan '45 due to a shortage of replacement personnel or cadre to man it, but it had been reconsituted again by late January/early February 45. One of the biggest problems commanders had to face time and time again was the necessity of having to commit these battalions to combat when they clearly were not ready, but the manpower situation in many units was so dire by the latter part of the war that commanders felt they had no choice. With so many Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe personnel being transferred into divisions by late Nov/Dec 1944, you HAD to have some means to ease their transition from being an "Etappenhengst" (rear area warrior) to a front line infantryman, and FEBs did a lot to make that transition a reality, though with widely varying degrees of success.
Hope this helps -
Cheers,
Doug

[John W. Howard]

Hello Doug:
Your information is a great help. After more research, I am finding VGD's with FEB's listed. In the case of the 36ID, its FEB was destroyed in the Bobruisk Kessel in July of 1944. I have nothing to indicate it was reconstituted, but probably was, given its importance. I think this is once again a case where primary sources will be necessary to answer my question.
I was struck by the logic in the German system, detailed above in Kamen's post, as compared to the US system. Toward the end of the war some US divisions attempted something similar. I think the FEB probably went a long way in making the Germans the cohesive force they were. Thanks again Doug. Best wishes.

[Hans Weber]

Hello

Interesting topic.
In this context, would it be save to say that various Schattendivisionen built since 1944 were regularly also missing a FEB besides the Div Nachschubtruppen (that's what I assume to be the major part of the socalled rückwärtigen Dienste)?

Cheers
Hans

[John W. Howard]

Hi Hans:
I've been wondering where you were!! Best wishes.

[Leo Niehorster]

Feldersaztbataillon (FEB) are difficult units to follow. Where the FEB were authorized, they were only filled up when enough troops/replacements were available. After the division had spent some time in the field, and was taking casualties, the FEB tended to disappear. Even the FEB cadre tended to be used to replace casualties. In some cases, Army and Army Group training units took the place of the FEB.

Upon mobilization in August 1939, FEB were only present in the 1. Welle (the so-called peace time) infantry divisions. The 2. - 4. Welle (mobilization) infantry divisions, and the 14. Landwehr Division did not have them.

By the way, the infantry division FEB were part of the Field Army, not the Replacement Army, as in any event can be seen by the battalion headquarters (KStN 125) and the companies (KStN 134) which had regular Infantry Inspectorate KStN, (numbered between 100 and 299.) So the existence or non-existence with the divisions would not be a matter of concern of or by the Replacement Army.

(One index finger raised. [German joke!]) It's always dangereous to take just one order raising diviisons as indicating the only real authorized organization. Many, if not to say all, organizations were changed somewhere along the by AHM, modification orders by the OKH/Org.Abt., etc., even including those orders raising the various Welle. Particularly in the 1944, the raising orders for divisions were continually being manipulated. The only way to be certain is to have all the orders, and even then, the real (in the field) organization could be different - for lack of personnel, equipment, training, etc. With the FEB, which was a temporary unit dependent on replacements being available, this applied in spades.

The only way to be certain is to find the 10-day report, and even not all of those indicate whether they had a FEB.

Cheers
Leo

[Hans Weber]

Hello John

Busy in the real world, I might say

I tried answering my own question and after checking up with Tessin, I think it is indeed safe to say that there were no FEBs in Schattendivisionen. Normally they were just two Regiments, one Art. Abt.,one Pio Abt and maybe a Pzj Kp. Beeing basically formed to refresh existing formations and thus not intended to be long standing formations, this shouldn't surprise us.

This applies to all the Schattendivisionen form 24. Welle (early 1944), 26. Welle (May 44) Welle, 28. Welle (July 44) and 34. Welle (45).

29. Welle is interesting, as the unit formed in July 44 as Sperrdivisions, later named Grenadierdivisions and even later becoming Volks-Grenadier Divisions indeed would not have FEB at first. Some of them later adopted a FEB on the Kommandoweg (i.e. formed from within), a few only managed to rebuild a Divisions-Kampfschule. A lot of them only had an official FEB forming in Jan 45. This confirms what has been said: Whenever possible, Divisions tried to form this rather important asset. It is thus not surprisingly that even the Infantrie Division type 45 had a FEB authorized.


Cheers
Hans

[John W. Howard]

Hello Hans and Dr. Niehorster:
Thank you much for helping me to understand this issue. It seems the more I learn, the more questions arise. Best wishes to all who have helped.

[V. Andries]

Hi all,

As already noted above, the divisions of the 29. to 32. Welle were originally not meant to have a FEB, but it was planned to be added later on. Only a divisional Kampfschule (combat school) was left, but this was not even planned for the divisions of the 29. Welle when first raised. Attempts to leave out as many 'unnecessary' personnel as possible, but also the very short period in which the 29. and 32. Welle were to be raised and committed to combat, together with the fact that the majority of their riflemen were green anyhow, were the reasons for this decision. The Kampfschule was left solely for the formation of specialists (snipers, engineers, tank-hunters,...) or the refining of their skills, and for the training of NCO's.

Yet, the fact that there was no longer a FEB was somewhat compensated by the allowance of the forming of regimental Reserve-Kompanien. These can be considered as a lower-level form of FEB: the least-experienced riflemen of the regiment were to be baby-sitted there by veteran officers and NCO's for further training or low-risk duties, while at the same time they were kept close to the front, in case reinforcements were needed quickly. The recruits could either be fed forward into the regular Grenadier-Kompanien when appropriate, or in a real emergency be committed together, in which case the company was considered as an 'Alarm-Kompanie'.
Also this way the Grenadier-Kompanien were kept smaller (well below KStN-establishment), in order to avoid 'misfortunes' on the battlefield in which large numbers of badly trained personnel got lost in one blow, due to the increasing lack of experienced junior leadership: from medio '44 it became prescribed OKH-policy to have Grenadier-Kompanien totalling not more than 60 to 80 men (counting only Kampfstärke, and excluding any heavy weapons crews remaining with the Kompanie), as experience had shown that it was wiser to fight with smaller, yet more efficient companies, and have ready reserves closeby, than to enter combat with full-strength, but nearly unmanageable companies, which ended up burning out very quickly and for which there were no replacements.

Now suppose each Grenadier-Regiment of a (Volks-)Gren-Division formed a so-called Reserve-Kompanie, then that division would have disposed over three such companies, or together nearly the same size of a complete divisional FEB...
So the choice for a Volks-Gren.-division to create a FEB auf dem Kommandowege (on its own authority) would have depended on the quantity of available raw manpower, the average training level of the recruits, the necessity to have reserves close to the front, and not the least the available personnel and logistical means to create the battalion-level cadre for a FEB. Finally, the tradition of the parent-division (if there was one) no doubt played its part too.

These divisions of the 29. Welle created a FEB auf dem Kommandowege: 45., 78., 544., 547., 551., 558., 559., and 562. OKH officialised their FEBs later on. For the 32. Welle these were: 18., 26., 183., 212., 246., 272., 352. and 708., in their turn officialised (etatisiert) later on by OKH.
Next to those divisions, the 62., 326. and 271. VGD were exceptionally ordered by OKH to raise a FEB at the time of their establishment.
62. VGD even had the means to create the cadre for a second FEB, which was filled with stragglers and new recruits from Marsch-Kompanien during the Ardennes Offensive, while its first FEB was being committed in combat as a single fighting unit.

Hope this was of some interest,

cheers,

Andries

[Doug Nash]

Andries,
That was an excellent summation - nothing more to add except that at least in the case of the 272nd VGD, it had established (or rather, it had kept) its FEB and created the Sturm-Kompanien at regimental level that you mentioned and created Alarm-Kompanien too. So, in one case, Gren.Rgt. 980 of the 272nd not only had its 1st and 2nd Battalions, but had Sturmkompanie 980 and Alarmkompanie 980 --- Sturmkompanie 980 was the elite infantry assault company of the regiment, led by the best officers and NCOs, while Alarmkompanie 980 was composed of trains and HQ personnel. In combat, Sturmkompanie 980 created quite a reputation but not Alarmkompanie 980, which was just cannon fodder but useful if you needed to throw warm bodies in a gap until you could get better troops there. Life in such units, to paraphrase one previous source, was "exciting but short."
Cheers and thanks for a great posting.
Doug

[V. Andries]

Doug, my pleasure.

Thanks for the information about 272. VGD. That kind of details on the Volks-Grenadier-Divisions, especially about those committed in the Ardennes Offensive, is very interesting to me.

Andries

[Doug Nash]

Andries,
my pleasure. Say, the 272nd VGD was supposed to play a role in the Ardennes Offensive, but got diverted by the American attack on Kesternich on 13 Dec, which occupied its full attention until 18 Dec. So it never crossed the start line and in fact got hit while it was repositioning its three regiments for its planned offensive role in the Ardennes. I don't want to go into any more detail than that - I'm going to cover this aspect of the plan for the Ardennes in my upcoming book "Victory was Beyond Their Grasp" and don't want to give the game away just yet!
Best regards,
Doug